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ABSTRACT
This study quantifies the change in one measure of plant risk, the frequency of loss of
long-term decay heat removal, due to changes in maintenance at the James A. Fitzpatrick
(JAF) plant. Quantification is accomplished in two steps. First, the effects of
maintenance are quantified in terms of changes in: a) the frequency of common cause
failure of residual heat removal (RHR) pumps and b) the frequency with which operators
fail to correctly restore the RHR system following maintenance. These parameters are
selected as the result of an importance analysis for the plant. Second, the changes in these
two parameters are propagated through a simple plant model to obtain the associated
change in plant risk.
Based on this study's assessment of the current maintenance program at JAF, it
appears that the potential for significant risk reduction due to improved maintenance is not
extremely large; an optimal program might lead to an 80% reduction. The optimal
program would place a stronger emphasis on predictive maintenance, and would employ
improved procedures for RHR pump maintenance. There is potential for significant risk
increase (around a factor of 70) if the maintenance program is significantly degraded (e.g.,
if post-maintenance is deemphasized).
This study shows how, at a simple level, maintenance program changes can be
quantified without explicit modeling of the details of a plant's management and
organizational structure. However, such modeling may be required: a) to more strongly
justify the quantitative factors used in the analysis and b) to quantify the effect of other
program changes not yet treated (e.g., the strengthening of program elements ensuring
feedback of information to organization). In addition, failure data specific to the JAF
plant are also needed to increase the confidence in the quantitative results of this study.
i
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors would like to thank N. Rasmussen and R. Su for their useful comments
and discussion, and A. Hudson for her assistance with the preparation of this report.
Special thanks are given to H. Specter of the New York Power Authority for his interest
and patience. This report, based upon the S.M. theses of the first two authors, was
prepared with the support of the New York Power Authority under contract S-90-00196,
"Research for Operating and Maintenance Cost Reduction Using Probabilistic Risk
Assessment (PRA)." The opinions, findings, conclusions and recommendations expressed
herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the view of the New York
Power Authority.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ABSTRACT
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS iii
LIST OF TABLES vi
LIST OF FIGURES vii
1. INTRODUCTION 1
1.1 Background 1
1.2 Objective 2
1.3 Quantitative Analysis Approach 2
1.4 Summary of Results 4
1.5 Report Structure 4
2. MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS AND THE MAINTENANCE RULE 7
2.1 Elements of a Maintenance Program 7
2.2 Maintenance Program at the James A. Fitzpatrick
Nuclear Power Plantodel Scope 10
2.2.1 Work Request Process 10
2.2.2 Predictive and Preventive Maintenance 11
2.2.3 Training of Maintenance Technicians 12
2.2.4 Procedures 12
2.2.5 Quality Control 12
2.2.6 Comparison with Maintenance Block Diagram 13
2.3 The Maintenance Rule 14
2.4 PRA Applications to Improve Maintenance 15
2.4.1 Technical Specifications Improvement Using PRA 15
2.4.2 Reliability-Centered Maintenance 17
2.5 Summary and Contents 18
3. MAINTENANCE IN PRA MODELS 22
3.1 Maintenance Contributions to Component Unavailability 22
3.2 Maintenance Contributions to System Unavailability 24
3.3 Current Modeling of Parameters Affecting Unavailability 25
3.3.1 Modeling the Standby Failure Rate As 25
3.3.2 Modeling the Human Error Rate #he 27
3.3.2.1 THERP Methodolog 0] 27
3.3.2.2 ASEP Methodology 28
3.3.2.3 The MAPPS Model 29
3.4 Summary and Comments 30
4. SIMPLIFIED JAF PLANT MODEL AND SCOPING CALCULATIONS 35
4.1 Simplified Plant Model 35
4.1.1 Plant Risk Model 35
4.1.2 Comparison with Current Plant Model 36
iii
4.2 Ranking of Systems, Components, and Failure Modes 37
4.2.1 Importance Measures 37
4.2.1.1 Risk Reduction Worth 38
4.2.1.2 Risk Achievement Worth 38
4.2.1.3 Birnbaum Structural Importance 38
4.2.1.4 Criticality Importance 39
4.2.1.5 Fussell-Vesely Importance 39
4.2.2 Application to JAF Preliminary IPE 39
4.3 Scoping Calculations 40
4.3.1 Risk Reduction 41
4.3.2 Risk Increase 42
4.3.3 Areas for Improvement 43
4.4 Summary and Comments 43
4.5 Tables 44
5. MAINTENANCE PROGRAM IMPACT ON CCF RATES 62
5.1 General Procedure for Calculating CCF Rates 62
5.1.1 General Procedure for Calculating CCF Rates 62
5.1.2 Step 2 - Selection of Probability Model 62
5.1.3 Step 3 - CCF Event Data Classification and Screening 63
5.1.4 Step 4 - CCF Parameter Estimation 64
5.2 Development of Screened RHR Pump Failure Event Data Base 65
5.2.1 Data Sources 65
5.2.2 Selection of Events 65
5.2.3 RHR Pump Failure Mechanisms 66
5.2.3.1 Root Causes 66
5.2.3.2 Coupling Mechanisms 67
5.3 Modeling Maintenance Impact on CCF Rates 67
5.3.1 Initial Impact Vectors for Actual Events 68
5.3.2 Degree of Applicability to JAF 68
5.3.3 Mapping Up and Mapping Down 72
5.3.4 Estimation of CCF Parameters 73
6. MAINTENANCE PROGRAM IMPACT ON HUMAN ERROR RATES 95
6.1 Approach 95
6.2 Quantification of #re 96
6.2.1 Human Reliability Tree 96
6.2.2 Dependence Level Tree 97
6.2.3 Using MAPPS for Quantifying #re 98
6.3 Application to Restoration of RHR Pump Train Components 99
7. QUANTIFICATION OF MAINTENANCE IMPACT ON RISK 113
7.1 Maintenance Program Block Options 113
7.1.1 Block 1 - Maintenance Management 113
7.1.2 Block 2 - Corrective, Preventive, and Predictive 114
Maintenance
7.1.3 Block 3 - Post-Maintenance Testing 114
7.1.4 Block 8 - Personnel Qualification and Training 115
7.1.5 Block 9 - Procedures and Regulatory Constraints 115
iv
7.2 Effects of Maintenance Program Chances on Risk Model 115
Parameters
7.3 Effects of Maintenance Program Changes on Risk 116
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS 126
8.1 Summary of Results 126
8.2 Issues and Limitations 126
8.3 Applications 127
8.4 Future Work 128
9. REFERENCES 129
APPENDIX A
Table Title
A. 1 RSW System Component Ranking
A.2 ESW System Component Ranking
A.3 AC4 System Component Ranking
A.4 DC1 System Component Ranking
A.5 HPCI System Component Ranking
A.6 TBC System Component Ranking
A.7 Pumps Group Component Ranking
A.8 Valves Group Component Ranking
A.9 Control Circuits Group Component Ranking
A.10 Trains Group Component Ranking
A.11 Relay Group Component Ranking
A.12 Switchgears Group Component Ranking
A.13 Buses Group Component Ranking
v
LIST OF TABLES
No. Title Page
1.1 Summary of Results 6
4.1 JAF Initiating Event Frequencies 44
4.2 Dominant Sequences from JAF Preliminary Model 44
4.3 Samples of T2-4 Sequence Minimal Cutsets 45
4.4 Samples of T2-4 Sequence Minimal Cutsets 48
4.5 System Importance Rankings 52
4.6 Component Group Ranking 52
4.7 LPCI System Component Importance Ranking 53
4.8 Importance Matrix 54
4.9 Loss of Containment Heat Removal Initiator Frequencies 60
Before Recovery
5.1 17 Events Surviving Screening 74
5.2 Population Data for RHR Pump CCF Events (Fail to Start) 76
5.3 Failure Codes Used in Table 5.1 77
5.4 Proximate Cause of Event 38 (Lack of Lubrication) 78
5.5 Root Causes for RHR Pump CCF Events 79
5.6 Coupling Mechanisms for RHR Pump CCF Events 80
5.7 Initial Impact Vectors for RHR Pump CCF Events (Fail to Start) 81
5.8 Root Cause-Maintenance Defense Matrix 82
5.9 Modifier 'ml' to Account for the Impact of Maintenance Quality
on Electrical Equipment Failure Rate 83
5.10 Modifier 'm2' to Account for the Impact of Training on Quality
of Electrical/Mechanical Component Failure Rate 83
5.11 Modifer 'm3' to Account for the Impact of Training Levels on
Electrical/Mechanical Component Failure Rate 84
5.12 Modifier 'm4' for the Impact of Procedure Quality 84
5.13 Coupling Mechanisms - Maintenance Defense Matrix 85
5.14 Modifier 'im5' for the Impact of Maintenance Scheduling 86
5.15 Modifier 'm6' for the Impact of Staff Diversity Effect 86
5.16 Modifier 'm7' for the Impact of Staff Area Allocation 86
5.17 Modifier 'm8' for the Impact of Procedure Quality on 87
Coupling Mechanisms
5.18 Mapping Up Procedure 88
5.19 Mapping Down Procedure 89
5.20 Baseline Case Event Impact Vectors after Applicability Assessment 90
and System Size Mappings
6.1 Estimated HEPs Related to Failure of Administrative Control 102
6.2 Estimated Probabilities of Errors of Omission per Item of 103
Instruction When Use of Written Procedures is Specified
6.3 Estimated Probabilities that a Checker Will Fail to Detect 104
Errors Made by Others
6.4 Factors Affecting Human Error Rates 105
6.5 RHR Pump Failures Involving Human Error 106
6.6 RHR Pump Part Clearances 108
vi
7.1 Common Cause Failure Cases 118
7.2 Failure to Restore Model Cases 120
7.3 Definition of Combined Cases 123
7.4 Combined Cases Risk Results 125
LIST OF FIGURES
No. Title Page
2.1 Comprehensive Maintenance Program Block Diagram 21
3.1 Time-Dependent Component Unavailability 31
3.2 Time-Dependent System Unavailability (2 Pumps, Staggered Testing) 31
3.3 Simple THERP Tree 32
3.4 ASEP Dependency Analysis 33
3.5 MAPPS Analysis Methodology 34
4.1 Scoping Calculation (Change in Risk with Change in Human Error 61
and CCF Rates) 70
5.1 RHR Pump "FS" Mode Failure Mechanisms 92
5.2 Approach for Quantifying CCF Parameters 93
5.3 Approach for Quantifying CCF Event "Applicability" 94
6.1 Block Diagram for Quantifying Effect of Maintenance on Human 109
Error Rates and Plant Risk
6.2 Human Reliability Tree 110
6.3 Dependence Tree 111
6.4 Simplified P&IC for RHR System 112
vii
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
It is well understood that improvements in nuclear power plant service and
maintenance1 will lead to increased plant safety. However, the quantitative degree of
improvement in safety due to changes in maintenance activities, needed to determine
whether these changes actually represent improvements, are not as well understood. For
example, although it may be known that reducing the frequency of surveillance testing may
actually reduce the wear on a given component, the associated quantitative impacts at the
component, system, and plant levels of safety are not often known.
Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) is a tool that can be used to quantify the safety
impact of changes in plant maintenance. By determining the risk associated with specific
changes, decision making regarding maintenance can be improved. For example, PRA can
be used to help provide answers to four key questions:
a How should components be prioritized for servicing?
0 Should a given component be serviced now?
0 How often should a component be regularly serviced?
0 To what extent should a component be serviced?
Regarding the first question, PRA can be used directly to prioritize components from
the standpoint of risk. A variety of risk importance measures are available (and widely
implemented) to quantify the degree to which a particular component contributes to the
overall plant risk. This prioritization can also be useful if additional diagnostic
instrumentation is to be installed in the plant.
PRA cannot provide a complete answer to the second question; that depends largely
on the current physical condition of the component. However, PRA can be used to
determine the likelihood of an accident, given the failure of the equipment. In other words,
it can be used to determine if the component should be serviced immediately, or if, for
example, servicing can be delayed until the next plant outage. Note that faulty decisions
in this area, unsupported by PRA, have been important contributing factors to the TMI-2
accident and a number of other prominent incidents experienced by the nuclear power
industry.
PRA can be used, in principle, to directly answer the third and fourth questions. An
analysis can be done to determine optimal servicing intervals, and to determine the extent
of servicing (e.g., to determine if the component should be repaired or replaced). Increased
servicing frequency would likely lead to the decrease of certain sources of accidefits, but
could increase others (e.g., human errors leading to initiating events or safety system
unavailability). PRA models can be used to determine the optimized tradeoff between
these influences (subject to the current state of knowledge regarding the underlying
processes). Ref. 1 describes a prototypical study aimed at optimizing Surveillance Testing
Intervals for a standby safety system (a BWR high pressure coolant injection system) that
includes the possibility of component aging, wearout due to testing, and various levels of
repair/replacement effectiveness. Determination of the degree of servicing requires
treatment of component aging (e.g., see [2-4]).
1"Service and maintenance" (henceforth called "maintenance" for brevity) covers the wide
variety of activities, including support activities (e.g., scheduling), performed to ensure
that plant equipment is kept at a proper level of functionality.
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The qualifier "in principle" is used in the above descriptions of the potential benefits
of PRA because conventional PRA applications methods are not always sufficiently
advanced or detailed to quantify these benefits. This report, therefore, addresses a number
of PRA methodology issues, as well as the specific application of PRA to plant
maintenance.
1.2 Objective
The objective of this project is to evaluate the risk impact of potential changes in the
maintenance program for the James A. Fitzpatrick plant (JAF), a Mark I BWR chosen as
the case study. Achievment of this objective requires
e identification of important system failures, component failures, and component
failure modes [5], and
* quantification of the impact of potential regulatory changes on the frequencies of
these events.
Achievement of the first sub-objective allows the concentration of analysis resources on
risk-significant issues 2. Moreover, it also allows immediate identification of
systems/components/failure modes for which changes in the associated maintenance
activities will have little effect on risk. Achievement of the second sub-objective is
required to determine the quantitative impact of maintenance activity changes, in order
that risk-benefit comparisons can be made.
Current probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) technology is capable of satisfying the
first sub-objective. Indeed, the identification of important contributors to risk is a central
feature of most, if not all, current risk assessment studies. This project employs
conventional importance analysis methods to identify important systems, components, and
failure modes for JAF. Different presentations of the results of the importance analysis
(including that suggested in Ref. 5) are investigated for their usefulness to decision makers.
On the other hand, current PRAs typically address some, but not all, issues
associated with the second sub-objective. For example, methods to treat the effect of
altered maintenance frequencies and durations on maintenance-induced unavailability have
been previously explored (e.g., see [1]). However, changes in component failure rates due
to altered maintenance programs are not quantified. The quantification portion of this
project concentrates on assessing the change in the frequencies of potentially dominant risk
contributors due to changes in maintenance activities; in particular, it addresses the
impacts of maintenance on common cause failure rates and human error rates.
1.3 Quantitative Analysis Approach
The general approach adopted to quantify the risk impact associated with specific
maintenance program changes is straightforward. Assuming that a PRA model has been
constructed for the plant of interest, the plant risk is a function of the basic event
likelihoods provided as input to the PRA model. Furthermore, in many PRAs, most of the
basic events do not actually contribute significantly to the overall risk; only a few basic
2The possibility that the effects of maintenance program will be so dramatic that previously
unimportant systems/components/failure modes become dominant is believed to be
unlikely and is not dealt with in this report. The methods provided in the report, however,
can be used to determine on a case-by-case basis if this assumption should be relaxed.
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events "dominate" the risk. Thus, the analysis only needs to quantify the impact of
maintenance program changes on the likelihoods of these few, dominant basic events, and
to propagate these changes through the PRA model.
The four tasks implementing this approach are as follows:
* Develop simplified system and plant models
As indicated above, only a relatively small number of basic events contribute
significantly to the overall risk. This task involves the creation of a simplified,
approximate model for the JAF plant's risk which enables rapid recalculation of
plant risk after key basic event likelihoods are modified. The model is based on the
dominant sequences reported in Ref. 63. The task also involves the creation of a
simplified model for the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system, since the impact of
maintenance program changes on the unavailability of that system are of interest.
* Identify important components/failure modes
Using the simplified plant and system models, the important components are
identified. This study employs the well-known Fussell-Vesely measure of basic event
importance [8]. (The use of other importance measures, e.g., the "risk reduction
measure," does not lead to significant differences in ranking, as discussed in
Section 4.) The results of this task indicate that two basic events, the common cause
failure of four RHR pumps to start on demand, and the failure of operators to restore
the RHR system to its original configuration after testing/maintenance, are
significant contributors to risk.
* Quantify impact of maintenance program changes on PRA parameters
The results of the second task indicate that two failure modes, "common cause
failure" and "failure to restore," are significant for the JAF plant. This task develops
and applies simple models needed to calculate the changes in the likelihoods of these
two failure modes due to postulated changes in the JAF maintenance program.
Changes in common cause failure likelihood are computed using common cause
failure data for RHR pumps in combination with the a-factor model [9]; changes in
the probability that operators fail to restore the RHR system following maintenance
are computed using the Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) [10].
* Propagate PRA parameter changes through models
This is done in a straightforward manner using the simplified plant and RHR system
models developed in the first task.
3Ref. 6 provides risk results generated for an early risk model for JAF. Ref. 7 presents the
more recently developed JAF Individual Plant Examination plant model. Due to timing
considerations, this report employs the model and results of Ref. 6 as a case study;
however, the general approach and some of the methods developed in this report are
expected to be useful in any updated analyses of the risk impact of maintenance program
changes at JAF.
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1.4 Summary of Results
This report develops two simple approaches for quantifying the effect of maintenance
program changes on common cause failure rates and on human error rates, respectively.
These methods are applied to the James A. Fitzpatrick (JAF) plant, using a preliminary
version of the JAF Individual Plant Examination to translate the changes in common cause
failure and human error rates into changes in risk.
Table 1.1 summarizes the quantitative results of the analysis. A comparison of
"best" and "worst" case maintenance program changes with a baseline calculation for plant
risk shows that the maximum improvement that can be achieved (considering only
common cause failure and human error) is roughly a 50% reduction in risk from the
baseline JAF value. On the other hand, if the maintenance practices at JAF are
significantly degraded, the risk can increase by up to a factor of 60.
The effect of maintenance program changes on RHR system unavailability are much
smaller. This is due to the fact that, in this study, the dominant sequences are associated
with loss of offsite power (LOSP) initiators; the basic events contributing the most to total
RHR system unavailability are different from those contributing to RHR system
unavailability when offsite power is lost.
This study shows that the impact on risk of maintenance program changes can be
quantified. Although the degree of impact is not necessarily dramatic, especially when
considering realistic program changes, knoweledge of the quantitative impact is
nevertheless useful when optimizing a maintenance program from the standpoint of
economics and safety.
1.5 Report Structure
In order to quantify the impact of potential changes in a maintenance program, the
characteristics of a maintenance program must first be described. Section 2 presents the
elements of a general maintenance program, and discusses how elements of this program
are implemented in the French, German, and Japanese nuclear programs, and by the
particular plant being used as a case study (the James A. Fitzpatrick plant. Section 2 also
provides an overview of the "maintenance rule" recently issued by the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission [11].
Section 3 discusses conventional methods currently used in PRA studies to assess the
risk contribution associated with service and maintenance activities. It also briefly models
for component failures that can be adapted to quantify partial impacts of maintenance
program changes on risk, and models for human error that can be used in a similar
capacity.
Section 4 provides an overview of the simplified plant and system models (based on
the preliminary JAF risk study [6]) used to determine the impact on risk due to changes in
basic event probabilities. This is used to quantify the risk impact of maintenance changes
(which are directly manifested by changes in the basic event probabilities). Section 4 also
presents a number of scoping analyses which provide order-of-magnitude estimates for the
impact of maintenance.
Section 5 describes the methods used to treat the impact of maintenance program
changes on common cause failure rates. The section covers the available data, the a-factor
parametric model used for quantification [9], and the changes in the model
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parameters (the a-factors) due to specific changes in maintenance. Calculations are
performed to indicate the effect of maintenance program changes on common cause failure
rates and, hence, on RHR system unavailability and plant risk.
Section 6 describes the methods used to treat the impact of maintenance program
changes on human error rates (the failure to restore mode). The adaptations of the
THERP model used in the analysis are described. Calculations are performed to indicate
the effect of maintenance program changes on human error rates and on RHR system
unavailability and plant risk.
Section 7 presents the quantitative impacts on plant risk and RHR system
unavailability due to a number of maintenance program changes. The effects of these
changes on common cause failure rates and on human error rates, and the resulting joint
effect on unavailability and risk are computed. It is shown that a number of postulated
program improvements can lead to a 30% reduction in risk, and that one undesirable set of
changes can lead to a fator of 90 increase in risk.
Section 8 summarizes the results of the study, discusses some of the study
limitations, indicates how the results can be used in applications, and discusses where
additional work is required.
5
Table 1.1 - Summary of Results
System Ratio to Plant Ratio to
Case Unavailability Baseline Risk Baseline
Qrhr Qrhr F(TW)b F(TW)
IPE Result 5.5*10 -3 0.98 1.7*10-4 0.85
Baseline 5.6*10 -3 1.0 2.0*10-4 1.0
Best Case 5.4*10 -3 0.96 1*10-4 0.50
Worst Case 1 180 1.2*10-2 60
Case 1 5.6*10 -3 1.0 1.9*10-4 0.95
Case 2 5.5*10 -3 0.98 1.4*10-4 0.70
Case 3 5.5*10-3 0.98 1.5*10-4 0.75
Case 4 5.5*10 -3 0.98 1.3*10-4 0.65
Case 5 5.7*10-3 0.98 1.0*10-3 5.0
aSee Table 7.3 for a definition of
bFrequency of sequence class TW:
the different
loss of long
cases.
term decay heat removal.
2. MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS AND THE MAINTENANCE RULE
In order to quantify the impact of changes in a maintenance program, it is first
necessary to characterize the elements of a maintenance program. This section presents a
general representation of a comprehensive nuclear power plant maintenance program. This
representation is based largely on the requirements of the recently issued "Maintenance
Rule;" this rule, in turn, relies to a significant extent on Ref. 12's review of maintenance
practices of the French, German, and Japanese nuclear industries, as well as of the
maintenance programs in the U.S. Navy and the U.S. commercial airline industry. This
section also discusses the current maintenance program for the James A. Fitzpatrick (JAF)
plant and provides an overview of the Maintenance Rule. Finally, two applications of PRA
(or PRA-related methods) that are currently being used in the improvement of
maintenance programs and that can be useful in the implementation of the maintenance
rule are reviewed. The first deals with the optimization of plant technical specifications;
the second, Reliability-Centered Maintenance (RCM), provides an improved method for
prioritizing plant components for maintenance.
2.1. Elements of a Maintenance Program
An effective maintenance program includes more than just the actual performance of
maintenance. Supporting functions are also needed to effectively perform maintenance
tasks. Figure 2.1 identifies the elements necessary for effective maintenance of plant
equipment, and links between these elements. This figure is based in part upon the
previously mentioned review of maintenance practices in international nuclear power
programs and in other industries [12].
0 Block 1 - Maintenance Management
Proper management is necessary to implement an effective maintenance program.
Block 1 represents the maintenance management function. This includes planning,
scheduling, staffing, shift coverage and resource allocation. The planning and
scheduling activity includes the development of priorities and the resolution of
conflicting work paths. It also includes the coordination of support groups such as
engineering and operations. In planning maintenance activities, consideration should
be given to radiological exposure (Block 7); proper planning results in lower radiation
exposure to workers. Attention must be paid to the availability of parts and tools
(including the issue of storage), as this affects planning and scheduling. Staffing and
shift coverage should be sufficient to allow for training and qualification of personnel.
Also included in Block 1 is the establishment (by corporate management) of overall
maintenance policies, goals, and objectives. This is necessary for efficient planning
and scheduling, resource allocation, etc. Ref. 12 points out that in the Japanese
nuclear industry, these policies, goals, and objectives are developed based on ten-year
maintenance plans; these plans, in turn, are developed from required annual
maintenance inspections. In the French nuclear industry, maintenance is given a
priority comparable to operations, allowing maintenance departments to secure
necessary resources.
0 Block 2 - Corrective, Predictive, and Preventive Maintenance and Surveillance
This block indicates different strategies for maintaining equipment. Corrective
maintenance is performed when component performance is deemed unacceptable or
when the component fails. When corrective maintenance is performed, it is
important to identify the cause of the failure, document this cause, and feed this
information back to the preventive and predictive maintenance programs.
Preventive maintenance involves the performance of maintenance activities on a
regular schedule, independent of the status of the equipment. Predictive
maintenance employs trends obtained from surveillance testing, as well as
measurements of current equipment/process parameters and properties to determine
when maintenance activities should be performed (i.e., when to schedule preventive
maintenance). Surveillance testing is performed to obtain inservice performance
data. This data is used to monitor and determine trends in component performance.
Predictive and preventive maintenance are alternate maintenance strategies that can
be used to reduce the amount of corrective maintenance performed at a plant.
Japanese nuclear power plants employ a strong preventive maintenance program.
Plant shut down for periodic maintenance inspection is required after 13 months.
These inspections involve the disassembly and measurement of wear of individual
components. The French nuclear industry, on the other hand, emphasizes predictive
maintenance. Using the expected failure times for components and assessments of
the importance of the components (obtained through a general risk model), priorities
for preventive maintenance are established. The German nuclear industry employ a
roughly 50/50 mixture of corrective and preventive maintenance activities. Periodic
inspections of systems and components are performed; a procedure for conducting
these inspections has been cooperatively developed by experts from the regulators,
vendors, and utilities.
* Block 3 - Post-Maintenance Testing and Return to Service
Post-maintenance testing is important when verifying that standby safety equipment
have been properly restored to service. It can also indicate the degree to which
maintenance goals are being met.
Practices regarding post-maintenance testing vary across the different bodies
surveyed. In the Japanese plants following a long outage, before a plant can be
returned to service, a regulatory representative must witness tests for overall
performance. In the French plants, post-maintenance testing is carried out by the
plant operators.
* Block 4 - Measure Overall Effectiveness
In order to ensure that maintenance goals are being met, there should be some
measure of maintenance effectiveness. A number of measures can be used to monitor
maintenance effectiveness. One measure is the number of component failures
experienced over time. Some other indications include ratio of corrective to
preventive maintenance, work order backlog, time to restore components after
discovery of failure, and the frequency of rework on components.
Block 4 provides an important part of a feedback mechanism which tells a plant if
the current maintenance program is satisfactory. Information from this block should
be processed by the trending function (Block 5) and communicated to a variety of
groups in the plant (Block 6).
Ref. 12 states that the Japanese utilities measure their overall maintenance
effectiveness using several factors: the rate of unplanned outages, plant availability,
the rate of occurrence of incidents and failures regarding safety systems, exposure of
personnel, and the amount of radioactive waste material generated. These are largely
the same performance indicators as employed by INPO for U.S. plants.
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e Block 5 - Equipment History and Trending
Maintenance goals, policies and objectives should be based in part on equipment
history. This block indicates how equipment history and trending analyses based on
this history can be used to provide feedback to the plant useful for improving
maintenance management.
Ref. 12 points out that the Nuclear Power Engineering Test Center in Japan
performs root cause analyses for failures down to the train level. The French have
two support groups which aid in equipment history and trending data. One group
analyzes significant events and failures and maintains records on equipment life. The
other group, the Groupe des Laboratories, researches equipment conditions and
failure mechanisms. To avoid failures from being repeated, the French constantly
update their maintenance procedures and training based on operating history.
* Block 6 - Communication
Block 6 provides a channel for communication between all relevant parts of the
organization so that deficiencies can be corrected in a timely manner.
Communication with both the corporate management and other support groups also
provides for organizational learning.
Regular meetings are held in Japanese utilities to review safety measures and
maintenance schedules. In the French plants, the maintenance manager reports
directly to the plant manager. Since plant operations are responsible for overseeing
maintenance work packages, there is a direct line of communication between these
two departments.
* Block 7 - ALARA
Improved planning and scheduling can help reduce the time spent in high radiation
areas. In France, Germany, and Japan, efforts are also being made to develop robots
designed to perform maintenance in these areas.
* Block 8 - Training
Training directly impacts the performance of maintenance personnel, and thereby
provides a condition on the planning process. Training should include both classroom
and on the job training.
Training practices vary somewhat across the different groups. Japan has developed
national maintenance training centers where workers receive hands-on training. The
French and German utilities provide extensive in-house training of personnel. In all
three countries, Ref. 12 notes that the level of experience in the maintenance area
appears to be higher than in the U.S. plants, due to the former's policies of lifetime
employment or promotions from within. Ref. 12 also points out that most of the
management personnel in the French industry have maintenance backgrounds.
* Block 9 - Procedures
Like training, available procedures can affect the performance of maintenance
personnel. Procedures should be technically correct and up-to-date and should be
presented utilizing sound human factors principles.
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In Japan, specific procedures are written for each plant. In the French plants, less
emphasis is placed on writing detailed procedures; there is significant reliance on the
experience and qualifications of the maintenance personnel.
* Block 10 - Quality Assurance/Quality Control
Quality control/assurance (QA/QC) activities affect the reliability of spare
parts/components used in maintenance and provide a second check on maintenance
performance. In Japan, QA/QC is the primary responsibility of the manufacturer.
Utilities work with the manufacturers on the design of components and the quality of
the associated manufacturing processes. In the French plants, QA/QC is responsible
for verification of maintenance work and review of maintenance work packages. The
QA function in German groups includes keeping a list of recurrent maintenance; this
list specifies the work done for a particular component and the time interval between
work actions. (Note the overlap with Block 5.)
2.2 Maintenance Program at the James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant
This section describes the current maintenance program at the JAF plant and
discusses this program at the JAF plant with respect to the comprehensive program
described in Section 2.1. The program description is based on interviews with the head of
the JAF maintenance department and with personnel from the JAF QA/QC department,
maintenance training group, preventive maintenance tracking force, and performance
group.
2.2.1 Work Request Process
The following discussion describes activities performed before and after maintenance
is actually performed on a component. The activities include the planning and scheduling
of maintenance activities, the coordination of support groups, post-maintenance testing,
and record keeping.
The first step in the maintenance process is to generate a work request. All plant
personnel can generate a work request, but most work requests are initiated by operators
that identify problems in their daily rounds.
The work request is forwarded to the shift supervisor for review. The shift supervisor
decides if the problem is reportable, if authorization is required, and if the work request
will put the plant in a limiting condition of operation (LCO).
Next the work request is then given to quality control (QC) personnel in the work
control center. The work control center is an area adjacent to the main control room. It is
staffed by personnel from the operations, radiation protection services, and QC
departments. The QC personnel ensure that the QA (quality assurance) category assigned
by the initiator is correct and decide if a person from the QC department is needed while
the work is performed.
The work request is next forwarded to the maintenance department. A clerk enters
the work request into a computer system and then assigns it to a planner. Each planner is
responsible for certain systems. If the job requires parts, it is designated "hold for parts"
(HFP). When it is ready to be worked it is designated "ready to work" (RTW). The job
is then scheduled with operations and radiation protection by the maintenance general
supervisor.
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A work package, including the work request, is then given to the maintenance
supervisor. The package also contains work permit requests and work tracking forms. The
work permit request is used to get permission to do the job. This is generally filled out by
the maintenance supervisor. It provides instructional guidance for the task and pertinent
historical data (from previous JAF experiences). The work tracking form gives permission
to do the work. This form is filled out by a Senior Reactor Operator. It is also used by the
worker to document the work performed. Sometimes, photographs of the component to be
worked will be taken and included in the work package to ensure that the component can
be easily identified.
Communication between the maintenance and support groups can occur in two ways.
The first is provided by the activities in the work control center, as described above. The
second is through daily morning meetings between management and group supervisors.
During these meetings the maintenance tasks to be carried out that day are discussed and
support groups are able to provide input or concerns to the maintenance group.
Upon completion of the task, the work package is returned to the supervisor for
review and then to the work control center. Operations will assess whether there is to be
post-work testing. If testing is required, this is performed by operations.
When postwork testing is completed, the planners record the work history into the
computer system, QC checks package for completeness, operations checks the package, and
then the package is microfiched. If the work is found to be unsatisfactory during the
post-work testing, another worktracking form is initiated for rework.
2.2.2 Predictive and Preventive Maintenance
The above discussion describes the process carried out for corrective maintenance.
The maintenance program at JAF also includes preventive and predictive maintenance.
Most of the current preventive maintenance (PM) at JAF is based on manufacturers'
recommendations. Recently, a Preventive Maintenance Tracking Force (PMTF) has been
formed to review the current preventive maintenance program. The PMTF group
evaluates the preventive maintenance being done on components in terms of frequency and
task being performed. The group findings are intended for use in scheduling preventive
maintenance to be performed on components.
The concept behind much of the work being performed by the PMTF is similar to
that underlying Reliability-Centered Maintenance (discussed in the next section). In the
case of the PMTF, however, the analysis is done on a component basis, e.g., all check
valves, as opposed to a system basis. The intent of the PMTF is to allocate limited
maintenance resources more efficiently.
Regarding predictive maintenance, a separate performance group (not in the
maintenance department) provides technical services for a variety of plant components.
The group provides the maintenance department with enough information to implement
predictive maintenance. The group performs the following tasks:
1. Monitoring of vibration of safety related pumps and valves.
2. Lube oil analysis.
3. Inservice testing - flows, differential pressures, and temperatures.
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These tasks are performed by daily critical equipment online monitoring, and monthly
walk-around checking of safety related equipment.
If a problem is identified that is critical to plant operations, an emergency work
request form is issued by the performance group. If a problem is identified that is not
critical, it is deferred to the next refueling outage.
2.2.3 Training of Maintenance Technicians
The JAF practices for staffing of maintenance technicians follows that of French and
German utilities in that technicians are hired from within the company. New technicians
are selected from the security guard force. A test is given and the people with the highest
scores are selected to participate in the apprentice training program.
All training is done in-house. Training begins with subjects such as algebra,
chemistry, and heat transfer. The training department is equipped with mock-up
components so the apprentice technicians get hands-on training. At times, large
components, e.g., service water pumps, may be brought in to train the technicians on.
Technicians are sent to other training facilities to learn some specific skills such as welding.
The training program for an apprentice also includes on the job training. As the apprentice
learns and can perform certain tasks, the task is checked off a list of required skills.
After apprentice training is completed, the technician becomes a journeyman.
Journeymen also receive ongoing training. If the maintenance supervisor discovers a
deficiency in the performance of some task, he recommends that the training department
prepare a lesson on this task. Training department personnel also keep track of incidents
at other plants. The training department decides if the incident is relevant to the JAF
plant. If it is relevant, a training session is given on this event.
2.2.4 Procedures
The maintenance procedures at JAF are written by a special group trained to write
procedures (with an emphasis on human factors). The group is composed of experienced
maintenance personnel. As in the French plants, there is some reliance on the skill of
maintenance technicians in that there are not procedures for all tasks. In some cases, the
technical manual for the component is judged to be sufficient for job performance.
Procedures are reviewed biannually. The procedure review is prioritized by the
importance and frequency with which the procedures are used.
The results of the interviews indicate that most errors made by maintenance
technicians have been due to the misinterpretation of procedures. Technicians are being
trained to stop work if the procedure is unclear. Work should not be resumed until the
problem is resolved. This may require going to the original procedure writer for
clarification. To encourage this process, the steps for updating procedures or making
temporary changes have been made easier.
2.2.5 Quality Control
The quality control department is independent of all other plant departments and
,roups. They report to a Quality Control group at corporate headquarters. There are
three groups in the Quality Control (QC) department:
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1. Procurement - located in the warehouse; performs the purchasing of components and
ensures the quality of incoming components.
2. Auditing - assesses the quality of administrative aspects of departments such as
procedures and training.
3. Inspectors - work directly with the technicians; makes sure technicians are using
proper parts and procedures.
The QC inspector watches the task being performed but does not tell the worker how to
perform his job. This is to ensure that the worker will feel responsible for the quality of his
work. If there is a problem with the procedure, or quality of work, QC makes
recommendations to the department to make changes.
2.2.6 Comparison with Maintenance Block Diagram
A comparison of the JAF maintenance program with Figure 2.1 shows that the JAF
program appears to address most of the issues of interest identified in that diagram. Many
of these issues are dealt with by the work request process, as described earlier. For
example, this process addresses the maintenance management function (Block 1), the
recording of component history (Block 5), communication between management,
operations, and maintenance (Block 6), radiation protection concerns (Block 7), and
QA/QC concerns (Block 10). The work request process requires interactions between the
planners, who schedule equipment maintenance (and also are in charge of parts
acquisition), the operations group, and the radiation protection group. The work request
process also requires that when a work order is prepared, the history of the component of
interest must be provided; when the work is completed, the maintenance performed on the
component must be recorded in a computer system and on microfiche.
Regarding corrective, preventive, and predictive maintenance (Block 2), the work
request process discussion indicates how corrective maintenance is performed. Preventive
maintenance also involves the processing of a work request. Currently, the Preventive
Maintenance Tracking Force is in the process of determining if components are correctly
prioritized and if they are being maintained at the optimal frequency. As part of this
activity, preventive maintenance requirements are also being developed. Predictive
maintenance is performed by the performance group. This group performs inservice testing
of components.
Post-maintenance testing (Block 3) is performed by the operations department. The
decision to perform this testing is also made by the operations department.
Maintenance technicians are hired from within the company. All training is done
in-house (Block 8). The technicians have both classroom and on-the-job training. The
training department also monitors industry events to proactively determine if training
could prevent similar occurrences at JAF (this can be viewed as fulfilling part of the
function of Block 5).
Maintenance procedures (Block 9) are written by a specially trained group of
procedure writers. These writers are all experienced maintenance technicians. Procedures
are updated based on their importance and frequency of use. The process for making
changes in procedures has been recently updated to make it easier to change procedures.
This was done to encourage technicians to suggest changes, instead of requiring them to
interpret and apply poorly written or incorrect procedures.
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The one block in Figure 2.1 apparently not addressed (at least formally) by the JAF
maintenance program is Block 4. This involves the measurement (at a plant level) the
effectiveness of maintenance. It is not dear from the available information if there are
additional weaknesses in the depth of application of each block (e.g., in the amount of
staffing for the training group) or in the interactions between the various blocks (e.g., in
the communication of industry experience to other parts of the organization besides
training). A comprehensive evaluation of the organizational strengths and weaknesses of
the current JAF maintenance program requires more research into the detailed program
structure (e.g., see [13]); the tools developed in this work should be useful in the
quantification portion of the evaluation.
2.3 The Maintenance Rule
As stated earlier, Ref. 12 documents an NRC-conducted survey of maintenance
practices in foreign nuclear plants. This study confirms the belief of the commission that
good maintenance is correlated with high component reliability, low plant transient
frequency, and thus, low plant risk [11]. The NRC has also performed Maintenance Team
Inspections (MTIs) of U.S. nuclear power plants and concludes that although there is an
improving trend in maintenance programs, there are still weaknesses that need to be
addressed. Ref. 11 points out some areas of weakness, including inadequate root cause
analysis leading to repetitive failures, lack of equipment performance trending, lack of
consideration of plant risk in the prioritization, planning and scheduling of maintenance.
Ref. 11 states that the effectiveness of maintenance must be continuously assessed.
The results of these assessments should be fed back through the plant's maintenance
organization to provide requirements where inadequacies are found. In addition to the
assessment of maintenance programs, the reliability of equipment should be assessed
because this is also an important measure of maintenance effectiveness.
The weaknesses identified by the MTIs has led the NRC to develop a "Maintenance
Rule" requiring all nuclear power plant licensees to monitor the effectiveness of
maintenance. The rule will integrate risk considerations into this monitoring and provide a
basis for inspection and enforcement. This rule is added to 10 CFR 50.65 and is called
"Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants."
The maintenance rule requires licensees to determine maintenance goals based on
safety and industry-wide operating experience. Institution of a method for assessing the
degree to which these goals are being met is also required. If the goals are not being met,
the rule requires that corrective action be taken.
According to the maintenance rule, the assessment of maintenance performance shall
include monitoring the performance of components to ensure that they are capable of
fulfilling their intended function. Ref. 11 states that monitoring can be performance
oriented (e.g., reliability monitoring), condition oriented (e.g., parameter trending), or a
combination of these two. The rule recognizes that not all components need to be
monitored in this fashion due to their high reliability. The use of reliability-based
methods, such as PRAs, for developing maintenance goals is encouraged. Monitoring may
vary from system to system depending upon system importance to plant risk.
Furthermore, the rule states that for the most part, monitoring can be accomplished at the
system or train level. The extent of monitoring depends on the contribution of the system
to the plant risk.
An annual evaluation of maintenance goals and preventive maintenance activities is
required by the maintenance rule. This evaluation should take into account industry-wide
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operating experience. This evaluation should also assess the status of all equipment in the
plant. A balance should be attained between the goals of preventive maintenance and the
objective of minimizing the unavailability of equipment.
The structures, systems, and components subject to this rule
include the following [11]:
1. Safety related equipment that are necessary following a design basis event to ensure
the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, the capability to shut down
the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, and the capability to
prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents.
2. Nonsafety related equipment that are relied upon to mitigate accidents or transients
or are used in plant emergency operating procedures.
3. Nonsafety related equipment whose failure could prevent safety-related structures,
systems, and components from fulfilling their safety-related function.
4. Nonsafety related equipment whose failure could cause a reactor scram or actuation
of a safety-related system.
Ref. 11 states that it is not necessary for plants to develop a new maintenance
program, only to assess their current maintenance practices and address weaknesses.
Compliance with the rule is through performance or condition monitoring against
appropriate goals. When these goals are not being met, corrective action shall be taken.
In addition, periodic assessment of the monitoring, goals, and preventive maintenance
activities shall be made to ensure that failure and unavailability of components are
minimized.
The rule will take effect five years from the date of publication in the Federal
Registrar. The Commission will develop a regulatory guide within two years. The utilities
will then have three years for final development. The maintenance rule is not overly
proceduralized and allows the utility flexibility in carrying out the rule. The final
maintenance rule is a results- oriented approach to assuring that maintenance is effectively
conducted at nuclear facilities.
2.4 PRA Applications to Improve Maintenance
This section discusses two separate applications of PRA or PRA-based techniques to
improve a plant's maintenance program.
2.4.1 Technical Specification Improvement Using PRA
One of the earliest uses of PRA in the area of maintenance program improvement has
been the assessment of the change in risk associated with changes in Allowed Outage Times
(AOT) and Surveillance Testing Intervals (STI) as specified in the Technical Specifications
or a given plant. The AOTs specify the amount of time a plant may operate in a
potentially vulnerable configuration (due to the failure of specified equipment) before it
must be shut down; the STIs specify the frequency at which equipment surveillance tests
must be performed.
Refs. 14-20 describe a number of studies for the relaxation of AOTs and/or STIs
using risk-based arguments. Ref. 14 performs several case study analyses using the
SOCRATES computer program [15]. The SOCRATES program uses the results of a PRA
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to calculate changes in risk due to changes in STIs and/or AOTs. The required inputs
include the minimal cut sets describing the problem of interest, component failure rates
and demand failure probabilities, technical specification requirements, and specific testing
strategies for plant equipment. The code allows the treatment of dependence between
tests, and includes a calculation of conditional risk (the increase in risk level when a
component is known to be failed or out of service). The code also calculates the benefits
from testing of redundant components during an outage. The flexible input of the
SOCRATES program allows trade-off and sensitivity studies to be performed with relative
ease. Often, a trade-off such as an increased AOT balanced by more frequent surveillance,
can provide operational benefits without increasing the calculated risk.
In Ref. 14, different strategies are tried: 1) to establish a basis for an AOT
relaxation; 2) to study special testing requirements; 3) to study trade-offs from the results
of (1) and (2); and 4) to analyze modeling sensitivities. The results show that a proper
combination of strategies could allow AOTs to be increased without increasing risk. The
results of sensitivity studies on AOT extension show that the predicted risk level associated
with an AOT extension could be 11.5% less than the base case value due to variation in the
probability values for human error or test-caused failures, and up to 23% less because of
possible variations in the component failure rates.
Refs. 16-20 describe a number of utility applications for relaxation of AOTs and/or
STIs using risk-based arguments. Ref. 16 describes a situation where a one-time
relaxation of an AOT for a steam-driven auxiliary feedwater pump was accepted on the
basis that the additional risk incurred was negligible. Ref. 17 presents the NRC's
acceptance of an application requesting a reduction in diesel generator surveillance testing
and an extension of the diesel generator AOTs; the acceptance was based on a
demonstration that the risk associated with the extended AOT was still lower than that for
a baseline period (not involving a limiting condition of operation). Ref. 18 presents a
proposal to extend AOTs and STIs for 22 Technical Specifications. The proposed changes
are shown to lead to a 69% increase in the computed frequency of core damage, but it is
argued that this increase is small in comparison with the uncertainties in this frequency (a
factor of 10). It is interesting to note that Ref. 18 states that the assessment
conservatively does not account for potential improvements in maintenance due to
increased AOTs which would allow increased maintenance time for components. Less time
would also be spent disassembling, assembling, testing, and returning equipment to service,
and there would be reduced opportunity for human error. (It is hoped that these issues will
be addressed in this research project.) Ref. 19 presents the NRC's acceptance of an
application requesting extended AOTs for a swing diesel generator; the acceptance is based
on a computation showing that the increase in risk associated with the extended AOT is
negligible. Finally, Ref. 20 presents an NRC analysis supporting acceptance of applications
for increased AOTs for a number of safety systems, and rejection of applications for
increased AOTs for a number of other safety systems. The acceptance and rejection
arguments are both based on the degree of risk change associated with the extended AOTs.
Ref. 1 presents a methodology for assessing the impact of modified AOTs and STIs,
and applies this methodology to a particular plant. In the case of AOTs, it is recognized
that AOTs are direct sources of unavailability. Thus, since Ref. 1 does not account for
potential reductions in component failure rates (postulated in Ref. 18 due to increased time
for maintenance), increased AOTs lead to increased unavailability. Ref. 1 calculates the
increase in system unavailability using simple models, propagates this increase through the
overall risk model to determine the increase in core damage frequency. For the plant of
interest, it is determined that the increase in core damage frequency is significant in some
cases, and insignificant in others.
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Increased STIs will lead to reduced detection of standby failures, reduced downtime
due to testing, reduced test-related degradation, and reduced likelihood of test-related
failures. The first effect will tend to increase the overall risk; the last three will tend to
reduce the risk. Ref. 1 treats only the first effect. As in the case of AOTs, when the
methodology is applied to the plant of interest, the computed increase in risk due to
increased STIs is determined to be significant in some cases, and insignificant in others.
Refs. 1 and 14-20 show that acceptable arguments for relaxing plant Technical
Specifications can be made on the basis of negligible risk impact, even though potential risk
reduction benefits are not treated. Quantitative approaches for assessing these benefits are
likely to prove useful in further optimization of the Technical Specifications.
2.4.2 Reliability-Centered Maintenance
One interesting non-regulatory application of PRA technology towards the
improvement of a plant's maintenance program is reliability-centered maintenance (RCM).
RCM, developed in the naval and aircraft industries in the late 1960's, is being investigated
by EPRI for its potential use in the nuclear industry. Studies for Florida Power and
Light's Turkey Point Units 3 and 4, Duke Power's McGuire Station, and Southern
California Edison's San Onofre Units 2 and 3 have been used to demonstrate the benefits of
RCM (including economic gains).
RCM systematically identifies those maintenance-related tasks which prevent
failures from occurring and are cost-effective in regard to "safety and economic
consequences" [21]. The first step in the RCM process is to define the system boundaries.
The analyst should work with plant personnel to define the system. The definition of the
system should include the subsystems of the system being analyzed.
Before any analyses are begun, the operating histories of the system and its
components are studied. Past surveillance tests, maintenance records, and interviews with
maintenance personnel aid in this process. The present preventive maintenance program is
also studied to determine if preventive maintenance accounts for the reliability of
components.
The significant functions of the system and the functional failures are then identified.
This is done using a Functional Failure Analysis (FFA). The FFA gives the description,
the interfaces, and the functional failures of the system.
The next step in the RCM process is to determine a suitable methodology to analyze
each functional failure. In some cases the functional failure may not need to be analyzed
further, because it may be determined to be a non-critical failure. The methods use to
analyze a functional failure are quantitative or qualitative. The quantitative approach
makes use of a fault tree model or a GO model. With both of these tools, the importance
of component failures can be calculated allowing the ranking of components. A Failure
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) gives a qualitative analysis of functional failures. The
dominant failure modes and their effects are identified for each functional failure. A Logic
Tree Analysis is performed for each dominant failure mode considered to have a significant
effect. The Logic Tree Analysis ranks the failures as high, medium, or low criticality
depending on the answers to several questions involving the effect of the failure.
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With the quantitative approach, the dominant failures are identified. However to
develop an effective preventive maintenance program, the failure modes of those failures
considered to be critical to system reliability must be explicitly determined. In the studies
performed, those failures with an importance greater than 0.1 were considered to be of high
criticality. A failure modes analysis must be performed for all critical failures to determine
the failure modes.
In order to develop a preventive maintenance program, interviews are conducted with
maintenance personnel regarding the dominant failure modes found in the RCM analysis.
There are three types of preventive maintenance tasks: time directed, condition directed,
and failure finding. The time directed task is one in which a schedule is set up for
performing maintenance. (In an analogous situation, the oil in a car will be changed every
3000 miles.) The condition directed task involves maintenance based on specific standards.
(Continuing the analogy, the oil might be changed based on its color or viscosity.)
Failure-finding tasks are basically surveillances that find hidden failures and correct them.
Based on input from maintenance personnel, it is decided which type of task will best
prevent each dominant failure from occuring.
2.5 Summary and Comments
A comprehensive maintenance program involves a variety of supporting activities, as
well as the actual performance of maintenance. Figure 2.1 illustrates the different program
elements of a maintenance program, and the interactions between these elements. A
comparison of the current James A. Fitzpatrick maintenance program with Figure 2.1
shows that most of the elements in the latter are covered at least to some extent.
However, Block 4, which represents the evaluation of the effectiveness of the maintenance
program at a plant level, is not implemented. It appears that this block will need to be
addressed in response to the recently issued "Maintenance Rule" [11].
In order to develop a maintenance program optimized from the standpoint of plant
safety, it is important to assess the risk impact associated with the different
implementations of the basic maintenance program elements. A number of these program
elements can be directly treated in a conventional PRA model. For example, as discussed
in Section 3, changes in the scheduling of maintenance activities (included in Block 1,
"Maintenance Management") will lead to changes in computed component/system
unavailabilities whenever standby failures are treated explicitly. Reductions in average
repair times, due perhaps to improved availability of parts (included in Block 1) or to
improved personnel training (included in Block 8, "Personnel Qualification and Training"),
and reductions in human error rates due to improved procedures for returning equipment
to service (included in the Block 3, "Post-Maintenance Testing") can also be directly
treated, if data are available.
Other program elements are more difficult to treat in a conventional PRA. For
example, it is difficult to specify the degree to which maintenance-related human error
rates should change as a result of a modified training program, or how common cause
failure rates should be modified to reflect an increased emphasis on preventive
maintenance. These issues, and related topics, are addressed in later sections of this
report.
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Figure 2.1 - Comprehensive Maintenance Program Block Diagram
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3. MAINTENANCE IN PRA MODELS
Maintenance actions on a component can affect component unavailability in a
number of ways. First, the component can be rendered unavailable for a certain duration.
Second, the component can be improperly restored upon completion of maintenance.
Third, a component failure can be induced by improper maintenance. Fourth, on the
positive side, the maintenance actions can, in principle, change the failure parameters for
the component; effective maintenance can reduce the failure rate of a component subject to
aging. Fifth, also positively, failures occurring while a system is in standby can be
detected.
By affecting component unavailability, maintenance will also clearly affect system
unavailability. The degree of impact will depend on a number of factors, including the
degree of redundancy and the particular scheme used to schedule testing and maintenance.
This section briefly discusses conventional models used to treat the effect of
maintenance on component unavailability and advanced modeling efforts aimed at better
treating the effect of maintenance on system unavailability.
3.1 Maintenance Contributions to Component Unavailability
Component unavailability models vary according to whether the component is
normally running or on standby. In the former case, it is clear when a component fails;
renewal theory shows that the average unavailability for a normally running component is
given by [22]4
Qr- r (3.1)Tf + Tr
where Tf is the expected failure time (i.e., the "mean time to failure") and rr is the mean
repair time (i.e., the "mean time to repair"). Here, it can be seen that maintenance
activities enter primarily through the repair term Tr, although improved maintenance
should affect the failure term rf also. Time-dependent unavailability models can be
developed using Markov modeling techniques (e.g., see [23]), but are not generally used in
current PRA studies.
In the case of standby components, the failure may not be detected until the next
demand, test, or surveillance. A simple plot for the time-dependent unavailability of a
standby component is shown in Figure 3.1. This plot assumes that the component is
unavailable during the testing/maintenance period (T - Ttm,T). Immediately following
testing and maintenance, the time-dependent component unavailability is very small (it is
non-zero since there remains a finite probability that the component will fail to start on
demand, possibly because the maintenance is performed incorrectly). The unavailability
increases with time, as there is increasing likelihood that the component will fail, until the
next maintenance period. Note that, in principle, the unavailability growth between
maintenance periods can vary; this reflects the opposing effects of aging and maintenance
on the component failure parameters (e.g., the standby failure rate As). However, if As is
constant and if As(T - Ttm) is small, the time-dependent unavailability for a standby
component can be simply written:
4Assuming that the component is restored to "as-good-as-new" conditions after
maintenance.
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QSW ~Qd + Ast 0 < t < T - 7tm(32Qs(t) = {Q+s ~ -- ,(3.2)
1 T - rtm < t < T
where Qd represents component unavailability on demand (including the possibilities that
there is an undetected failure, possibly from a human error during system restoration, and
that the component fails on demand). Using the definition for average unavailability over
a time period (0,T):
Q = 1Q(t)dt (3.3)Q T 0
the average unavailability for the standby component over the interval (0,T) is then
approximately given by
(assuming that T >> 7tm). Note that it is common practice in PRA to separate the
contributions of hardware failures and human errors to the demand unavailability Qd [24],
and that separate testing and maintenance contributions to Tt. are also often distinguished.
Thus, for intervals (0,T) in which multiple tests and/or maintenance actions are allowed,
QS = Oh + . ftTt + fmTm + Qhe (3-5)
where #h is the demand failure probability (for hardware failures), ft is the frequency of
tests (per unit time), Tt is the average duration of tests, fm is the frequency of maintenance
actions (per unit time), Tm is the average duration of maintenance actions, and Qhe is the
unavailability of the component due to human errors. This last term is a function of the
frequency with which testing/maintenance is performed, the conditional frequency that an
error is committed given that testing/maintenance is performed (#he), and the length of
time required to detect the error (Td):
Q he = ft he,tTd,t + fm WhemTd,m (3.6)
If an error arising during testing is not detected until the next test and an error arising
during maintenance is not detected until the next maintenance, then ftTd,t = 1 and
fmnTd,m = 1. In this case,
Qhe = Ohet + Ohem (3.7)
It should be pointed out that Eqs. (3.5)-(3.7) apply only when one type of testing and one
type of maintenance are performed. However, the generalization of this model to handle a
variety of tests and maintenance actions is clear.
A slightly more complicated model for standby component unavailability is presented
in Ref. 15. In this model, when a component is undergoing maintenance, there is a finite
probability that the component can function properly when demanded (i.e., the
test/maintenance function can be overridden). This covers cases where even if a
component is aligned in a testing configuration, it can realign when a demand signal is
received. Note that upon overriding the maintenance function, there is a possibility that
the component will fail to operate on demand.
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As in the simple model of Eqs. (3.2) and (3.5), the component can fail while on
standby. In this model, however, the possibility that the failure can be detected and
repaired before the next scheduled testing/maintenance period is treated. In such cases,
the repair time can be treated explicitly as a random variable, or can be conservatively
assumed to be equal to the associated Allowed Outage Time (AOT).
3.2 Maintenance Contributions to System Unavailability
The simple models described in the previous section quantify the time-dependent and
average unavailabilities of a single component. The time-dependent and average
unavailabilities of standby systems and normally operating systems depend not only on the
component unavailability, but also the degree of redundancy within the system (with
respect to the component of interest) and the system operating procedures. The
procedures, for example, determine how long a component can be unavailable before the
plant must be shut down (i.e., they provide the Allowed Outage Times).
The system time-dependent and average unavailabilities also depend on the
particular testing/maintenance scheme used. There are three general test/maintenance
schemes that can be envisioned:
i) simultaneous testing/maintenance,
ii) sequential testing/maintenance, and
iii) staggered testing/ maintenence.
The last scheme is similar to the sequential scheme, except that the testing/maintenance
actions on redundant components/trains are separated by some time interval (rather than
having one action immediately succeed another).
Given the particular testing/maintenance scheme, the calculations for system
unavailability can be accomplished analytically for simple systems. Consider, for example,
two identical, redundant standby components under a sequential testing scheme (see
Figure 3.2). The time-dependent unavailability of the system is given by
(Qd + Ast) + (Qcf + Accft) 0 t < T - 2Ttm
Qsys(t) = - (3.8)
(Qd + Ast) T - 27tm t < T
where, as in Eq. (3.2), the Qd term includes hardware failures and human error, and the
subscript "ccf" denotes common cause failure 5. The term Ttm is the duration of the
testing/maintenance period for one component. Note that the second line in Eq. (3.8)
treats the conditional unavailability of one component, given that the other component is
unavailable due to testing/maintenance.
Using Eqs. (3.3) and (3.8), the average unavailability for this system is approximated
by (assuming that Ttm << T):
{sys = [Q3 + Qd(AsT) + 3 + (Qccf + T + (Qd + AsT)(2Ttm (3.9)
5Human errors, or course, are a source of common cause failures. In this report, "common
cause failure analysis" refers to the analysis of dependent failures that are not modeled
explicitly elsewhere in the PRA.
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Note that if the dependence between the components is ignored, there would result:
Qsys {[Q3 + Qd(AsT) + ]+ 2(Q + ,)( ) + (T )2 (3.10)
The last term, which treats a fictitious contribution due to simultaneous maintenance, is
likely too small to account for the lack of treatment of common cause failure [as
represented correctly in Eq. (3.9)]. Comparing Eqs. (3.9) and (3.10), it can be seen that
system unavailability due to testing/maintenance must be treated at the system (fault
tree) level, rather than at the component level.
Refs. 25 and 26 provide several expressions for M/N systems under simultaneous,
sequential, and staggered testing policies. Ref. 27 develops a model for the unavailability
of a periodically tested component with general failure, testing, and repair time
distributions. Optimal test intervals, based on exponentially distributed failure times (also
assumed in this section) are derived. Note that these results do not include demand or
common cause failures.
3.3 Current Modeling of Parameters Affecting Maintenance Unavailability
Changes in a maintenance program can affect the unavailability of components and
systems through the parameters of Eqs. (3. ) and (3.10). Some changes can be modeled
very simply. Increases in the frequency of testing, for example, can be treated by
increasing ft in Eq. (3. ) and reducing T (since increased testing leads to a reduced
detection time and a reduced likelihood of standby failures). Other changes, however,
require more analysis. Changes in the failure parameters (h, As, Qccf, Accf, and #he are of
particular interest.
The following two sections discuss current work on the modeling of As and #he. The
first term, #h, can be argued to be incorporated (at least to some extent) in the treatment
of As, since both "standby failures" and "failures on demand" are observed (barring tests)
at the time of demand. Indeed, most plant-level PRA studies lump these two failures
together. The common cause failure terms, Qccf and Accf, are the subject of this study
(the impact of maintenance on these parameters has not yet been treated in other studies).
3.3.1 Modeling the Standby Failure Rate As
In principle, the standby failure rate As can vary between maintenance periods, due
to the competing effects of aging and maintenance. A significant amount of work has been
done on the issue of aging; work aimed at quantifying the impact of maintenance on As has
only recently been initiated.
In standard PRA analyses, the failure rates for components are assumed to be
constant over time. (Equivalently, failures are assumed to be random events governed by a
Poisson process.) This model corresponds to the constant failure rate portion of the
well-known bathtub "curve." To accomodate aging effects, the failure rate must be
allowed to vary as a function of time.
In Ref. 4, the linear aging model described in Ref. 28 is implemented in a
time-dependent fault tree program (FRANTIC-LA) to compute the effects of component
aging on system availability. The failure rate is expressed as follows:
A(t) = A0 + at (3.11)
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where AO is the initial failure rate and the parmeter "a" is the aging acceleration
parameter. In the absence of repair, it can be easily shown that the corresponding
time-dependent unavailability is given by
Q(t) = 1 - exp{-(Aot + 1at2)1 (3.11)
Ref. 4 applies this model to periodically tested components. It allows different treatment
of renewal options. The model also allows the user to change component aging parameters
during plant life. In turn, this allows the modeling of different aging scales for every
component, as a function of the time when the component was first introduced into service,
the time when the component was subject to any significant maintenance or repair action,
and the time when the component was replaced with a new one. In addition to different
renewal options, Ref. 4 allows detailed modeling of the test and repair processes; not only
does it treat the time required for performing tests and repairs, it also incorporates the
probability of test-caused failures, the probability that test-overrides do not function on
demand, and test-interval dependent failure rates (i.e., the discontinuous changes in failure
rate with the number of tests performed).
Ref. 4 applies the linear aging model to the analysis of an Auxiliary Feedwater
System (AFWS) of a PWR, and a High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCIS) and
Low Pressure Coolant Injection System (LPCIS) of a BWR. The results show that over a
60 year time period, the resulting system unavailability can be a factor of 4 to 8 greater
than that predicted by a conventional PRA6.
Ref. 4 also studies the impact of testing and maintenance on the aging-related
unavailability of piping systems. Not surprisingly, it is shown that good-as-new testing
and repair has the maximum effectiveness with regard to detecting and correcting aging
contributions. Two other renewal strategies also shown to be capable of controlling aging
effects are: good-as-old testing with good-as-new repair, and periodic replacement of aging
components. The study shows that the testing effectiveness and frequency are very
significant parameters in controlling aging effects, even when the testing only returns the
component to a good-as-old condition. For example, after 60 years, piping unavailability
without testing is 30 times larger than the unavailability when testing is performed once a
year.
Ref. 2 studies core melt frequency changes due to aging. Let the component
unavailabilities, structure failure probabilities, and initiating event frequencies be
represented by the generic parameter Q. Changes in Q, denoted by 6Q, are related to the
aging rate and plant maintenance policy using a linear aging model. When a component is
periodically overhauled, replaced, or otherwise renewed, at intervals of L with no
intermittent checking for aging effects, then Eq. (3.11) indicates
6Q(L) = aL2 (3.12)
When surveillances are performed in-between overhauls to determine the extent of aging,
Ref. 2 shows that the comparable result is
6Q = a(L - T) + aT2 (3.13)
6This result depends naturally on the values used for the aging parameters.
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where T is the surveillance interval. Ref. 2 also shows how the change in core melt
frequency can be simply computed, using the 6Q's calculated from Eq. (3.13) and
sensitivity coefficients derived from simple importance calculations. Using these results,
maintenance activities can be prioritized based on their contribution to core damage.
Note that in Eqs. (3.12) and (3.13), the component is assumed to be restored to as
good as new conditions after a time period L. After a time period T (after a surveillance),
the component is assumed to be operational. To account for the possibility that the
overhaul is not completely efficient, the scheduled overhaul interval can be replaced by an
"effective overhaul interval". To account for the possibility that the surveillance is not
completely efficient in detecting aging effects, an "effective surveillance interval" can be
used. Assessments of efficiency are made based on the maintenance practices employed at
the time of the analysis.
As mentioned earlier, work on evaluating the effect of maintenance on the failure
parameters used in a PRA is more recent. Ref. 29 discusses a quantitative methodology to
assess the reliability and risk benefits of maintenance. This work employs a Markov model
that treats a variety of component states: working, degraded, under maintenance, and
failed. This model addresses the primary problem with the current data base when
attempting to quantify the impact of maintenance on failure parameters: the failure data
are generally too scarce. By including other states for which more data are available, the
model of Ref. 29 can provide a more robust analyses of maintenance effectiveness. Such
analyses can be used when responding to the Maintenance Rule, discussed in Section 2.
Ref. 29 evaluates the impact of variations in AOTs treating both positive and
negative impacts. The results show that using the Markov model, the predicted effects of a
rolling maintenance program on component unavailability can be significant (greater than
a factor of 10), and that optimal maintenance regions can be identified. The unavailability
results are used as input for PRA models to determine system and plant effects. The plant
average core melt frequency is shown to be reduced by a factor of 2.6 to 4.1, while the peak
core melt frequency can be reduced by a factor of 9.0 to 11.3.
3.3.2 Modeling the Human Error Rate #he
A number of models have been developed for human reliability analysis. This section
discusses the Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) [10], which is
representative of models currently used in PRAs and is used in this study, a simplified
methodology developed for use in recent PRAs [30], and the Maintenance Personnel
Performance Simulation (MAPPS) [31]. MAPPS provides an example of improved human
reliability analysis models that may be used in future PRAs.
3.3.2.1 THERP Methodology [10]
The THERP methodology employs 5 steps. First, the analyst must define the task of
interest, what constitutes failure, and what human actions can lead to this failure. This
involves the identification of the different subtasks that must be performed by the
operators. A tree diagram is constructed to represent possible sequences of successes and
failures in performing the different subtasks. Figure 3.3 provides an example THERP tree.
In this figure, the lowercase letters represent successful performance of the subtask; the
uppercase letters represent failure.
Second, the basic error rates relevant to the tree are determined. In general, the
error rates are obtained from Ref. 10. The estimated error rates provided in Ref. 10 are
based on experience from the nuclear power and defense industries. In Figure 3.3, for
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example, estimates are obtained for p{a}, the probability with which the maintainers use
procedures, p{B I a}, the probability of an error given that procedures are used, and
p{B A}, the probability of an error given that procedures are not used7 . Not surprisingly,
the Ref. 10 estimate for p{B I a}, 0.003, is lower than the estimate for p{B I A}, 0.005.
The basic human error rates given in the tables provided in Ref. 10 are for tasks
performed under average industry conditions. In the third step, other factors, called
Performance Shaping Factors (PSFs), are introduced to account for stress, work
environment, etc.
Fourth, once the basic error rates, as modified by the appropriate PSFs, are
established, the analyst needs to determine if there are dependencies between the subtasks
that would tend to increase the probability of multiple failures. For example, consider a
task in which several level transmitters are to be calibrated. If the same technician is
responsible for calibrating all transmitters, the probability that an error is made for two
transmitters is greater than the square of the basic error probability for miscalibration.
Ref. 10 defines five levels of dependence: zero dependence (ZD) low dependence (LD),
medium dependence (MD), high dependence (HD), and complete dependence (CD). Let F.
denote an error at the nth step/subtask in a task, and F,.. 1 denote an error at the (n-1)st
step/subtask. These five levels of dependence are operationalized as follows:
P{Fa|FnI 1 ..1,ZD} = #
P{FnIFn.,LD} = +20
P{FnIFn.1,MD} = 1 (3.14)
P{FnIFn..iHD} =
P{FnIFn. 1,CD} = 1
where # is the modified error rate (including the effect of the PSFs).
In the final step, the sequence probabilities for the failure sequences in the THERP
tree are summed to obtain the probability of failure for the task.
3.3.2.2 ASEP Methodology [30]
The human reliability analysis methodology described in Ref. 30, called the Accident
Sequence Evaluation Program (ASEP) methodology, is a simplified version of the THERP
methodology. This method is designed to be used by systems analysts who do not have
training in human reliability analysis.
The ASEP methodology employs a relatively small number of rules for probability
assignments. A basic human error rate of 0.03 is assumed for all latent human errors
(errors that are undetected until the associated component or system is demanded). Most
recovery factors (which model the probability that the operators will discover and remedy
an error in time) are assigned a value of 0.9. The probability that a crew will fail to
perform a post-maintenance test correctly is assigned a value of 0.01.
7The "human error probabilities" referred to in Ref. 10 correspond to the conditional
frequencies used in this report. The terminology "frequency" is used to indicate situations
where the uncertainties are stochastic rather than state-of-knowledge.
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The treatment of dependence between tasks performed by the same person is
different in the ASEP methodology as compared with the THERP methodology. If actions
are performed on components in a series system, the actions are considered to be
independent (i.e., zero dependence is assumed between the actions). Figure 3.4 is used to
determine the level of dependence between actions performed on components in a parallel
system. As can be seen in Figure 3.4, errors of commission and errors of omission are
treated differently. Errors of commission are assumed to have a zero level of dependence.
Errors of omission are assumed to have either zero, high, or complete dependence.
Several recovery factors can be used in the analysis of latent human errors. However,
credit is not allowed for all recovery factors in all cases. Ref. 30 presents tables showing
which recovery factors can be applied in each case. Recovery factors are applied to the
following situations:
0 errors are indicated by a compelling signal (e.g., an annunciator)
0 post-maintenance testing is performed that will identify an error
0 a written checkoff list is provided to verify component status after task completion
0 there is a requirement for a check every shift or every day of component status inside
or outside of the control room using a written checklist.
Once the appropriate recovery case and level of dependence between subtasks are
determined, a look-up table in Ref. 30 is used to determine the joint human error
probability for the task.
3.3.2.3 The MAPPS Model [31]
Ref. 31 describes the Maintenance Personnel Performance Simulation (MAPPS), a
computer simulation program designed to provide maintenance oriented human
performance data for PRA purposes.
MAPPS is an ability-driven, group-oriented, stochastic simulation model. It
simulates the maintenance tasks through the use of three types of input data - variable,
task and subtask. Variable parameters describe the conditions of the environment and
characteristics of the workers. Task and subtask parameters describe the maintenance job
to be performed. MAPPS allows for the simulation of up to five job specialties:
instrumentation and control technician, maintenance mechanic, electrician, supervisor, and
quality control technician.
Figure 3.5 shows the basic algorithm used by MAPPS to determine the probability of
success on a task. The analyst inputs the basic ability levels of the technicians performing
the task and the parameters characterizing the task. These latter include:
* quality of written procedures for supporting performance,
e accessibility of equipment to worked on, and
* the need to wear protective clothing.
These parameters are used to determine the level of ability (intellectual and perceptual)
required to perform a given task. Algorithms are used to modify the technicians' basic
ability levels as a function of their current states and the working conditions; the following
factors are among those treated:
0 technician fatigue,
0 high environment temperature,
0 fatigue relief due to rest breaks,
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0 technician's level of aspiration,
e time since the team members last performed the task,
e organizational climate, and
0 whether the actual manning is greater/less than that nominally required.
The sum of the team members' ability levels is compared with the ability
requirements for the task. The difference between total ability available and ability
required is then used as one of four components in computing the task success probability.
The other three components in the calculation involve stress. They are: time stress,
communication stress, and radiation stress. Time stress arises when the time required to
perform all remaining tasks is greater than the time available for total task completion.
(Note that the process is nonlinear, since the time required to perform a task can change
with stress.) Radiation stress arises when the absorbed radiation dose for a technician is
greater than 800 millirem. Communication stress increases in direct proportion with noise
level in the work area, the length of communications, and the number of technicians in the
group. The total stress on a technician is calculated as the sum of the component stresses;
the total stress on a maintenance crew is computed as the sum of the stresses on the
individual technicians.
Subtracting the total team stress (minus an input threshold level) from the total
team ability (minus the ability requirements of the task), the ability difference for a task,
AD, is obtained. The probability of failure is obtained using a data-based correlation:
AD + 2.95
e = + (3.15)
1 +e
In order to account for the inherent variability in the impact of the identified factors
on an individual's ability and stress, MAPPS establishes upper and lower stochastic bounds
and utilizes Monte Carlo sampling to choose a particular effect for a given individual. The
distribution for team performance characteristics (e.g., task duration) are obtained by
repeated sampling.
3.4 Summary and Comments
Conventional PRA methods are currently capable of quantifying the risk impact of
certain maintenance program changes (e.g., changes in testing intervals). These models,
however, do not address potential changes in the values of failure parameters (e.g., A)
associated with the maintenance program changes. Recent work on the modeling of
component degradation and aging (e.g., [2,29]) shows considerable promise in addressing
this issue. However, common cause failures, which are dominant contributors to risk, have
not yet been addressed, and models for human errors during maintenance, which can also
be significant contributors to risk, have not yet been applied to quantify the impact of
maintenance program changes on risk 8.
This project employs simple models for common cause failures and human errors
during maintenance to address these problems. These models are discussed in Sections 4
and 5 of this report.
8Human errors, or course, are a source of common cause failures. In this report, "common
cause failure analysis" refers to the analysis of dependent failures that are not modeled
explicitly elsewhere in the PRA.
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4. SIMPLIFIED JAF PLANT MODEL AND SCOPING CALCULATIONS
In general, a change in plant risk associated with changes in maintenance can be
computed in two steps. First, the parameters for the plant PRA model (e.g., the
maintenance frequency fi) are modified to reflect the change in maintenance. Next, the
plant model is requantified, using the modified parameter values as input. The problem
with this procedure, if carried out too mechanically, is that requantification of the entire
plant model can require significant computational resources. Moreover, since many of the
parameters may have little impact on overall risk, complete requantification is not really
required.
This section presents a simplified plant model suitable for use in sensitivity studies.
The model is based on the dominant sequences (and the minimal cutsets for these
sequences) presented in Ref. 6, a preliminary risk study for the James A. Fitzpatrick (JAF)
plant8 . An importance analysis is applied to the simplified plant model, in order to
determine the dominant basic events contributing to plant risk. Two particular basic
events, the common cause failure of 4 RHR pumps, and the failure of operators to properly
restore an RHR train following maintenance, are found to be significant. Using these basic
events, a number of scoping calculations are performed to determine the potential
magnitude of changes in risk due to changes in maintenance.
4.1 Simplified Plant Model
4.1.1 Plant Risk Model
The risk model results in Ref. 6 are developed using the small event tree/large fault
tree approach. (Ref. 32 provides the modeling assumptions underlying the results of
Ref. 6.) The model is aimed at quantifying the frequency of the "TW sequence" - the loss
of long term decay heat removal. (The purpose of Ref. 6 is to provide supporting
information on the desirability of installing a filtered/venting system for the containment.)
Decay heat removal capability is provided by the residual heat removal (RHR) system. At
JAF, the RHR system has four RHR pumps, four RHR service water pumps and two RHR
heat exchangers.
To quantify the frequency of loss of long term decay heat removal (Adhr), Ref. 6
identifies 12 classes of accident initiators that can lead to loss of long term decay heat
removal. These 12 classes involve either transients or LOCAs; Table 4.1 shows the
initiators and their frequencies. For each of the initiators identified in Table 4.1, dedicated
event trees are constructed. These allow definition of the TW sequences in terms of the
underlying systems, components, and failure modes. Following event tree quantification,
the dominant sequences are identified. Table 4.2 shows the 11 dominant sequences
identified and their frequencies. (The cut-off frequency used in the quantification process
is 1.0*10-9/yr.)
Once the dominant sequences are identified, the dominant minimal cutsets (those
that contribute the most to the dominant sequences) can be found. For example, Table 4.3
shows the dominant minimal cutsets associated with the T2-4 sequence (prior to recovery).
8Ref. 7 presents the more recently developed JAF Individual Plant Examination plant
model. Due to timing considerations, this report employs the model and results of Ref. 6
as a case study; however, the general approach and some of the methods developed in this
report are expected to be useful in any updated analyses of the risk impact of maintenance
program changes at JAF.
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Note that although recovery factors were applied to the dominant sequences in Ref. 6, this
study focuses on the sequences prior to this application.
It can be seen that there are five accident initiators in these 11 dominant sequences.
They are:
0 T1: Loss of Offsite Power (LOSP);
0 T2: Loss of PCS Transients (MSIV, or Turbine Bypass Failure);
9 TDC: Transient Caused by Loss of Safety DC Bus;
0 Si: Intermediate LOCA;
* S2: Small LOCA.
In order to summarize the risk model, we define the following terms:
0 F1: total frequency of sequences with initiator of T1;
a F 2: total frequency of sequences with initiator of T2;
0 F3 : total frequency of sequences with initiator of TDC;
0 F 4 : total frequency of sequences with initiator of Si;
0 F5 : total frequency of sequences with initiator of S2;
0 F(TW): total frequency of dominant TW sequences;
Using the notation Aje to represent the frequency of a specified initiating event and
E(Sequence) to denote the sum of the probabilities of the dominant minimal cut sets for a
given sequence, the simplified JAF risk model is as follows:
F1 = Ati T1-4 + E T1-14) + E(T1-33-S3-37)]
F 2 = At2J T2-4 + E T2-34-S1-3)]
F3 = Atdc [TD A-4 + E(TDCB-4)] (4.1)
F4 = Ast*E(S1-3)
F 5 = As2[E(S2-5) + E(S2-37) + E(S2-42)]
and
5
F(TW) = Fi (4.2)
i:1
4.1.2 Comparison with Current Plant Model
As mentioned earlier, the plant model used in this study is based on a preliminary
version of the Individual Plant Examination (IPE) study documented in Ref. 6. The
primary differences between the preliminary study and the final study documented in
Ref. 7 are as follows:
a Ref. 6 is an analysis focused on the endstate "Loss of Long Term Decay Heat
Removal." The final IPE is a focused on core damage.
0 The frequencies of the accident initiators are reduced in Ref. 7.
0 The frequencies of the dominant accident sequences are reduced in Ref. 7.
a The risk-dominant common cause failure events and human errors are different in
the two studies.
The fourth bullet is an expected consequence of the first; the second and third bullets are
also expected, since most PRA studies involve a continual, iterative refinement of their
parameter values and submodels.
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It is not expected that the difference in results between the two studies require any
modifications of the general methodology employed in this study to quantify the impact of
maintenance on common cause failures and on human error rates. However, this study's
emphasis on common cause failures and on failures to restore equipment after maintenance
does depend on the results of Ref. 6; therefore, the detailed methods developed might
require modification to deal with the updated model.
4.2 Ranking of Systems, Components, and Failure Modes
In order to properly focus maintenance resources on those systems, components, and
component failure modes most critical to safety, some indication of the "importance" of
these entities is required. This section discusses a number of the more prominent
importance measures that have been suggested in the literature (some of which are
routinely calculated by current PRA computer codes) 9. Additional discussions on
importance analysis can be found in Refs. 22 and 33-35.
4.2.1 Importance Measures
The basic question of how important a particular component (or component failure
mode) is to risk can be asked in a number of different ways. For example, if the maximum
possible reduction in risk associated with replacing a component by a perfectly good
component is desired, the "risk reduction worth" is the appropriate importance measure to
use. If the maximum possible increase in risk associated with replacing a component by a
perfectly bad component is desired, the "risk achievement worth" is the appropriate
importance measure to use. If the relative contribution of a component's unavailability to
overall risk is desired, either the Fussell-Vesely importance measure or the "criticality
importance measure" are appropriate.
This section presents five measures: the risk reduction worth, the risk achievement
worth, the Birnbaum structural importance, the criticality importance, and the
Fussell-Vesely importance. The following notation is employed (largely based on that used
by Ref. 34):
g [Q(t) Baseline "risk" at time tQi(t) Unavailability of component i at time t
ms-(t) Unavailability of minimal cut set j at time t
[0i)] Conditional "risk" at time t, given that component i is
available (i.e., that Q = 0)
g[1i,Q(t)] Conditional "risk" at time t, given that component i is
unavailable (i.e., that Qi = 1)
Note that the risk function, g[-], can represent the likelihood of loss of decay heat removal,
core damage, or of system failure, as well as the likelihood of adverse public health
consequences.
9The variety of measures stems from the fact that the fuzzy notion of "importance" can be
stated mathematically in a number of different ways. It is important to note that none of
the measures is clearly superior to the rest for all possible system configurations.
Furthermore, as pointed out by Ref. 32, the different measures can lead to significantly
different rankings of components and systems. As a result, current importance analyses
tend to use a number of different measures, rather than a single one.
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4.2.1.1 Risk Reduction Worth
This importance measure reflects the change in risk when component i is replaced by
a "perfectly good" component. Using an interval scale,
I (t) g[Q(t)] - g[0i,Q(t)] (4.3)
Using a ratio scale,
I IR(t) 91 (0 (4-4)
4.2.1.2 Risk Achievement Worth
This importance measure reflects the change in risk when component i is replaced by
a "perfectly bad" component. Using an interval scale,
I}A(t) g[li,Q(t)] - g[Q(t)] (4.5)
Using a ratio scale,
IAR(t) = 8 (4.6)
4.2.1.3 Birnbaum Structural Importance
This measure can be viewed as a combination of the interval-based risk reduction
worth and risk achievement worth measures.
IB(t) g[11,Q(t)] - g[Oi,Q(t)] (4.7)
It is interesting to note that when the components in the system are independent, this
measure can be computed as the derivative of the risk function with respect to Qi:
I (t) = NI Q(03l(4.8)
The risk reduction worth, risk achievement worth, and Birnbaum structural
importance measures are easy to compute and appear to have nice intuitive meanings. It
should be cautioned, however, that their use may lead to seemingly non-intuitive results.
For example, the Birnbaum measure, when applied to a parallel system, will indicate that
the component with the highest unavailability is the least important. Ref. 22 shows that
this result is due to the fact that the Birnbaum measure gives the probability that the
system is in such a state that component i is "critical", i.e., that it is in a state such that
the failure of component i can change the system state. A small value of Qi implies that
the system is very likely in a state where component i is critical. This result underlines the
fact that different ways of asking whether or not a component is importnat can lead to
different answers.
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4.2.1.4 Criticality Importance
This measure is related to the Birnbaum structural importance measure. However,
this measure looks at the relative importance of a component:
(t) ={g[1,Q(t)] - g[0i,Q(t)]}*-(4.9)
which, in the case of independent components, becomes
ICR t = * Q (4.10)I~ (t = -~~ Nit
These equations show that the criticality importance is a fractional sensitivity
measure, indicating the relative likelihood that the system is in a state where component i
is critical to system failure at time t.
4.2.1.5 Fussell-Vesely Importance
This measure indicates that a component is important if it appears in a large number
of minimal cut sets (MCS).
FV P{at least one MCS containing i is failed
I; (t = gQ(t)J
SQ Mes-j
gW [ Q(t) (4'11)
Here, a component can be important to risk without being "critical." Unlike the
Birnbaum structural importance measure, this measure states that all components in a
parallel system are equally important.
4.2.2 Application to JAF Preliminary IPE
With the information provided by the minimal cutsets for the dominant sequences,
the ranking of systems, components, and failure modes with respect to their contributions
to plant risk can be accomplished. In this study, the Fusell-Veselly importance measure is
used for the ranking calculations, due to its simplicity of application to this problem.
Table 4.3 provides the contributions to plant risk (loss of long term decay heat
removal) associated with each basic event in the simplified plant model. The basic events
are organized by system. The contribution for basic event i, Pi, is calculated as follows:
Pi = P{MCSk l iEk} (4.12)
j k
where.Aj is the frequency of initiating event j and P{MCSk I iEk} is the probability of the
kth minimal cutset of which basic event i is a member.
Using the data in Table 4.3, the Fussell-Vesely measure for system, component, and
failure mode importance can be easily computed. These results are provided in Tables 4.4
through 4.19. An importance matrix, summarizing these results, is shown in Table 4.20.
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The format of the table is largely as suggested in Ref. 5. Efforts to calculate changes in
risk due to changes in maintenance can concentrate on the important components/failure
modes shown in this table. (The contributions from components/failure modes not
appearing in the table are not necessarily ignored; they can, however, probably be
adequately treated using sensitivity analyses rather than specific models.) Table 4.21
shows the total frequency of the important TW sequences.
The following results can be observed from the importance matrix:
0 Common cause failures are the most important contributors to plant risk. This can
be seen from the fact that in the global ranking, common cause failure events hold
the top two positions in the matrix.
0 Human Error is the second most important contributor to plant risk. The particular
error, Failure to Restore, is the third most important failure mode in the global
ranking.
0 Among the component groups, the pump component group is the most significant
contributor to plant risk. The valve component group is the next most important.
0 The RHR system (LPCI mode) is the most important system.
Based on these results, the bounding calculations described in the following section,
and the detailed calculations aimed at quantifying the risk impact associated with changes
in maintenance, focus on: 1) the common cause failures of RHR pumps, and 2) the failure
of operators to restore the RHR system after maintenance. The latter failure, or course, is
a form of common cause failure. The term "common cause failure analysis" is used to refer
to the statistical analysis of dependent failures that are not modeled explicitly elsewhere in
the PRA. (Restoration errors following maintenance, failures caused by external events,
and failures caused by the failure of support systems are examples of dependent failures
that are modeled explicitly in most PRAs studies.)
4.3 Scoping Calculations
The purpose of the scoping calculations discussed in this section is to quickly
determine how much an assumed stricter (relaxed) maintenance practice aimed at a
specific component/ failure mode can reduce (increase) the plant risk. According to
Eqs. (4.1) and (4.2), the effect can be assessed by appropriately modifying the probabilities
of the minimal cutsets in the dominant sequences.
It should be pointed out that many changes in maintenance practices could have a
global effect on plant components. This will not only affect several minimal cutset
probabilities, it could also affect the initiating event frequencies. This study does not
investigate the impact of maintenance program changes on initiating event frequencies.
However, it is interesting to observe that, in the case of Loss of Main Feedwater initiators,
Ref. 36 indicates that their frequency might be reduced by a factor of 2 if service and
maintenance are improved.
The scoping calculations are performed as follows:
1) Identify the minimal cutsets which have the failure events of the interest (e.g.,
common cause failures of RHR pumps);
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2) Set the probabilities of these cutsets to zero to account for the maximum possible
improvement due to improved (stricter) maintenance;
3) Multiply the probabilities of these cutsets by a variety of values (> 1) to
parametrically account for relaxed maintenance (note that setting the probability of
a cutset to one would lead to the occurrence of the sequence with a frequency equal
to the frequency of the initiating event);
4) Calculate the plant risk from (2) and (3) and compare these values with the baseline
value. In this case, the frequency of loss of long term decay heat removal is
F(TW) = 1.7*10-4/reactor year
4.3.1 Risk Reduction
Five calculations are performed to bound the potential impacts of various
improvements in maintenance.
* Assume that perfect maintenance practices could eliminate all common cause failure
events completely. In this case, the probability of all minimal cutsets including
common cause failure (CCF) events can be set to zero. There results:
F(TW without CCF) = 9.5*10- 5/reactor year
The risk reduction factor (dividing this value by the baseline risk value) is 1.77.
* Assume that perfect maintenance practices could eliminate all human errors
completely. In this case, the probability of all minimal cutsets including human error
can be set to zero. There results:
F(TW without human error) = 1.3*10- 4/reactor year
The risk reduction factor is 1.3.
* Assume that perfect maintenance practices could eliminate all pump component
related failure events completely. In this case, the probability of all minimal cutsets
including pump failure events can be set to zero. There results:
F(TW without pump failures) = 8.8*10-5/reactor year
The risk reduction factor is 1.9.
* Assume that perfect maintenance practices could eliminate all valve component
related failure events completely. In this case, the probability of all minimal cutsets
including valve failure events can be set to zero. There results:
F(TW without valve failures) = 1.2*10- 4/reactor year
The risk reduction factor is 1.5.
* Assume that perfect maintenance practices could eliminate all RHR system hardware
related failure events completely. In this case, the probability of all minimal cutsets
including any RHR system hardware failure events can be set to zero. There results:
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F(TW without RHR system hardware failure) = 1.0*10 -4/reactor year
The risk reduction factor is 1.6.
It can be seen that the maximum decrease in risk, even for the most important
systems, components, and failure modes is around a factor of 2.
4.3.2 Risk Increase
A number of calculations are performed to gauge the potential impacts of various
relaxations in maintenance that end up increasing the frequency of common cause failure
and human error. Some samples for the results are provided below.
* Assume that the RHR pump CCF rate is increased by a factor of 5. There results:
F(TW: CCF increased by a factor of 5) = 2.8*10- 4/reactor year
The risk increase factor is 1.7.
* Assume that the RHR pump CCF rate is increased by a factor of 10. There results:
F(TW: CCF increased by a factor of 10) = 4.3*10- 4/reactor year
The risk increase factor is 2.5.
* Assume that the RHR pump CCF rate is increased by a factor of 100. There results:
F(TW: CCF increased by a factor of 100) = 3.0*10-3/reactor year
The risk increase factor is 18.
* Assume that the failure to restore rate
F(TW: HE increased by a factor
The risk increase factor is 2.0.
* Assume that the failure to restore rate
F(TW: HE increased by a factor
The risk increase factor is 3.3.
* Assume that the failure to restore rate
F(TW: HE increased by a factor
is increased by a factor of 5. There results:
of 5) = 3.4*10- 4/reactor year
is increased by a factor of 10. There results:
of 10) = 5.6*10- 4/reactor year
is increased by a factor of 100. There results:
of 100) = 4.0*10-3/reactor year
The risk increase factor is 24.
The effect on risk due to increases/decreases in the probabilities of common cause
failure and human error are shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. Not surprisingly, the plant risk
increases nearly linearly with both the RHR pump CCF rate and the human error rate.
This relationship is due to the importance of these parameters in the risk model.
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4.3.3 Areas for Improvement
From the above scoping calculations, it can be seen that the most effective method
for risk reduction is one that reduces the probabilities of pump component failure events.
The next choice is a method that reduces the probability of common cause failure events.
Figure 4.2 shows the results of additional scoping calculations where the common cause
failure rates are reduced by factors of up to 1000. It can be seen that with a increase in
reduction factor from 2 to 10, there is a (relatively) rapid risk reduction. When the
reduction factor is near 1000, the resulting risk is nearly equal to the risk calculated when
the common cause failures are completely eliminated.
The scoping calculations identify areas where improved maintenance can have the
largest impact. The next problem is to see what maintenance improvements can actually
lead to the hypothesized reductions in common cause failure and human error rates. This
is discussed in the following two sections.
4.4 Summary and Comments
Using the dominant sequences and minimal cutsets identified in the preliminary IPE
for JAF, a simple risk model is constructed. (Because this study uses Ref. 6 as a basis, the
consequence of interest in this project is loss of long term decay heat removal, rather than
core damage.) This risk model is then used to determine the order of magnitude of possible
changes in plant risk due to changes in maintenance that affect common cause failure rates
and human error rates.
The results of the scoping calculations show that, even with fairly drastic
assumptions (e.g., all pumps are rendered perfect, all common cause failure rates increase
by an order of magnitude), the associated changes in plant risk are not large (from a factor
of 2 risk reduction to a factor of 5 risk increase). Note that these scoping calculations are
performed for important components/failure modes. Changes in the failure parameters
characterizing less important components/failure modes will have significantly less impact
on plant risk. Thus, if reductions or increases in risk of this order will have no effect on
decision making, no additional analysis is needed to quantify the impact of maintenance
changes. The models and accompanyin discussion provided in the remainder of this report
are relevant when these risk reductions increases are indeed significant.
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4.5 TABLES
Table 4.1 - JAF Initiating Event Frequencies
Initiator
Ti: Loss of Offsite Power (LOSP)
T2: Loss of PCS Transients (MSIV, or
Turbine Bypass Failure)
T3A: Transients With Condenser
Initially Available
T3B: Loss of Feedwater With Main
T3C:
TAC:
TDC:
A:
S1:
S2:
N
Condenser Available
IORV (Inadvertently Open Relief Valve)
Transient Caused by Loss of Safety AC Bus
Transient Caused by Loss of Safety DC Bus
Large LOCA
Intermediate LOCA
Small LOCA
ean Frequency
(yr-1)
0.057
0.48
4.72
0.39
0.094
5.0E-3
5.0 E-3
1.0E-4
3.OE-4
3.0E- 4
Notes:
1) JAF plant- specific data with Bayesian update.
2) JAF plant-specific data from actual operating history.
3 NUREG/CR-4550, Vol. 4, Rev. 1, Part 1, Table 4.3-3
Table 4.2 - Dominant Sequences from JAF Preliminary Model
Before Recovery
Sequence
T1- 4
T1-14
T1-33-S3-37
T2-4
T2-34-S1-3
S1-3
S2-5
S2-37
S2-42
TDCA-4
TDCB-4
Frequency
3.43 x 10-5
2.11 x 10-6
9.58 x 10-7
7.58 x 10-5
1.22 x 10-7
6.75 x 10-8
1.09 x 10-8
1.15 x 10-8
< 1.0 x 10-9
2.3 x 10-5
4.1 x 10-5
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Source
(1)
(2)
(2)
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
Table 4.3 - Samples of T2-4 Sequence Minimal Cutsets (Page 1 of 3)
EVENT NAME DESCRI PTION
--- -- -
PROB. (Note 1)
1) T2-4
1) RSW-CCF-VF-2MOVS
T2
UlX-SUCC
/C
/P
2) LCI-CCF-PF-4MDPM
T2
UlX-SUCC
/C
/P
3) RSW-CCF-PF-4MDPS
T2
U1X-SUCC
/C
/P
4) LCI-HTX-VF-HE-2A
LCI-HTX-VF-HE-2B
T2
UlX-SUCC
/C
'/P
5) LCI-HTX-VF-HE-2B
T2
UlX-SUCC
RSW-RCK-NO-MV89A
/C
'/P
6) LCI-HTX-VF-HE-2A
T2
UlX-SUCC
RSW-RCK-NO-MV89B
/C
/P
CCF OF RHRHX SW DISCH VLVS FAIL TO OPEN
LOSS OF POWER CONVERSION SYS INITIATOR
SUCCESSFUL ALIGNMENT OF HPCI SUCT TO CS
REA9TOR PROTECTION SYSTEM
SRV S RESEAT '
RHR PUMP COMMON CAUSE FAILURE
LOSS OF POWER CONVERSION SYS INITIATOR
SUCCESSFUL ALIGNMENT OF HPCI SUCT TO CS
REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM
SRV'S RESEAT
COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF RHRSW PUMPS
LOSS OF POWER CONVERSION SYS INITIATOR
SUCCESSFUL ALIGNMENT OF HPCI SUCT TO CS
REA9TOR PROTECTION SYSTEM
SRV S RESEAT
LOOP A HEAT EXCHANGER E-2A FAILURE
LOOP B HEAT EXCHANGER E-2B FAILURE
LOSS OF POWER CONVERSION SYS INITIATOR
SUCCESSFUL ALIGNMENT OF HPCI SUCT TO CS
REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM
SRV S RESEAT
LOOP B HEAT EXCHANGER E-2B FAILURE
LOSS OF POWER CONVERSION SYS INITIATOR
SUCCESSFUL ALIGNMENT OF HPCI SUCT TO CS
VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT NO OUTPUT
REA9TOR PROTECTION SYSTEM
SRV S RESEAT
LOOP A HEAT EXCHANGER E-2A FAILURE
LOSS OF POWER CONVERSION SYS INITIATOR
SUCCESSFUL ALIGNMENT OF HPCI SUCT TO CS
VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT NO OUTPUT
REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM
SRV S RESEAT
7. 01E-05
5.24E-05
1.40E-05
2. 85E-06
1.24E-06
1.24E-06
Table 4.3 - Samples of T2-4 Sequence Minimal Cutsets (Page 2 of 3)
EVENT NAME
7) LCI-XHE-RE-PM3AP
AC4-RLY-NO-HOEB3
T2
UlX-SUCC/C/P
8) LCI-XHE-RE-PM3AP
AC4-RLY-NO-HOEB1
T2
Ulx-SUCC
/C
'/P
9) T2
UlX-SUCC
RSW-RCK-NO-MV89A
RSW-RCK-NO-MV89B
/C
'P
10) LCI-HTX-VF-HE-2A
AC4-RLY-NO-HOEB3
T2
UlX-SUCC
/C
'/P
11) LCI-HTX-VF-HE-2A
AC4-RLY-NO-HOEB1
T2
UlX-SUCC
/C
'P
DESCRI PTION
FAIL TO RESTO PM-3A PATH CMPTS AFT MAIN
LO REL 86-1HOEB03 PATH FAILURE
LOSS OF POWER CONVERSION SYS INITIATOR
SUCCESSFUL ALIGNMENT OF HPCI SUCT TO CS
REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM
SRV'S RESEAT
FAIL TO RESTO PM-3A PATH CMPTS AFT MAIN
REL 86A-1HOEB01 PATH FAILURE
LOSS OF POWER CONVERSION SYS INITIATOR
SUCCESSFUL ALIGNMENT OF HPCI SUCT TO CS
REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM
SRV'S RESEAT
LOSS OF POWER CONVERSION SYS INITIATOR
SUCCESSFUL ALIGNMENT OF HPCI SUCT TO CS
VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT NO OUTPUT
VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT NO OUTPUT
REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM
SRV'S RESEAT
LOOP A HEAT EXCHANGER E-2A FAILURE
LO REL 86-1HOEB03 PATH FAILURE
LOSS OF POWER CONVERSION SYS INITIATOR
SUCCESSFUL ALIGNMENT OF HPCI SUCT TO CS
REA9TOR PROTECTION SYSTEM
SRV'S RESEAT
LOOP A HEAT EXCHANGER E-2A FAILURE
REL 86A-1HOEB01 PATH FAILURE
LOSS OF POWER CONVERSION SYS INITIATOR
SUCCESSFUL ALIGNMENT OF HPCI SUCT TO CS
REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM
SRV'S RESEAT
PROB. (Note 1)
- 1.1OE-06
1. 1OE-06
5.42E-07
5.30E-07
5.30E-07
Table 4.3 - Samples of T2-4 Sequence Minimal Cutsets (Page 3 of 3)
EVENT NAME
12) LCI-XHE-RE-PM3DP
T2
Ulx-SUCC
DC1-BDC-ST-10500
/C
'/P
13) LCI-XHE-RE-PM3DP
T2
Ulx-SUCC
DC1-BDC-ST-DC-A4
/C
/P
14) LCI-XHE-RE-PM3DP
T2
Ulx-SUCC
DC1-BDC-ST-BCB2A
/C
/P
15) LCI-XHE-RE-PM3AP
T2
Ulx-SUCC
DC1-BDC-ST-10600
/C
/P
DESCRIPTION
FAIL TO RESTO PM-3D PATH CMPTS AFT MAIN
LOSS OF POWER CONVERSION SYS INITIATOR
SUCCESSFUL ALIGNMENT OF HPCI SUCT TO CS
PANEL FAULTS BY ANY LOAD 10500
REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM
SRV'S RESEAT
FAIL TO RESTO PM-3D PATH CMPTS AFT MAIN
LOSS OF POWER CONVERSION SYS INITIATOR
SUCCESSFUL ALIGNMENT OF HPCI SUCT TO CS
PANEL FAULTS BY ANY LOAD 71DC-A4
REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM
SRV'fS RESEAT
FAIL TO RESTO PM-3D PATH CMPTS AFT MAIN
LOSS OF POWER CONVERSION SYS INITIATOR
SUCCESSFUL ALIGNMENT OF HPCI SUCT TO CS
PANEL FAULTS BY ANY LOAD BCB-2A
REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM
SRV'S RESEAT
FAIL TO RESTO PM-3A PATH CMPTS AFT MAIN
LOSS OF POWER CONVERSION SYS INITIATOR
SUCCESSFUL ALIGNMENT OF HPCI SUCT TO CS
PANEL FAULTS BY ANY LOAD 10600
REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM
SRV'S RESEAT
PROB. (Note 1)
2.69E-07
2. 69E-07
2. 69E-07
2. 69E-07
Table 4.4 - Samples of T2-4 Sequence Minimal Cutsets (Page 1 of 4)
RHR Service Water (RSW)
(RSV-1):
(RSV-2):
(RSW-3):
(RSV-4):
(RSV- 5):
(RSW-6):
(RSV-7):
(RSW-8):
(RSV-9):
(RSV-10):
(RSV- 11):
(RSV- 12):
2 MOV RHRHX SW Discharge Valves, fail to open, P2MOVs= 3.8E-5
RHR Pumps, fail to run, P4MDPS = 7.6E-6
MOV 89A Control Circuit , no output, PNOA = 4.4E-6
MOV 89B Control Circuit , no output, PNOB = 4.4E 6
Manual Switch 1OA-S48B Path, fault, PFTB = -7
Manual Switch 1OA-S48A Path, fault, PFTA =5.5E-7
Motor Driven Valve MV89B, fail to open on demand, PCCB= 7
Motor Driven Valve MV89A, fail to open on demand, PCCA =7.E-7
Manual Valve 24B , fails closed (plugged), PPGV = 1.6E-7
Manual Valve 11B in Loop B, fails closed (plugged), PPG11v= 1.6E-7
Pump P-1A, fail to continue running, PFR1A= 1.6E-7
Pump P-1C, unavailable due to maintenance, PMA1C= 1.6E-7
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Table 4.4 - Plant Risk Contributions from Basic Events (Page 2 of 4)
Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LCI)
(LCI-1):
(LCI-2):
(LCI-3):
(LCI-4):
(LCI-5):
(LCI-6):
(LCI-7):
(LCI-8):
(LCI-9):
(LCI-10):
(LCI-11):
(LCI- 12):
(LCI- 13):
(LCI- 14):
(LCI-15):
(LCI- 16):
(LCI- 17):
(LCI- 18):
(LCI-19):
(LCI- 20):
(LCI- 21):
(LCI- 22):
(LCI- 23):
(LCI- 23):
(LCI- 25):
(LCI- 26):
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PM-3A Path, fail to restore after maintenance, PRE3A = 2.2E-5
Loop A Heat Exchanger E-2A, fails, PHEAF = 1.2E-5
PM-3D Path, fail to restore after maintenance, PRE3D = 2.1E-5
Loop B Heat Exchanger E-2B, fails, PHEBF = 1.2E-5
4 RHR Pumps, fails, P4MF = 2.8E-5
Motor Driven Valve MOV16A, fails to open on demand, PM16A= 1.3E-8
Motor Driven Valve MOV16B, fails to open on demand, PM16B= 1.3E-8
Relay 1OA-K84A Path, fails, PK84A =4.5E-9
Relay 1OA-K48B Path, fails, PK48B = 4.2E-9
SWGR Control Circuit, no output, PRP3D = 2.3E-7
Pump P-3D, stop running, PP-3DF = 2.6E-10
Check Valve VCM-30AN-42D, fails to open, PFOV = 1.1E-6
Relay 10-A-K22B, fails to remain open, PFRO = 5.9E-7
Manual Switch 10-S3D Path, Fails, PSWPF = 1.2E-10
Check Valve VCW-30AN-42B, fails to remain closed, PFRC= 2.9E-6
Valve MOV12B in Heat Exchanger outlet, plugged, P12PG = 2.0E-7
Valve MOV65B in Heat Exchanger outlet, plugged, P65BPG= 2.OE-7
Valve VCM-30AN-45D, fails to close, plugged, P45PG= 1.6E-7
Check Valve VCM-30AN-42C, fails to stay close, PFSC = 2.9E-6
SWGR Control Circuit RP-3A, no output, PNO3A = 2.3E-6
Check Valve VCM-30AN-42A, fails to open on demand, PF42A= 1.1E-6
Relay 10A-K19A, fails to remain open, PFRO = 6.9E-7
Valve P-3A, fails to close (plugged), PFPGP3A = 2.0E-7
Valve MOV65A fails to close (plugged), PFPG65A = 2.OE-7
Valve MOV12A, fails to close (plugged), PFPG12A = 2.0E-7
Manual Valve 151A, fails to close (plugged), PPG151A = 1. 6E-7
Table 4.4 - Plant Risk Contributions from Basic Events (Page 3 of 4)
Emergency Service Water System (ESV)
(ESW-1): Loop B, unavailable due to maintenace, PMLPB = 2.8E-6
(ESW-2): Loop A, unavailable due to maintenace, PLPA = 1.9E-6
(ESW-3): Motor Driven Pump 46-2A, fails to remain running, PFA= 2.2E-6
(ESW-4): Motor Driven Pump 46-2B, fails to remain running, PFRB= 2.2E-6
(ESW-5): Manual Valve 3B, fail to restore after test, PFR3B = 5.7E-7
(ESW-6): Manual Valve 3A, fail to restore after test, PFR3A = 5.7E-7
AC Power System (AC4)
(AC4-1): Bus 10600 UV Relay, miscalibration, PMC 5.7E-7
(AC4-2): Bus 10500 UV Relay, miscalibration, PMC = 5.7E-7
(AC4-3): Lower Relay 86A-1HOEB03 Path, fails, PRL86FB3= 8.8E-7
(AC4-4): Lower Relay 86A-1HOEB01 Path, fails, PRL86FB1= 8.8E-7
(AC4-5): Lower Relay 86A-1HOEAO1 Path, fails, PRL86FA1 = 1.9E-8
(AC4-6): Circuit Breaker 10640, fails normally running, PFNR1= 1.5E-6
(AC4-7): Circuit Breaker 10550, fails normally running, PFNR2 = 1.5E-6
High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HCI)
(HCI-1): System, unavailable due to maintenance, PHCIMA = 2.9E-7
(HCI-2): Turbine Driven Pump, fails to run, PPFR = 4.2E-8
(HCI-3): Turbine Driven Pump, fails to start, PPFR = 4.8E-8
(HCI-4): Steam Supply/Exhaust Path, fails, PSUPF = 1.7E-8
DC Power System (DC1)
(DC1-1): BCB-2B Panel, fault, by any load, PPLF2B= 1.7E-8
(DC1-2): 10500 Panel, fault, by any load, PPLF10500 = 1.3E-7
(DC1-3): 10600 Panel, fault, by any load, PPLF10600 = 1.3E-7
(DC1-4): 71DC-A4, fault, by any load, PPLF-A4 = 1.3E-7
(DC1-5): BCB-2A Panel, fault, by any load, PPLF2A = 1.3E-7
(DC1-6): DC Fuse, blown (negative), PFBL= 9.8E-8
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Table 4.4 - Plant Risk Contributions from Basic Events (Page 4 of 4)
Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water System (TBC)
(TBC-1): Control Circuit for Pump 37P-2B, fails, PPCF = 1.OE- 9
(TBC-2): Control Circuit for Pump 37P-2A, fails, PPCF = 1.0E-9
(TBC-3): Pump 37P-2B, unavailable due to maintenance, PpN = 8.8E-10
(TBC-4): Pump 37P-2B, fails to restore after maintenance, PFR = 2.1E-10
AC Power System (ACO)
(ACO-1): Transformer T3, unavailable due to maintenance, PT3U = 1.6E-9
(ACO-2): Transformer T2, unavailable due to maintenance, PT2U = 1.6E-9
Suppression Pool Cooling (SPC)
(SPC-1): Service Water 1OA-S17A path, fault, PF-S17A = 5.5E-7
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Table 4.5 - System Importance Rankings
System Ranking
LPCI 1
RSW 2
ESW 3
AC4 4
DC1 5
SPC 6
HPCI 7
TBC 8
ACO 9
Table 4.6 - Component Group Ranking
GROUP RANKING
PUMPS 1
VALVES 2
HEAT EXCHANGERS 3
CONTROL CIRCUITS 4
TRAINS 5
RELAYS 6
SWITCHGEAR 7
BUSES 8
FUSES 9
TRANSFORMERS 10
52
Table 4.7 - LPCI System Component Importance Ranking
COMPONENT & FAILURE MODES FAILURE DATA RANKING
4 RHR Pumps - FS 2.8E-5 1
PM-3A Path - RE 2.2E-5 2
PM-3D Path - RE 2.1E-5 3
Heat Exchanger E-2A - DN
E- 2b - DN 1.2E- 5 4
Check valve VCM-30AN-42B - CO
VCM-30AN-42C - CO 6.9E-6 5
Control Circuit RP-3A - NO 2.3E-6 6
Check valve VCM-30AN-42A - CC
VCM-30AN-42D -- CC 1.1E-6 7
Relay 1OA-K19 -+ C 6.9E-7 8
Relay 1OA-K22B - OC 5.9E-7 9
Control Circuit RP-3D - NO 2.3E- 7 10
MOV12B - PG
MOV65B - PG
Valve P-3A - PG
MOV65A - PG
MOV12A -- PG 2.0E-7 11
Valve VCM-30AN-45D -- PG
Manual valve 151A -+PG 1.6E-7 12
NOV 16A - CC
16B - CC 1.3E-8 13
Relay 1OA-K48A path - NO
1OA-K48B Path -+ NO 4.5E-9 14
Pump P-3D - FR 2.6E-10 15
Switchgear 10-S3D - DN 1.2E- 10 16
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Table 4.8 - Importance Matrix
IISIBE ISBES COMPONENT FAILURE MODES
1AIfICs
CLIAL A IICIN CC OC CO | PG | FS | FR | ST | NO DN MC RE MA
FA IL 171B CAUSES
* VALVES * Valve Group Ranking = 2
RSW SYSTEM 1
2 DISCH. NOVS 1
RSV SYSTEM 3
MOV 89A 16
RSV SYSTEM 3
MOV 89B 16
RSV SYSTEM 2
MANU VALVE 24B 24
RSW SYSTEM 2
MANU.VALVE 11B 24
LPCI SYSTEM 4
MOV 16A 31
LPCI SYSTEM 4
MOV 16B 31
LPCI SYSTEM 2
CHK. VALVE 42A 14
LPCI SYSTEM 1
CHK. VALVE 42B 8
LPCI SYSTEM 1
CHK. VALVE 42C 8
LPCI SYSTEM 2
CHK. VALVE 42D 14
LPCI SYSTEM 1
MOV 12B 23
LPCI SYSTEM 1
MOV 65B 23
LPCI SYSTEM
CHK. VALCE 45D
2
24
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FS | FR | ST | NO | DN |MC | RE | MA
LPCI SYSTEM 1
MOV 3A 23
LPCI SYSTEM 1
MOV 65A 23
LPCI SYSTEM 1
MOV 12A 23
LPCI SYSTEM 2
MA.VALVE 151A 24
ESW SYSTEM 2
MANU. VALVE 3A 19
ESW SYSTEM 2
MANU. VALVE 3B 19
* PUMPS * Pump Group Ranking =1
RSW SYSTEM 2 3
PUMP 1A 6 24
RSW SYSTEM 2
PUMP 1B 6
RSW SYSTEM 2 4
PUMP iC 6 24
RSW SYSTEM 2
PUMP 1D 6
LPCI SYSTEM 1 1
PUMP 3A 2 3
LPCI SYSTEM 1
PUMP 3B 2
LPCI SYSTEM 1
PUMP 3C 2
LPCI SYSTEM 1 5 2
PUMP 3D 2 37 4
ESW SYSTEM 1
PUMP 2A 11
ESY SYSTEM
PUMP 2B
1
11
55
cc | 0 CO |PG |
* UP cn.|CC | 0 CO |PG |FS |FR |ST |NO |DN |MC |RE | A
*PUMPS *(cont.
HPCI SYSTEM 3 4
TUB. DIV. PUMP 27 28
TBC SYSTEM 3 5
PUMP 37P-2B 38 36
* CON. CIRCUITS * Control Circuit Group Ranking = 4
RSW SYSTEM 1
MOV 89A CON. 7
RSW SYSTEM 1
MOV 89B CON. 7
LPCI SYSTEM 2
SWG.CON.RP-3A 10
LPCI SYSTEM 4
SWG.CON.RP-3D 22
AC4 SYSTEM 2
BREAKER 10640 13
AC4 SYSTEM 2
BREAKER 10550 13
TBC SYSTEM 9
P37-2A CONTROL 35
TBC SYSTEM 9
P37-2B CONTROL 35
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* RELAYS *
LPCI SYSTEM
1OA-K48A PATH
LPCI SYSTEM
1OA-K48B PATH
LPCI SYSTEM
1OA-K22B PATH
CC | C |CO I PG I FS | FR | ST | NO DN | MC | RE | MA
Relay Group Ranking = 6
7
32
8
33
1
18
LPCI SYSTEM 2
10A-K19A PATH 17
AC4 SYSTEM 1
10600 BUS UV 19
AC4 SYSTEM 1
10500 BUS UV 19
AC4 SYSTEM 6
86A-1HiEA01 29
AC4 SYSTEM 3
86A-1HOEB01 15
AC4-SYSTEM 3
86A-1HOEB03 15
* ELEC BUSES * Buses Group Ranking = 8
DC1 SY
BCB-2A
STEM 1
25
DC1 SYSTEM
BCB-2B
DC1 SYSTEM
10500 PANEL
DC1 SYSTEM
10600 PANEL
DC1 SYSTEM
71DC-A4 DIV
2
30
1
25
1
25
1
25
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* SWITCIGEAR *
CC | OC | CO | PG | FS | FR : ST
Switchgear Group Ranking =
NO | DN | MC | RE | MA
7
RSW SYSTEM 3
1OA-S48B PATH 20
RSW SYSTEM 3
1OA-S48A PATH 20
SPC SYSTEM 3
10A-S17A PATH 20
LPCI SYSTEM 5
SWG. 10-S3D 39
* HEAT EXCHANGER * Heat Exchanger Group Ranking = 3
LPCI SYSTEM 1
LOOP A-E2A 5
LPCI SYSTEM 1
LOOP B-E2B 5
* TRAINS * Trains Group Ranking = 5
ESW SYSTEM 2
LOOP A 12
ESW SYSTEM 1
LOOP B 9
HPCI SYSTEM 4
STEAM SUP. PATH 30
HPCI SYSTEM 3
WHOLE SYSTEM 21
* TRANSFOIER * Transformer Group Ranking = 10
ACO SYSTEM 4
TRANSFORMER 2 34
ACO SYSTEM 4
TRANSFORMER 3 34
* FUSES * Fuse Group Ranking = 9
DC1 SYSTEM 5
DC FUSE 26
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The Failure Modes, as defined in JAF PRA analysis, are listed below:
CC Normally closed, fails to open on demand
0C Normally open, fails to remain open
CO Normally closed, fails to remain closed
PG Plugged, blockage
FS Fails to start
FR Fails to continue running
ST Short circuit
NO No output
DN Does not operate
MC Miscalibration
RE Failure to restore to correct position following test
and maintenance
MA Unavailable due to maintenance
The Failure Causes are defined as follow:
CCF Common Cause Failure
TE Test
MAI Maintenance
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Table 4.9 - Loss of Containment Heat Removal Initiator Frequencies
Before Recovery
Initiator
T1
T2
T3A
T3B
T3C
TAC-10500
TAC-10600
TDC- A
TDC-B
A
S1
S2
Total
Frequency*
2.03E 5/RY
7.05E- 5/RY
4.95E-6/RY
1.43E 6/RY
3.50E- 7/RY
1.60E 6/RY
5.00E 8/RY
3.90E 5/RY
3.95E 5/RY
1.76E-8/RY
7.23E 8/RY
2.24E 8/RY
1.69E-4/RY
*Each frequency is calculated by summing the individual sequence
are dominant (i.e., >1.0E-9)
frequencies that
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0.03
0.02-
0.01- CCF
0.00- I I .
0 200 400 600
Increase in Human Error/CCF Rate
Figure 4.1 - Scoping Calculation (Change in Risk With
Change in Human Error and CCF Rates)
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5. MAINTENANCE PROGRAM IMPACT ON CCF RATES
In Section 4.2.2, the common cause failure (CCF) of 4 RHR pumps is identified as
being the most important contributor to RHR system unavailability and a prime
contributor to plant risk10. CCF events have been found to be dominant risk contributors
in many PRA studies. This section develops an approach for analyzing the effects of
different maintenance practices on the likelihood of common cause failure, and applies this
approach to a number of test cases. The approach is used to analyze postulated changes in
the JAF maintenance program in Section 7.
5.1 General Procedure for Calculating CCF Rates
Ref. 37 presents a general approach for including common cause failures in a PRA
study. (As noted in earlier sections, "common cause failure analysis" refers to the
statistical analysis of dependent failure events not explicitly modeled elsewhere in a PRA.)
The approach employs four major stages: 1) system logic model development,
2) identification of common cause component groups, 3) common cause modeling and data
analysis, and 4) system quantification and interpretation of results. This work focuses on
the third stage, since the results of the first two stages are incorporated in the JAF IPE,
and the fourth stage is the subject of Section 7 of this report.
According to Ref. 37, common cause modeling and data analysis in the third stage
are accomplished using the following four steps:
a Define common cause basic events.
@ Select probability model for common cause basic events.
0 Classify and screen CCF event data.
0 Estimate common cause failure model parameters.
The following subsections discuss the application of these steps towards the analysis
of the failure of 4 RHR pumps.
5.1.1 Step 1 - Common Cause Basic Event Definition
In general, the objective of a CCF analysis is to quantify the frequency with which
multiple components in a common cause failure group (which is usually composed of
redundant, identical components in a system) fail due to the same cause. If there are m
components in the group, the analysis is intended to estimate Qk, the frequency with which
k components (k = 1,2,...,m) fail due to a single cause.
In this study, the basic event of interest is the common cause failure of 4
motor-driven RHR pumps. This frequency of this event is denoted by Q4mdp in the
remainder of this study.
5.1.2 Step 2 - Selection of Probability Model
A number of probability models for CCF analysis are presented in Ref. 37. In
particular, it describes both the #l-factor model [38], which is used in the JAF IPE, and an
improved version, the a-factor model [9], which is used in this study. As discussed in
Refs. 9 and 37, the a-factor model has two advantages: a) it explicitly treats different
loThe basic event is denoted LCI-CCF-PF-4MDPM in the James A. Fitzpatrick (JAF)
Individual Plant Examination (IPE).
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levels of common cause failure events, and b) uncertainties in its parameters can be more
easily estimated from available data. This latter advantage is due to the system-level
orientation of the a-factor model, as opposed to the component-level orientation of the
3-factor model.
Using the a-factor model, the frequency of interest, Q4mdp, is computed as follows:
Q4mdp = 4a 4 (5.1)
where
ak= fraction of RHR pump failure events involving the failure of k pumps
(k = 1,2,3,4) due to a common cause
Od total demand failure rate for an RHR pump (runtime failures are
neglected, due to their low likelihood)
at E a normalization factor, a, + 2a 2 + 3a3 + 4a4.
The value of the demand failure rate (#d) can be estimated from data (the number of
failures divided by the number of trials), but is often obtained from standard sources of
PRA parameter values. The values of the ak are estimated from available CCF event
data, as described in the next two subsections.
5.1.3 Step 3 - CCF Event Data Classification and Screening
In preparation for a-factor estimation, the available CCF event data are reviewed for
their applicability to the problem at hand. Events judged to be inapplicable are "screened
out" of the data base, i.e., they are not used in the estimation process.
Ref. 37 presents a number of general guidelines for screening events.
* Component-caused functional unavailabilities are screened out. It is assumed that
multiple failures events in which one component failure is caused directly by the
failure of another are directly modeled in the PRA. Note that the validity of this
assumption depends on the modeling boundaries used (e.g., whether or not control
circuits which can affect multiple components are treated separately or are included
as part of the affected components).
* If a plant-specific defense exists that clearly precludes a class of CCF events, all
specific events belonging to that class can be screened out.
* Events related to inapplicable plant conditions (e.g. pre-operational testing) can be
screened out unless they reveal general causal mechanisms capable of occurring
during power operation.
* If the event occurred during shutdown and would be restored before resuming power
operation because of pre-service testing or if it cannot occur during power operation,
the event is screened out.
* When considering multiple failure events, if the second failure happened after the
first failure was dealt with, the failures are considered as being independent.
* Events regarding incipient failure modes (e.g., packing leaks) that clearly do not
violate component success criteria can be screened out.
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* Only the events regarding the failure modes of interest are taken into consideration;
events regarding failure modes that are irrelevant to the system logic model are
screened out.
Due to the rarity of CCF events, the CCF parameter estimation process is quite
sensitive to variations in the data base. The classification and screening task is therefore
quite an important one. Section 5.2 discusses the performance of this task for the RHR
pump CCF data.
5.1.4 Step 4 - CCF Parameter Estimation
In principle, the estimation of the ac-factors is straightforward. Let nk represent the
number of failure events in the data base involving the common cause failure of k
components. Then a maximum-likelihood point estimate for ak is given by
ak = m k (5.2)
i=1
where m is the number of components in the common cause group. However, in practice,
there may be significant uncertainty in the ni [37,39].
To understand the sources of this uncertainty, it is important to recognize that the
raw data used for CCF analysis generally consist of narratives of CCF events that have
occurred in nuclear power plants. Furthermore, most of the events do not involve the
plant being analyzed. These two points lead to uncertainties in determining the nk.
First, because the event narratives do not always provide enough detail, there can be
significant uncertainty as to how many components were actually failed as a result of the
event. Second, it is not clear if the event is applicable to the plant being analyzed, or, if it
is applicable, what the level of impact of the event would be. In other words, even if the
same initial common cause initiating fault arises, the number of components affected by
the common cause could vary. (Note that clearly inapplicable events are screened out of
the data base, as described in the preceding subsection.) The second source of uncertainty
is due to differences both in plant design and in plant operation and maintenance policies.
A three-step approach is used to quantify the a-factors, given the uncertainty in the
CCF event data base [37]:
i) Create an "impact vector" for each CCF event (or potential CCF event). For Eventj in the data base, the impact vector is:
qj = {qoj, qij, ... , qkj, ... , qmj} (5.3)
where qkj is the probability that the jth event involved the common cause failure of k
components. If the impact of the event is known with certainty, one Pk is assigned a
value of unity and the others are assigned values of zero. For example in one event
in the event data base, one RHR pump failed to start on demand because of a poorly
connected fuse. The plant experiencing the event has only two RHR pumps. Thus,
the impact vector for this event is {0,1,0}.
ii) Modify the impact vectors to reflect the specific conditions at the plant being
analyzed. This requires an assessment of the applicability of the event and an
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assessment of the magnitude of the event. Differences in system size are also treated
(Ref. 37 describes "mapping up" and "mapping down" procedures that can be used to
systematically account for differences in system size.) The result is a set of modified
impact vectors:
Pj = {Poj, Pj, ... , Pkj, ... , p.j} (5.4)
where Pkj is the probability that the jth event would lead to the common cause
failure of k components at the plant being analyzed.
iii) Estimate the ak using average values for the nk'1 :
= k (5.5)
i=1
where nk is the average number of events leading to the common cause failure of k
components. If there are N modified impact vectors in the CCF event data base,
N
k= Pkj (5.6)
j=1
The application of this estimation procedure in the analysis of RHR pump common
cause failures is discussed in Section 5.3.
5.2 Development of Screened RHR Pump Failure Event Data Base
This section discusses the collection of failure event data regarding RHR pumps (with
an emphasis on common cause failures) and the screening of this data prior to application
to JAF. The screening is based on the rules provided in Section 5.1.3, the assumptions and
boundary conditions of the RHR system model, and the plant-specific conditions at JAF.
Also discussed are the root causes and the linking mechanisms underlying each of the
multiple failure events in the screened data base.
5.2.1 Data Sources
Ref. 40 provides an analysis of RHR pump failure events occurring over the period
1972 through 1981. Ref. 41 summarizes RHR pump failure events for the period 1972
through 1980. Ref. 41 provides more information on system performance and failure
causes, and is used as the basis for the quantitative analysis done in this study.
5.2.2 Selection of Events
Ref. 41 provides one-line descriptions of pump failure events sorted by system.
There are 76 RHR pump failure events included in this listing. Of these 76 events, 17 are
found to be applicable. The screening process employs the following criteria:
1"This use of the average values for the nk is approximate. Ref. 39 provides an exact
approach for dealing with data uncertainties, but also shows that the error in the point
estimate for ak generated using the approximate method is usually small.
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* Pre-operational failure events are eliminated. (These events are identified by
comparing the commercial operation date and the date of the event.)
* Most failure events coded as "loss of function" and "leakage/rupture" are eliminated.
As stated in Ref. 41, "loss of function" refers to degraded performance of the pump,
but the pump continues to run. Only those events in which the pump eventually
stopped (or failed to start in the first place) are included.
* Failure events involving components outside of the pump boundary (as modeled in
the PRA) are not included. The following components are considered to be within
the pump boundary:
- driver (the motor)
- pump to motor coupling
- other pump hardware, including casing, impeller, shaft, bearing
- pump motor circuit breaker
- pump motor control circuit, panel, switch, relay
* Pump failures caused by the failure of operators to restore the system following
testing or maintenance are not included (these are modeled separately).
* Only "fail to start" events are included. Runtime failures, although observed, do not
contribute significantly to plant risk.
Table 5.1 provides a listing of the 17 events surviving the screening process.
Table 5.2 indicates the plant name, the population of RHR pumps at the plant, the number
of RHR system demands, and the total run (exposure) time. Table 5.3 provides the failure
codes used in Table 5.1.
5.2.3 RHR Pump Failure Mechanisms
Some understanding of the failure mechanisms underlying the RHR pump failure
events in Table 5.1 is needed in order to develop the impact vectors for these events. This
understanding is also essential to the assessment of the impact of various maintenance
program changes on the likelihood of common cause failure.
Two particular issues are of interest: what was the failure root cause, and how did
more than one component become susceptible to the same failure cause at the same time,
i.e., what was the "coupling mechanism." With the identification of root causes and
coupling mechanisms, the effectiveness of CCF defense tactics implicit in the current (or
modified) maintenance practices at JAF can be evaluated.
5.2.3.1 Root Causes
Knowledge of a failure event's root cause is important because it indicates how
defenses can be constructed to prevent the causal chain of events that eventually led to
failure. However, since defenses can applied at different points in the chain, and since the
concept of a root cause is generally tied to the defenses being considered, different analysts
may identify different "root causes" for the same event. In this work, root causes of failure
events are defined in terms of the maintenance proqram. Events occurring after the root
cause but before the final failure event are termed proximate causes" by Ref. 42.
A "proximate cause" of a failure event is a condition that is readily identifiable as
leading to the failure. For example, an event may involve a pump failure due to a failed
motor; the motor failed because of a lack of lubrication. A proximate cause for the event is
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the lack of lubrication. However, the eventual cause of the lack of lubrication, as shown in
Table 5.4, could be a deficiency in the maintenance program. If so, then this deficiency is
the root cause of the event.
Ref. 42 provides two concepts useful for the systematic review of the failure event
data, especially for the analysis of environment-caused failures. These are the notions of a
"conditioning event" and a "trigger event." A "conditioning event" is an event that
predisposes a component to failure or increases its susceptibility to failure, but does not of
itself cause failure. In the previous example (failed pump motor), possible conditioning
events are the failure of maintenance personnel to properly lubricate the motor moving
parts and the lubrication oil quality does not meet required standards. (Note that the
notion of an "event" is somewhat stretched by the last example.) The effect of the
conditioning event is latent, but the conditioning event is, in this and other cases, a
necessary contributor to the failure mechanism.
A "trigger event" is an event that activates a failure or initiates the transition to the
failed state, regardless of whether that failure is revealed at the time the trigger event
occurs. In the previous example, the trigger event is not indicated by the event
description. A trigger event, particularly in the case of CCF events, is usually an event
external to the components in the question.
The root causes for the 17 events listed in Table 5.1 are presented in Table 5.5.
These are later used when assessing the CCF event impact vectors.
5.2.3.2 Coupling Mechanisms
In order for a multiple failure event to result from an initial root cause, the
conditions have to be conducive to the trigger event and/or the conditioning events
affecting all components simultaneously. (In this context, "simultaneous" failures are
failures that occur close enough in time such that redundant components cannot perform
their mission.) In other words, a "coupling mechanism" which links the failures of multiple
equipment must exist.
More formally, a "coupling mechanism" (sometimes referred as coupling factor) is a
characteristic of a group of component or piece parts that identifies them as susceptible to
the same causal mechanisms of failure [37,42]. Three categories of coupling mechanisms for
dependent failure events are functional, spatial, and human coupling mechanisms. For
CCF analysis, the last two categories are the most applicable. Functional coupling of
failures, such as the failure of a pump due to the failure of its supply bus, is usually treated
explicitly in PRA system models. Spatially coupled failures involve situations where the
failed components are exposed to the same environmental threat (e.g., high temperature).
Human coupled failures can take many forms, including design errors, operation errors,
maintenance errors, etc.
The coupling mechanisms for the 17 events listed in Table 5.1 are presented in
Table 5.6. These are later used when assessing the CCF event impact vectors.
5.3 Modeling Maintenance Impact on CCF Rates
The approach for quantifying the effect of maintenance program changes on the
a-factors is described in this section. This approach is outlined in Figure 5.1. The
approach is applied to the JAF maintenance program and postulated changes in that
program in Section 7.
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5.3.1 Initial Impact Vectors for Actual Events
As stated in Section 5.1.4, the first step in the estimation of the a-factors is the
assessment of the initial impact vectors for each of the events in the data base. For each
event, the analyst must determine:
* Whether the event involves independent failures, a non-lethal shock, or a lethal
shock. A non-lethal shock has the potential to fail all of the components in a
common cause component group. A lethal shock fails all of the components in the
group.
* The conditional failure probability p for a single component, given a non-lethal shock
(if the event involves a non-lethal shock). This parameter is used by the "mapping
up" and "mapping down" procedures described in Ref. 37, as discussed in
Section 5.4.3.
If the number of components failed is less than the total number of components in
the common cause component group, it can be expected that p is neither very small
(close to 0) or very large (close to 1). The following assignment rules are used for p.
Let m be the size of the common cause component group, and let k be the number of
components actually failedI 0.5 if k = 1
m=2:
0.8 if k = 2
0.3 if k= 1
m =3: p= 0.6 if k= 2
0.8 if k = 3
0.2 if k= 1
0.4 if k= 2
m =4: p=
0.6 ifk = 3
0.8 if k = 4
* The impact vectors for each event [see Eq. (5.3)]. In the case of independent events,
separate impact vectors are created for each event. In the case of lethal shocks, qk =
0.0 for k J m and qmj = 1.0. In the case of non-lethal shocks, judgment based on the
qualitative event description (which allows an inference of the underlying coupling
mechanism) is employed.
The impact vectors for the 17 events listed in Table 5.1 are presented in Table 5.7.
5.3.2 Degree of Applicability to JAF
The second step in the estimation process, following the creation of the impact
vectors for the actually experienced CCF events (the initial impact vectors), is the creation
of impact vectors relevant to the plant being analyzed (the modified impact vectors). This
second step employs, in principle, an assessment of the degree of applicability of each CCF
event to the plant being analyzed, a mapping of the initial impact vectors to the modified
impact vectors (if the sizes of the common cause component groups at the plants are
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different), and an assessment of the degree to which the modified impact vector profiles
(the relative values of the Pki) are different from the initial impact vector profiles (the
relative values of the qki). This section discusses the applicability assessment. The
mapping up/down procedure is briefly discussed in Section 5.3.3. The assessment of
changes in impact vector profiles is not performed in this study; it is judged that such
changes represent second order effects in the estimation of a-factors.
When analyzing the applicability of a CCF event, the following question must be
answered: Given all the qualitative differences between the two plants/systems, to what
extent are the root cause(s) and coupling mechanism(s) observed in the event relevant to
the system being analyzed (the "new" system)? Clearly, judgment must be employed to
answer this question. The following sections describe a procedure that is useful in
structuring this judgment. When applied to a given CCF event, the procedure results in a
probability that the event's root cause is applicable to the new system, and a probability
that the event's coupling mechanism is applicable to the new system. Define the "root
cause applicability" and the "coupling mechanism applicability" as follows:
arej = P {root cause for Event j is applicable to plant}
acmj = P{ coupling mechanism for Event j is applicable to plant}
Treating the root cause and coupling mechanisms as being independent (this assumption
can be relaxed on a case-by-case basis), the overall applicability of Event j is then defined
as
aj ~arcj* ac mj (5.7)
(Note that when Event j does not involve multiple failures, ac.- - 1.) This is the
probability that the event is applicable and should be used in te estimation of a-factors.
Using aj, the average impact vector for Event j is then obtained using the definition of
conditional probability:
pj = aj*pj(given that Event j is applicable)
+ (1 - aj)*pj(given that Event j is not applicable) (5.8)
For example, consider Event 9 in Table 5.1. The plant experiencing this event has 3
RHR pumps. The original impact vector assessed for this event is
q9 = (0, 0.8, 0.1, 0.1)
If the plant being analyzed also has 3 RHR pumps, the modified impact vector suitable for
use in estimating a1, a2, and a3 is:
p9 = (1 - a9, 0.8a 9, 0.1a9, 0.1ag)
If the plant being analyzed has more than 3 RHR pumps, this impact vector must be
modified using the "mapping up" procedure described in Ref. 37.
The root cause and coupling mechanism applicabilities arcj and acmj are functions of
the event's root cause(s) and coupling mechanism(s), and of the analyzed plant's defenses
with respect to these root cause(s) and coupling mechanism(s). The root causes and
coupling mechanisms for the CCF events are shown in Tables 5.5 and 5.6.
The quantitative effects of the root cause defenses (expressed at the level of the
maintenance program block diagram shown in Figure 2.1) are determined using Table 5.8.
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This table is called the "root cause-maintenance defense matrix" (RC-MD matrix). The
row headings in this matrix represent possible root causes; the column headings represent
the possible (maintenance-program level) defenses again conditioning events that will allow
the root cause to propagate to a failure. By providing more maintenance program defenses,
the likelihood of the root cause propagating to a failure is reduced (strengthening a given
defense reduces the likelihood that a conditioning event occurs). The entries in the matrix
indicate which of the following tables (Tables 5.9-5.12) should be used in the root cause
portion of the applicability analysis; their use is described below. The entries in
Tables 5.9-5.12 are based on failure rate multipliers collected from a variety of sources. It
is assumed that these failure rate multipliers can be used directly in an applicability
assessment.
The quantitative effects of the coupling mechanism defenses are determined using
Table 5.13. This table is called the "coupling mechanism-maintenance defense matrix'
(CM-MD matrix). The row headings in this matrix represent possible coupling
mechanisms; the column headings represent the the possible (maintenance-program level)
defenses again conditioning events that will allow the coupling mechanism to link multiple
failures. The entries in the matrix indicate which of Tables 5.14-5.17 should be used in the
coupling mechanism portion of the applicability analysis; their use is described below. The
entries in Tables 5.14-5.17 are also based on failure rate multipliers collected from a
variety of sources. It is assumed that these failure rate multipliers can be used directly in
an applicability assessment.
In general, the root cause applicability is a function of the failure rate multipliers
provided in Tables 5.9-5.12. Assuming that a simple linear combination model is
reasonable,
arcj = wrckMrc-md,k (5.9)
k
where the summation is over the different contributing root causes for event j, Mrc-d,k is a
multiplier for root cause k (given the maintenance defenses for the plant experiencing the
event and the defenses for the plant being analyzed) derived from the values presented in
Tables 5.9-5.12, and wrc,k is the assigned weight used to reflect which root cause is
dominant. The coupling mechanism applicability, acmj, is computed similarly.
The following procedure is used to apply Eq. (5.9).
Step 1
General: Develop the root cause weights (Wrc) for each event. Assuming that one of the
root causes is dominant, the following three rules are used to assign weights:
* Two contributing root causes: the dominant root cause is assigned a
weight of 0.8; the other root cause is assigned a weight of 0.2.
* Three contributing root causes: the dominant root cause is assigned a
weight of 0.6; the other root causes are assigned weights of 0.2.
* Four contributing root causes: the dominant root cause is assigned a
weight of 0.7; the other root causes are assigned weights of 0.1.
Note that if an event involves more contributing root causes, these rules may
need to be extended.
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Example: For Event 9, assume that a lack of RHR pump-specific training and complete
reliance on corrective maintenance are the two root causes. Let the latter be
the dominant one. Then the root cause weights are:
wrc training) = 0.2
wrc maintenance policy) = 0.8
Step 2
General: Develop the coupling mechanism weights (wcM) for each event. This is done in
the same manner (and with the same rules) as for the root cause weights.
Example: For Event 9, assume that the coupling mechanisms involve the use of deficient
procedures for maintenance and the same maintenance crew for both pumps
(without any staggerring in schedule). Assuming that the latter is dominant,
we have:
wcm(procedure) = 0.2
wcm(crew) = 0.8
Step 3
General: For each contributing root cause and each conditioning event defense, assess
the appropriate RC-MD multiplier (this is a function of the current practice for
each maintenance program block). This multiplier is the ratio of: a failure rate
multiplier specific to the plant being analyzed, and a failure rate multiplier
specific to the plant actually experiencing the CCF event. Thus, it measures
the relative difference between the maintenance practices of the two plants
with respect to the root cause/conditioning event defense combination. If the
maintenance practices at the plant experiencing the CCF event are unknown,
an average multiplier is used in the denominator of the ratio.
Compute the weighted sum of these RC-MD multipliers, where the weights are
obtained in Step 1 above. Perform a similar task for each contributing coupling
mechanism to obtain the weighted sum of the CM-MD multipliers (the weights
are obtained in Step 2 above). The product of the average RC-MD multiplier
and the average CM-MD multiplier is the applicability for the event.
Example: Continue with Event 9. Assume that at the plant being analyzed, the
maintenance crew is trained in the procedures specific to the RHR pumps. The
relevant entry in Table 5.8 is 'm2'; this indicates that Table 5.10 is used to
provide the multiplier value.
Mrc-md(training) = 0 = 0.79
Assume that at the plant being analyzed, only corrective maintenance is used.
The relevant entry in Table 5.8 is 'm3'; this indicates that Table 5.11 is used to
provide the multiplier value.
Mrc-md(maintenance policy) = = 1.0T 1.3 acu
The average applicability for the contributing root causes is then given by
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arcs wre(traini ng) *Mre- d(t raining) +
wrc(maintenance policy)*Mrc -d(maintenance policy)
= 0.2*0.79 + 0.8*1.0
= 0.96
The average applicability for the contributing coupling mechanisms is found in
a similar manner. Assuming that at the plant being analyzed, the same crew
performs the maintenance actions on both pumps but the maintenance is
staggered, the relevant entries in Table 5.13 are 'm5' and 'm6'. Assuming that
the procedures at the plant being analyzed are also deficient, the relevant entry
is 'm8'. Using Tables 5.14, 5.15, and 5.17, there obtains
Mem-md(crew) = * 0.2 0.5
Mem-md(procedures) = 0.5 1.0
Thus
acm9 = wcm(crew)*Mcm -md(crew) + wem(procedures)*Mcm-md(procedures)
= 0.8*0.5 + 0.2*1.0
= 0.6
The total applicability for Event 9 is then given by
ag = arc9*acm9 = 0.58
The modified impact vector for Event 9 is then
pg = (0.42, 0.46, 0.06, 0.06)
Note that this impact vector may need to be modified to account for differences
in system size (between the plant being analyzed and the plant experiencing the
event). The "mapping up/down" procedures used to accomplish this are
described briefly in the following section.
The example calculation used in this section is only applied to a single plant
maintenance program. It can be seen that the same approach can be used to determine the
impact of maintenance programs changes on event applicability. The applicability
quantification procedure described above is illustrated in Figure 5.2.
5.3.3 Mapping Up and Mapping Down
The applicability analysis is used to determine the degree to which a CCF event in
the data base is applicable to the plant being analyzed. Even after the applicability
analysis is performed, however, some adjustments to the impact vector may be required to
account for differences in system size.
Consider for example, Event 9 in Table 5.1. As mentioned previously, this event
occurred at a plant with only 3 RHR pumps. The modified impact vector assessed for this
plant, pg = (1 - ag, 0.8ag, 0.1ag, 0.)lag is not necessarily directly applicable to a plant with
4 RHR pumps.
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To account for differences in system (or more precisely, common cause component
group) size, Ref. 37 provides "mapping up" and "mapping down" procedures. These
procedures are summarized in Tables 5.18 and 5.19; it can be seen that the parameter p
assessed earlier in Section 5.3.1 is needed at this point.
To illustrate the use of these tables, assume that the modified impact vector for
Event 9 is to be mapped up to a plant with 4 RHR pumps. Let the non-lethal shock
probability (p) be 0.50. Using the equations in Table 5.18 for the 3 -4 mapping, we obtain
the following final impact vector:
pg = (0.34, 0.31, 0.26, 0.06, 0.03)
The impact vectors for RHR pump failures, modified to account for applicability and
system size, are presented in Table 5.20. These are used in the estimation of the a-factor
model parameters, as described in the following section.
5.3.4 Estimation of CCF Parameters
Given the impact vectors in Table 5.20, the a-factors can be estimated in a
straightforward fashion using Eqs. (5.5) and (5.6). Note that the data provided by Ref. 41
can also be useful for estimating #d. For a 4-pump system,
4
d kN * k (5.10)
k=1
In order to reflect the impact of changes in maintenance on #d, the maximum
likelihood estimator is modified as follows:
Mrc-mdri(modified program Mcm-mddi modified program
Mrc-mdi(baseline program) j Mcm-d,j(baseline program)
This equation is used in the sensitivity analyses presented in Section 7.
Using Eqs. (5.2) and (5.10), the following maximum-likelihood estimates for the
a-factor model parameters are obtained using root cause and coupling mechanism
weights/multipliers that best characterize the JAF maintenance program:
a, = 0.76
a2 = 0.18
a3 = 0.05
a4 = 0.01
Od = 0.005/demand
Using Eq. (5.1), a point estimate for Q4mdp is found:
Q4mdp = 1.6*10~4
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Table 5.1 - 17 Events Surviving Screening (Page 1 of 2)
No. Plant Event Failure Failure Mode Failure Cause
Name Date Code,Type,Class;
1 DB1 011678 B13, T, T Decay heat pump 1-1; Poor fuse contact in CKT
Fuses in BKR. Start CKT
2 DB1 110679 B13, T, T DHR pump 1 failed to start Faulty switch
3 BR1 060177 B13, S, D 1A RHR did not start on Sticky contactor on control
auto-signal switch
4 BR1 110577 B02, S, T RHR 1A did not start; cover Corroded due to water leaks
loose and contact corroded
5 BR1 010979 B13, S, D RHR pump 'D' would not Internal problems in circuit
start breaker
6 BR2 040479 B13, U, T RHR pumps 2B and 2D Would Poor connections on fuses
not start from RTGB and fuse box
7 C01 122379 B13, S, D RHR pump '1D' would not Breaker failure
operate
8 DA1 042375 B13, S, D RHR pump 229B failed to Logic relay E11-K708 did not
start trip as required
9 DR2 062576 B19, T, D 2C LPCI failed to start from Dirty switch in 4kv for pump
maintaining torus WTR. TEMP.
10 DR2 041579 BOO, , U 2A LPCI pump would not Cause unknown
start
Table 5.1 - 17 Events Surviving Screening (Page 2 of 2)
No. Plant Event Failure Failure Mode Failure Cause
Name Date Code,Type,Class;
11 EN1 070175 B13, S, D RHR 1B air circuit breaker Slipped cam in latch assemb.
failed to close of ACB
12 EN2 041580 B13, S, D 'D' RHR pump failed to Wire missing from terminal
start on LOCA signal No.7 on relay
13 FP1 121274 B18, S, D RHR pump 10P-3D failed to Breaker DC charging motor
start; replaced faulty BKR burned out
14 FP1 102079 B13, S, T RHR pump 'C' failed to Limit switch not adjusted
start properly properly
15 PB2 042978 B01 S, D Unit 2 'B'and 'D' RHR pumps Operator removed unit 2
blocked for 2 hours instead of unit 3 pump
16 VY1 011877 B13, S, D 'D' RHR pump would not A loose lead in a breaker
start caused failure
17 TR1 052577 B13, T, D B RHR Pump did not start- Sequencer contacts open with
Automatic too low current
Table 5.2 - Population Data for RHR Pump CCF Events (Fail to Start)
Plant Plant RHR Pump Number of Total
Code Name Population Demand Run Time (hrs)
DB1 Davis-Besse 1 2 36 6521
OE1 Oconee 1 3 89 22540
CC1 Calvert Cliffs 1 2 72 19225
CC2 Calvert Cliffs 2 2 46 13405
M12 Millstone 2 2 60 15290
BF3 Browns Ferry 3 4 50 13481
BR1 Brunswick 1 4 48 11223
BR2 Brunswick 2 4 65 13558
Col Cooper Station 4 78 22750
DA1 Duane Arnold 4 77 17591
DR2 Dresden 2 3 105 29346
EN1 Edwin I. Hatch 1 4 73, 19553
EN2 Edwin I. Hatch 2 4 27 5074
FP1 J.A. Fitzpatrick 4 70 15390
NM1 Nine Mile Point 1 3 105 29283
PB2 Peach Bottom 2 4 85 20249
PB3 Peach Bottom 3 4 74 20137
VY1 Vermont Yankee 4 102 28713
BV1 Beaver Valley 2 52 6888
DC2 D.C. Coole 2 2 30 8406
HN1 Haddam Neck 2 105 31753
SAl Salem 1 2 46 8244
SUl Surry 1 2 99 21260
TR1 Trojan 2 57 10999
YR1 Yankee Rowe 3 105 26758
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Table 5.3 - Failure Codes Used in Table 5.1
Failure Code
Failure Mode
CODE DESCRIPTION
leakage / rupture
does not start
loss of function
does not continue to
run
Failure Cause
CODE DECRIPTION
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
unknown
personnel operations)
personnel maintenance)
personnel (testing)
design errors
fab. /construction/q.c
procedural discrepances
normal wear
excessive wear
foreign material contamination
corrosion / erosion
extreme environment
loose fastener
elec./mech. control malfunction
failed internal
shaft / coupling failure
loss of pressure boundary
integrity
improper clearances
drive train failure
seal / packing failure
misalignment
bearing failure
Type of Event
CODE DESCRIPTION
recurring common cause failures
common cause failures
recurring failures
command faults
recurring command faults
common cause command faults
recurring common cause command faults
Event Classification
CODE DESCRIPTION
D-
T --
U --
demand
time
unknown
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A-
B-
C-
D -
B-
C-
R --
S-
T-
U -
V -
Table 5.4 - Proximate Cause of Event 38 (Lack of Lubrication)
Immediate Cause/Reason
Motor bursting into flames
Insufficient lubrication to LWR
RAD.BRNG
Failure to perform preventive
maintenance
Foreman forgot to do it
Foreman did not perform job properly
Programmatic deficiency: there is no
formal scheduling system to plant
preventive maintenance activities; or
procedure was not double-checked
There is no training provided on
lubrication job
Effect/Problem
Pump stops running
Motor bursting into flames
Insufficient lubrication to LWR
RAD.BRNG.
Failure to perform preventive maintenance
Failure to perform preventive maintenance
Foreman forgot to do it
Foreman did not perform the job properly
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Table 5.5 - Root Causes for RHR Pump CCF Events
Event Plant Root Causes
Number Name Conditioning Event (MP Blocks Related)
1 DB1 Fuses poorly connected Procedure bad, personnel not
trained; only CM (d)
2 DB1 Control switch internal Only corrective maintenance (d); no
failure training of personnel
3 BRI Environmental Only corrective maintenance (d); no
contamination on control training of personnel
switch
4 BRI Pump cover corroded due to Only corrective maintenance (d); no
leaking training of personnel
5 BRI Circuit breaker internal Procedure bad; personnel not
failure trained; only CM (d)
6 BR2 Fuse poorly connected Procedure bad; personnel not
trained; only CM (d)
7 COl Circuit breaker internal Procedure bad; personnel not
failure trained; only CM (d)
8 DA1 Relay internal failure Procedure bad; personnel not
trained; only CM (d)
9 DR2 Environmental Only corrective maintenance (d); no
contamination on control training of personnel
switch
10 DR2 No obvious evidence All three possible root causes as in
observed Event Number 1
11 EN1 Circuit breaker internal Procedure bad; personnel not
failure trained; only CM (d)
12 EN2 Relay wire missing Procedure bad; personnel not
trained (d)
13 FP1 Circuit breaker internal Only corrective maintenance (d); no
failure training of personnel
14 FP1 Control switch disabled by Procedure bad; personnel not
human error trained (d)
15 PB2 Pump disabled by human Procedure bad; personnel not
error trained (d)
16 VY1 Circuit breaker poorly Procedure bad; personnel not
connected trained; only CM (d)
17 TR1 Sequential contact open due Procedure bad; only corrective
to low CRNT maintenance (d)
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Table 5.6 - Coupling Mechanisms for RHR Pump CCF Events
Event Plant Conditioning Event Coupling Mechanisms
Number Name (MP Block Related)
1 DB1 Fuses poorly connected
2 DB1 Control switch internal Staff scheduling (d); same deficient
failure procedure used
3 BRI Environmental
contamination on control
switch
4 BR1 Pump cover corroded due to Procedure training (d); same
leaking deficient procedure used
5 BRI Circuit breaker internal
failure
6 BR2 Fuse poorly connected Staff scheduling (d); same deficient
procedure used
7 Col Circuit breaker internal
failure
8 DA1 Relay internal failure
9 DR2 Environmental Staff scheduling (d); same deficient
contamination on control procedure used
switch
10 DR2 No obvious evidence
observed
11 EN1 Circuit breaker internal
failure
12 EN2 Relay wire missing
13 FP1 Circuit breaker internal
failure
14 FP1 Control switch disabled by Staff scheduling (d); same deficient
human error procedure used
15 PB2 Pump disabled by human Staff scheduling (d); same deficient
error procedure used
16 VYl Circuit breaker poorly
connected
17 TRI Sequential contact open due Deficient procedure used (d)
to low CRNT
Note: (d) = dominant
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Table 5.7 - Initial Impact Vectors for RHR Pump CCF Events
(Fail to Start)
Event Plant Shock Shock Failure
Number Name PO P1 P2 P3 P4 Type Probability,
p
1 DB1 {0 1 0 }
2 DB1 { 0 1 0 } NL 0.5
3 BRI {0 1 0 0 0 }
4 BR1 { 0 0.8 0.2 0 0 } NL 0.4
5 BRI {0.9 0.1 0 0 0 1
6 BR2 { 0.7 0 0.2 0 0.1 } NL 0.2
7 001 {0.9 0.1 0 0 01 I
8 DA1 {0 1 0 0 0)
9 DR2 { 0 0.8 0.1 0.1 } NL 0.3
10 DR2 {0.8 0.2 0 01
11 EN1 (0 1 0 0 0)
12 EN2 0 1 0 0 0 }
13 FP1 {0 1 0 0 0)
14 FP1 0 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.1) NL 0.2
15 PB2 {0 0 1 0 0) NL 0.2
16 VY1 0.9 0.1 0 0 0)
17 TR1 { 0 1 0 } NL 0.5
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Table 5.8 - Root Cause/Maintenance Defense Matrix
Conditioning Events Block 1 Block 2 Block 8 Block 9
Maintenance Staff Shift Quality of Quality of Training Quality of
Scheduling Assignment Coverage Maintenance Training Levels Procedures
Fuses with poor connection ml m2 m3
Wrong circuit breaker is installed m3 m4
Breaker internal failures ml m2 m3
Breaker with poor connection ml m2 m3
Environmental contamination of ml m2 m3
breakers
Control switch disabled by m3 m4
human error
Control switch internal failures ml m2 m3
Environmental contamination of mI1 m2 m3
control switch
Relay internal failure ml m2 m3
Pump disabled by human error m3 m4
Note: The empty entries mean that defenses are not available. Qualitatively they indicate that those modifiers are equal to one.
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Table 5.9: Modifier 'm1' to Account for the Impact of Maintenance
Quality on Electrical Equipment Failure Rate
(ANSI/IEEE Std. 493-1980)
Quality of Failure Rate Modifier*
Maintenance
Fuses Breakers Control Switches Relay
Predictive 0.88 0.91 0.89 0.95
Preventive 1.15 1.1 1.2 1.1
Corrective 1.4 1.3 1.67 1.5
*The modifier provided in ANSI/IEEE Std. 493-1980 is to multiply the total equipment failure rate.
Table 5.10: Modifier 'm2' to Account for the Impact of Training on
Quality of Electrical/Mechanical Component Failure Rate
Failure Rate Modifier
Quality of
Training Electrical/Mechanical Component
Trained in Specific 0.95
Procedure
Not Trained in
Specific Procedure 1.2
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Table 5.11: Modifier 'm3' to Account for the Impact of
Training Levels on Electrical/Mechanical Component Failure Rate
Failure Rate Modifier
Level of
Training Electrical/Mechanical Component
Corrective Level 1.3
Preventive Level 0.9
Predictive Level 0.75
Table 5.12: Modifier 'm4' for the Impact of Procedure Quality
Procedure Failure Rate Modifier
Quality Operation Actions Maintenance/Surveillance/Testing Action
Procedure
not used 1.6 1.5
Used,need 1.3 1.2
improvement
Used, good quality 0.9 0.8
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Table 5.13: Coupling Mechanisms - Maintenance Defense Matrix
Selected Defense Against the Conditioning Events
BLOCK 1 BLOCK 2 BLOCK 8
Failure
Mechanisms Maintenance Staff Shift Quality of Quality of Training Quality of
Scheduling Assignment Coverage Maintenance Training Levels Procedures
Fuses with Poor m5 m 6 m8
Connection
Wrong Circuit Breaker m5 m6 m7 m8
Installed
Breaker Internal m5 m6 m8
Failures
Breaker with Poor m 5 m 6 m8Connection
Environmental
Contamination m5 m 6 m8
of Breakers
Control Switch m8
Disabled by Human Error m5 m 6 m 7
Control Switch m8
Internal Failures m5 m6
Environmental m5 m 6Contamination m8
of Control Switch
Relay Internal Failure m5 m6 m8
Pump Disabled by m5 m6 m7
Human Errors m8
Note: The empty entries mean that defenses are not available.
Qualitatively they mean that these modifiers are equal to 1.
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Table 5.14: Modifier 'm5' for the Impact of
Maintenance Scheduling
Maintenance Coupling Mechanisms Modifier
Schduling All Components
Staggered on Trains 0.25
Staggered on Loops 0.5
Non-staggered 1
Table 5.15: Modifier 'm6' for the Impact of Staff Diversity Effect
Staff Coupling Mechanisms Modifier
Diversit All Components
Different in
Each Train 0.05
Different in
Each Loop 0.1
Diversity not 0.2
Implemented
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Table 5.16: Modifier 'm7' for the Impact of
Staff Area Allocation
Staff Area Coupling Factor Modifier
Allocations All Components
Specific Area 0.1
Specific Component
Whole Area
Specific Component 0.2
Table 5.17: Modifier 'm8' for the Impact of Procedure Quality
On Coupling Mechanisms:
Procedure Coupling Mechanism 
Modifier
Quality Operation Actions Maintenance/Surveillance/Testing Action
Procedure
not used
Used, need 0.6 0.5
improvement
0.25
Used, good quality 0.3
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SIZE OF SYSTEM MAPPING TO
2 3 4
p (2) - 2(1 - p)P1(l) P1(3) - 3(1 - p)2p1(1) p1(
4) - 4(1 - p)3 p 1(1)
P2(2) - pP, (1) p2(3 ) - 3(1 - p)P1(l) P2(
4 ) - 6p(1 - p)2 p (1)
p3 (3)- . 2p,1 (1) p3 (4* 4p2( _ -P)p1 (1)
P4(4) - p
3
p (1)
p (3) - (3/2)(1 -- p)P1 (2 P 1(4) - 2(1 - p)2p,1(2)
p2(3) . PP (2) + (1 - p)P2(2) p2(4) - (5/2)p(1 - p)P1(2) + (I - p)2P2(2)
p3 (3- PP2E(2 P3 (4)- P2p,1(2) + 2p(1 - p)P2 2
p (4) p2p2 (
2)
, (4) -(4/3)(1 - p)P1 (3
p 2(4) p P 1(3 ) + (1 - p)P2 (3 )
p3 (4) PP 2(3) + (1 - p)P3(3)
p4 (4 ). PP3 (3 )
Table 5.18 - Mapping Up Procedure
(from NUREG/CR-4780, Vol. 2, p. D-16)
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0
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i-
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w
N
SIZE OF SYSTEM MAPPING TO (NUMBER OF IDENTICAL TRAINS)
3
P 0(3) , 1 (4) + P (4)
41
P1 (3) . 3 (4) + 2 1
, , 1 2 2
(3).1 p (4)3+ P (4
22 4
P 3 (3 1 p3(4) +P4(4)
43
2
(2) . 1
0 2
P (2) 11 2
P2 12) 1
2 6
P(4) +. p2 (4
1 6 2
(4) P2 + P
3 2
P2(4) +1 P3(4) +P4(4)
2~
0(1 (4) +1 p2 4 + 1 P34 2 4 3
I 1 1 (4) 3 (4)
4 2 43
+4 4 )
p (2) , (3) + P (3) P (1) .P (3) + P (3) 4  P (3)0 0 3 0 0 3 1 3 2
p (2) .2 (3) , 2 P (3) P (1) P. , (3) + 2 p (3) + P (3)
3 1 3 1 3 2 1 3 1 3 2 3
P2 (2),, 1 , (3) + P (3)32
P (1) ,P0  (2) + P (2)
0 0 2 1
1 (1. 1 (2) + P2(2)
21
'THE TERM P IS INCLUDED FOR COMPLETENESS. BUT IN PRACTICE, ANY EVIDENCE THAT MIGHT EXIST ABOUT
CAUSES THAT IMPACT NO COMPONENTS IN A FOUR-TRAIN SYSTEM WOULD BE "UNOBSERVABLE.'
Table 5.19 - Mapping Down Procedure
(from NUREG/CR-4780, Vol. 2, p. D-9)
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Table 5.20 - Baseline Case Event Impact Vectors
After Applicability and System Size Mappings
Event Po P 1  P2  P3 P4  Appllcabllltles
Number
app_rc appcm
1 Actual Plant 0 1 0 0.958
JAF Plant 0.083 1.917 0 0 0
2 Actual Plant 0 1 0 0.958
JAF Plant 0.042 0.479 0.599 0.24 0
3 Actual Plant 0 1 0 0 0 0.958
JAF Plant 0.042 0.958 0 0 0
4 Actual Plant 0 0.8 0.2 0 0 0.6
JAF Plant 0.425 0.46 0.115 0 0
5 Actual Plant 0.9 0.1 0 0 0 0.958
JAF Plant 0.042 0.096 0 0 9
6 Actual Plant 0.7 0 0.2 0 0.1 0.958 0.6
JAF Plant 0.425 0 0.115 0 0
7 Actual Plant 0.9 0.1 0 0 0 0.958
JAF Plant 0.042 0.958 0 0 0
8 Actual Plant 0 1 0 0 0 0.958
JAF Plant 0.042 0.958 0 0 0
9 Actual Plant 0.8 0.2 0 0 0.958 0.6
JAF Plant 0.425 0.429 0.178 0.058 0.017
10 Actual Plant 0 1 0 0 0.958
JAF Plant 0.042 0.192 0 0 0
11 Actual Plant 0 1 0 0 0 0.958
JAF Plant 0.042 0.958 0 0 0
12 Actual Plant 0 1 0 0 0 0.833
JAF Plant 0.167 0.833 0 0 0
13 Actual Plant 0 1 0 0 0 0.958
JAF Plant 0.042 0.958 0 0 0
14 Actual Plant 0 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.833 0.6
JAF Plant 0.5 0.35 0.05 0.05 0.05
15 Actual Plant 0 0 1 0 0 0.833 0.6
JAF Plant 0.5 0 0.5 0 0
16 Actual Plant 0 1 0 1
JAF Plant 0.042 0.096 0 0 0
17 Actual Plant 0 1 0 1
JAF Plant 0 0.5 0.625 0.25 0
JAF Average
Impact 2.99 9.21 2.153 0.588 0.122
Vector
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Figure 5.2 - Approach For Quantifying CCF Parameters
Event Initial
Impact Vector
Total Root Causes
Contributor Weights
Apply Dominant
Contributor
Rules
Here
Use Defense
Matrix
Modifier
Factors
Here
A0.
Conditional Cond
contributor cont
1 weight J WE
assessment asse
weights of
different
Levels of
maintenance
practice in
contributor I
itional Conditional
ributor contributor
sight k weight
ssment assessment
Summation of different
contributor's weight as
Total Root Cause
APPLICABILITY app-rc _j
Figure 5.3 - Approach for Quantifying CCF Event " Applicability "
Total Coupling
Mechanism
Contributor Weight
Conditional Conditional Conditional
contributor contributor contributor
1 weight m weight n weight
assessment assessment assessment
weights of
different
Levels of
maintenance
practice in
cnributor. .
Summation of different
contributor's weight as
Total Coupling Mechanism
APPLICABILITY app-cm
-A
94
6. MAINTENANCE PROGRAM IMPACT ON HUMAN ERROR RATES
This section quantifies the impact of maintenance program changes on one PRA
model parameter, the frequency that operators fail to correctly restore equipment after
maintenance (#re), and the resulting impact on risk. This parameter is shown in Section 4
to be important to the JAF plant risk. It has also proven to be an important source of
system unavailability in past PRA studies (e.g., WASH-1400 [43]). Moreover, as in the
case of the common-cause failure analysis discussed in Section 5, an analysis of this
parameter is interesting from a technical standpoint because it must deal with a key issue
in PRA (the estimation of the likelihood of human error in this case).
6.1 Approach
The quantification of the risk impact associated with a change in #re is done in three
steps, as shown in Figure 6.1. First, the particular maintenance program change
underlying the change in #re must be specified. These program changes are stated in terms
of changes in the factors that affect human performance (e.g., training, procedures). Next,
the change in #re (and any associated factors) is calculated using an appropriate analytical
model. Finally, the changes in re are propagated through the system and plant models.
Regarding the first step, many aspects of the maintenance program (e.g., the quality
of training, post-maintenance testing, and procedures) directly influence human reliability.
Procedures that are ambiguous may result in different intepretations and uses by different
groups. Faulty procedures can cause errors in maintenance by all who use the procedure.
Of course, training can alleviate some of the confusion resulting from poor procedures.
Post-maintenance testing serves as a check that the maintenance was performed correctly,
although it may not catch slowly degrading conditions induced by human errors (note that
these types of failures are not included in the quantification of #re). Quality control serves
as a second check that the job is being performed properly. Quality control is performed
by a separate group at JAF. Examples of explicit quality control at JAF include having a
second person check a maintenance technician's work, and having a double sign-off on all
important steps in a task. Another example, not implemented at JAF, involves having one
person read the procedure while the other is performing the task to ensure verbatim
compliance with procedures.
In order to perform the second step, a simple approach based on the well-known
Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) [10] is used. This approach allows
the direct treatment of a number of issues addressed in the maintenance program block
diagram (Figure 2.1). An alternate approach employing the MAPPS simulation code is
also briefly discussed. The THERP-based approach is applied to the failure of operators to
restore RHR pump path components following maintenance.
The third step is performed in a straightforward manner, using the simplified JAF
plant model and the RHR system model described in Section 4 (these are based upon the
preliminary models described in Ref. 6). It should be noted that there are two technical
weaknesses in these models regarding their treatment of the "fail to restore" failure mode
for RHR system components. First, these models do not treat the frequency of
maintenance or the time required to detect an incorrect system configuration. Second,
they do not treat the possibility that multiple RHR trains may be improperly restored.
These points are further discussed in Section 6.4.
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6.2 Quantification of ore
The basic THERP procedure for computing the frequency of human errors is
discussed in Section 3. In the case of multiple errors, it is pointed out that the analyst
needs to compute a base human error rate and a coupling factor. The latter factor is used
to compute the conditional probability of subsequent human errors, given the occurrence of
an initial error. This section presents two tools used to relate the base human error rate
and the coupling factor to changes in the maintenance program: the human reliability tree
and the dependence level tree.
6.2.1 Human Reliability Tree
The discussion in Section 6.1 indicates that there are five factors that affect the
likelihood of human error during maintenance. These are:
9 whether or not relevant procedures are available and used,
0 the quality of the procedures,
0 whether or not the maintenance technicians are trained on the specific task,
0 whether or not a person from the QC department (or any other group) performs a
second check on the maintenance work, and
0 whether or not post-maintenance testing is done.
Figure 6.2 depicts the possible combinations of these factors and the human error rates
associated with each combination. The human error rates are obtained using parameters
from Tables 6.1-6.3 (adopted from Ref. 10).
The human error rates obtained through use of Figure 6.2, are determined by
multiplying a basic human error probability by reduction factors that account for the
implementation of different maintenance strategies. (Note that it is assumed that these
parameters are independent and can therefore be multiplied to obtain the desired human
error rate.) For example, Table 6.2 is used to quantify the human error rate when the
operators use procedures that are above average quality. The value for this parameter is
0.00212. The reduction factors accounting for the other branches are quantified using
Table 6.3. For example, Table 6.3 presents the human error rates for failing to detect
errors made by others. For checking routine tasks using written materials, a human error
rate of 0.1 is given. For checks that involves active participation, e.g., post-maintenance
testing, an error rate of 0.01 is given. Table 6.4 presents the human error rates and factors
used in estimating the human error rates underlying Figure 6.2.
It should be noted that Figure 6.2 is a human reliability decision tree developed
specifically for treatment of maintenance tasks; it is not an event tree. Thus, the sum of
the endstate error rates is not equal to one; in fact, the sum of these rates has no meaning.
It should also be noted that the parameter values provided in Ref. 10 are based upon the
experience of the authors of that report, and are widely used in PRA studies. These
parameter values, however, do not reflect current data for RHR pumps nor do they
necessarily reflect the specific circumstances at the JAF plant.
12This value is derived using entries from Table 6.2. This table gives a human error rate of
0.001 for an error of omission when using procedures that consist of short lists and
check-off provisions. It is assumed that this is an optimal form for the procedure. It is
further assumed that an error of commission is always possible and that the human error
rate in this case is also 0.001. Therefore, the total error rate is 0.001 + 0.001 = 0.002.
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Limited data are actually available concerning the failure of operators to properly
restore RHR pumps after maintenance. However, a number of difficulties arise when these
data are applied to the estimation of the parameters underlying Figure 6.2. Table 6.5 lists
data on RHR pump failures obtained from Ref. 41. This reference provides LER-based
data on failures of a variety of pump types; the data are collected over the period January
1, 1972 through September 30, 1980. Table 6.5 includes only those RHR pump failures
involving human errors either by maintenance technicians or by operations personnel.
Note that three of the events involve failure to return a valve or a switch to the correct
positon. Four of the events involve procedure discrepancies and three are the result of
using the wrong parts. The problem with these data from the standpoint of Figure 6.2 is
that it is not known to which tree sequence each event applies. For example, in the case of
Event 6, the quality of procedures in use (if any), the degree of training of the personnel on
the restoration task, the involvement of QC, and whether or not post-maintenance testing
was performed are not clear. This ambiguity prevents direct use of the event in a
statistical analysis.
Improvements in Figure 6.2 can be made if JAF-specific data (or at least data from
similar plants) are gathered. The data would preferably consist of actual success and
failure counts; if such information is not available, the opinions of knowledgeable personnel
(e.g., training instructors) could be used in a manner similar to the analyses done for
seismic risk assessments and for severe accident probabilistic analyses.
6.2.2 Dependence Level Tree
Figure 6.2 provides the conditional frequency of human error, given the performance
of maintenance on a single component. If one wants to look at multiple failures as a result
of human errors during maintenance, those aspects of the maintenance program that couple
maintenance tasks on redundant components must be examined. One potential coupling
mechanism is provided by task scheduling. If similar tasks on redundant equipment are
scheduled too closely together, the chances of multiple equipment failures due to identical
mistakes being made during the nominally separate tasks are increased. One of the
defenses against multiple failures therefore is to schedule maintenance on redundant
equipment as far apart as possible. Procedure quality and use also will have a large impact
on the likelihood that operators fail to restore multiple trains of equipment. As pointed
out above, if the procedure is incorrect, mistakes are likely for all equipment affected.
Training too, can have an effect. If all the maintenance groups are properly trained on the
task and procedures, errors will be less likely.
To determine the conditional frequency of multiple failures due to human error
during maintenance, the THERP model is used. Thus, as described in Section 3, a human
reliability tree is drawn for the tasks in question. Here, each branch in the human
reliability tree represents maintenance on a single component. To account for the coupling
mechanisms described above, the dependence level parameters are modified to reflect the
presence or absence of defenses against these coupling mechanisms.
Figure 6.3 presents a tree diagram similar in concept to Figure 6.2, except that
Figure 6.3 is used to determine the degree of coupling (dependence) between maintenance
failures. Figure 6.3 includes the following coupling mechanisms and defenses against
multiple failures:
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Coupling Mechanisms Defenses
* Procedure quality * Training
* Use of same staff for mainte- 0 Diversity of staff
nance on redundant components
* Performance of maintenance * Time separation of maintenance tasks
tasks on redundant equipment on redundant equipment
close in time
The combination of coupling mechanisms and defenses applied are used to determine
the level of dependence between maintenance tasks performed on redundant components.
In the top branch of Figure 6.3, the procedure quality is good and different staff are used
for maintenance on redundant equipment. Since there are no coupling mechanisms, zero
dependence is assumed for tasks following this branch. Note that training is a defense
against multiple failures caused by poor procedures. Since the procedure quality is good,
the training question is not asked when following the upper branch. Furtheromore, if
diverse staff are used for maintenance on redundant equipment, the question of tight
scheduling is also not applicable.
If the same staff perform maintenance on redundant equipment, there can be
dependence between tasks. Medium dependence is assumed if the procedure quality is
good. This dependence level can be reduced (to low) if tasks are scheduled far apart in
time.
If the quality of the procedures is low, training can be used to defend against multiple
human errors. If this defense is employed, low dependence is assumed when diverse staff
work on redundant equipment. For the remainder of the tree, the level of dependence
increases as the likelihood of coupling mechanisms increases, but can be decreased by
employing the defenses discussed above.
Using this figure, the appropriate equation for quantifying the effect of dependence
[see Eqs. (3.14)] can be selected and used in the THERP human reliability tree.
As in the case of Figure 6.2, improved plant-specific estimates for the conditional
frequency of multiple failures can be developed if data are available. However, since
multiple failure events tend to be rare, it is likely to be much more difficult to develop
improved data-based estimates.
6.2.3 Using MAPPS for Quantifying re
As discussed in Section 3, the Maintenance Personnel Performance Simulation
(MAPPS) is a computer-based simulation model designed to estimate the likelihood of
errors during the maintenance process [31]. This model accepts inputs for a number of
variables that can be affected by changes in a maintenance program, such as technician
fatigue (which is affected by changes in planning, scheduling, staffing, etc.) and the quality
of written procedures. The model directly handles other issues such as post-maintenance
testing, since it simulates the performance of personnel performing these activities.
MAPPS appears to be a promising tool for analyzing #re, especially since a personal
computer version of the code, called Micro-MAPPS has been recently released [44]. It was
not used in this project due to the unavailability of Micro-MAPPS at the time this project
was being performed.
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6.3 Application to Restoration of RHR Pump Train Components
The above methodolodgy is applied to the Containment Spray (CS) mode of the
Residual Heat Removal System. A simplified system drawing is shown in Figure 6.4
(adapted from Ref. 45). The CS system aids in reducing primary containment pressure and
mixing containment air after transients or LOCAs have occurred. The CS mode of
operation is manually initiated by the operator upon receiving a LPCI (Low Pressure
Coolant Injection) initiation signal. The operator must check that the RHR pumps are
running and starts the RHR Service Water (RHRSW) pumps for the train being used. The
operator then puts the CS control switch in manual and the CS spray override switches in
override. The operator then opens valve 10MOV-26A/B and throttles valve
10MOV-31A/B (depending on which train is being initiated) [45].
The failure mode of interest is the failure to restore the RHR pump path components.
These include the motor-operated valve (MOV) 10MOV-13X, the pump RHR P-3X, and
manual valves 10RHR-250X and 10RHR-28X, where X denotes the train (either A, B, C,
or D). Non-restoration of any of these components would render the train inoperable. The
non-restoration frequency for Train X (#re,x), which is conditioned on the performance of
maintenance, is the sum of the conditional frequencies of non-restoration of each
component:
#rex = #re,10mov-13x + #rep-3x + #re,10rhr-250x + #re,10rhr-28x (6.1)
To determine each of the component non-restoration frequencies, the tasks and procedures
involving these components must be analyzed.
For maintenance to be performed on an RHR pump, 10MOV-13X must be closed
[46]. It is improbable that this valve could be left closed following maintenance without
being immediately detected. Following maintenance, RHR Pump Flow Rate and Inservice
Test ST-2A is performed. In this test, the RHR pump is lined up to recirculate water
through the suppression pool. Each loop is tested for desired flow and pump discharge
pressure [47]. If 10MOV-13X were left closed, the RHR pump would trip due to loss of
suction. This would alarm in the control room. The position of this valve is also verified
in monthly surveillance tests [48]. During this test, each RHR pump is run, one at a time,
circulating water to the suppression pool through the minimum flow line. Again, the pump
could not run if 10MOV-13X were not open. If however, this valve is left in the closed
position, it will prevent CS operation because it does not receive an open signal upon
receipt of a LPCI initiation signal.
Using Figure 6.2, the following assumptions are used to determine the frequency that
valve 10MOV-13X is not restored properly following maintenance:
0 the procedure used is of good quality,
* the operators are trained on this procedure,
* there is no second check that the valve is in the correct position, and
* a post-maintenance test is performed.
The third and fourth bullets come directly from the written procedure for pump
maintenance [46]. These assumptions result in a non-restoration frequency of 2.0*10-5.
Note that although it appears that the conduct of a post-maintenance test should virtually
eliminate the likelihood of a restoration failure, the non-zero failure frequency models the
possibility that the post-maintenance is not performed correctly, or is not performed at all.
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Manual valves 10RHR-250X and 10RHR-28X are also closed when the RHR pump is
to have maintenance performed on it. These valves discharge to the drain and minimum
flow lines, respectively. If these valves are left closed, it would not be detected during the
post-maintenance testing. The positioning of these valves are verified using a written
checklist after the performance of maintenance. The non-restoration frequency for each of
these valves is 2.0*10-4.
The last restoration error that could lead to the pump train being unavailable
involves the pump itself. Using Figure 6.2 with the assumptions that the technicians use
procedures and that there is post-maintenance testing, a non-restoration frequency of
4.0*10-4 is obtained.
The data of Table 6.1 suggests that poor procedures are significant contributors to
the human-induced unavailability of RHR pumps. A study done by the Tennessee Valley
Authority (TVA) [49] points out that procedure deficiencies caused a large percentage of
the human errors during maintenance. TVA reviewed its maintenance procedures to
identify ways to reduce human errors and made the following recommedations for
improving maintenance procedures [49]:
1. Procedures should be easy to read, understand, and follow, i.e., they should be "user
friendly."
2. Administrative controls and requirements should be separated from physical work
details.
To make procedures easy to read and understand, short concise statements involving action
steps should be used. Ref. 49 states that these action statements should begin with active
verbs such as remove, reinstall, clean, and inspect. Complex detail is removed from the
action step and is placed in tables or appears as listed items or action substeps.
The JAF RHR pump maintenance procedure does not use this format. The steps in
the procedure are not action statements. For example, the following procedure step is
taken from the JAF RHR pump maintenance procedure MP-10.1 [46]:
"7.2.16 Measure the inside diameters of the case wear ring 1-2) and
hydrostatic bearing wear ring (2-7) and the outside diameter of the
impeller (3-1) to determine the clearances. The measurements are to
be taken at four (4) locations, 450 apart at the edges and centers of the
running surfaces as shown in Figure 10.3. The design clearances are
shown in Table 10.2. Ovality is allowable within those clearances.
Clearance limits in excess of the maximums shown are allowed by the
manufacturer to 125% of design.
Clearances above 125% to 150% of design require manufacturer
consultation. Clearances above 150% of design are considered to be
totally worn and parts shall not be reused.
Marks, scratches, wear, etc. may be removed and the clearances
measured to determine limit status."
The use of graphics could simplify this statement and help avoid errors. A picture
illustrating the actual parts and the procedure by which the measurements are to be taken
would eliminate unessecessary wording and eliminate sources of confusion. A table should
accomodate the information concerning clearance limits. After measurements are taken
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they should be compared to the required measurements, e.g., the "125% to 150% of
design," explicitly stated in the table. The course of action to be taken if the clearances
are not within limits should also be explicity stated in such a table.
The JAF procedure does include a rough hand sketch of the manner in which
measurements are to be taken and a table of clearances at the end of the procedure. It is
suggested however that a picture of the actual parts be placed within the step instead of
the worded description presently used. This could be easily accomplished with currently
available software. The table of clearances in the JAF procedure is shown in Table 6.6.
This information should be placed in the actual step and a place for the recording of
measurements should be provided. As stated earlier, the information indicating what
should be done if the measurements are not within specified limits should also be integrated
in the table. The graphics and the table could take the place of most of the above
paragraph and present the information in a more easily understandable fashion.
Making procedures more user friendly may result not only in less mistakes in their
use but also more use. This will result in a lower frequency of human error.
Ref. 49 estimates that, 30% of the time, procedures are not used at all. According to
Figure 6.2, the human error rate during maintenance when procedures are not used is
estimated to be 0.002, given that post-maintenance testing is performed. If it is assumed
that the operators do not use the procedure 30% of the time, the resulting pump
non-restoration frequency for the RHR pump (i.e., for #rep-3x) is 9.0*10-4.
Using Eq. (6.1), the base case value for the non-restoration frequency for a single
pump train is obtained:
#re,x =krelOimov-13x + #re,p-3x + #re,10rhr-250x + #re,10rhr-28x (6.1)
= 2.0*10-5 + 9.0*10-4 + 2.0*10-4 + 2.0*10-4
= 1.3*10-3
To see how improving RHR pump procedures affects the non-restoration frequency,
assume that improvements in procedures lead to their use 100% of the time. Figure 6.2
then predicts that the associated non-restoration frequency for the pump is 4.0*10-5, a
reduction by a factor of 20 for #rep-3x. The resulting change in #re,x is given by
#re,x = 4.7*10-4
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Table 6.1
Estimated HEPs related to failure of
administrative control
Item Task HEP EF
(1) Carry out a plant policy or scheduled tasks .01 5
such as periodic tests or maintenance per-
formed weekly, monthly, or at longer intervals
(2) Initiate a scheduled shiftly checking or .001 3
inspection function*
Use written operations procedures under
(3) normal operating conditions .01 3
(4) abnormal operating conditions .005 10
(5) Use a valve change or restoration list .01 3
(6) Use written test or calibration procedures .05 5
(7) Use written maintenance procedures .3 5
(8) Use a checklist properly** .5 5
*
Assumptions for the periodicity and type of control room scans are
discussed in Chapter 11 in the section, "A General Display Scanning
Model." Assumptions for the periodicity of the basic walk-around
inspection are discussed in Chapter 19 in the section, "Basic Walk-
Around Inspection."
**
Read a single item, perform the task, check off the item on the
list. For any item in which a display reading or other entry must
be written, assume correct use of the checklist for that item.
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Table 6.2
Estimated probabilities of errors of omission per item of
instruction when use of written procedures is specified*
Item** Omission of item: HEP EF
When procedures with checkoff,
provisions are correctly used
(1) Short list, 410 items .001 3
(2) Long list, >10 items .003 3
When procedures without checkoff provisions are
used, or when checkoff provisions are incorrectly used
(3) Short list, (10 items .003 3
(4) Long list, >10 items .01 3
(5) When written procedures are avail- .05 5
able and should be used but are not used
The estimates for each item (or perceptual unit) presume zero dependence
among the items (or units) and must be modified by using the dependence
model when a nonzero level of dependence is assumed.
**
The term "item" for this column is the usual designator for tabled
entries and does not refer to an item of instruction in a procedure.
Correct use of checkoff provisions is assumed for items in which written
entries such as numerical values are required of the user.
ttTable 16-1 lists the estimated probabilities of incorrect use of checkoff
provisions and of nonuse of available written procedures.
If the task is judged to be "second nature," use the lower uncertainty
bound for .05, i.e., use .01 (EF = 5).
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Table 6.3
Estimated probabilities that a checker will fail to
detect errors made by others*
Item Checking Operation HEP EF
(1) Checking routine tasks, checker using written .1 5
materials (includes over-the-shoulder inspections,
verifying position of locally operated valves,
switches, circuit breakers, connectors, etc., and
checking written lists, tags, or procedures for
accuracy)
(2) Same as above, but without written materials .2 5
(3) Special short-term, one-of-a-kind checking with .05 5
alerting factors
(4) Checking that involves active participation, such as .01 5
special measurements
Given that the position of a locally operated valve .5 5
is checked (item 1 above), noticing that it is not
completely opened or closed:
(5) Position indicator** only .1 5
(6) Position indicator** and a rising stem .5 5
(7) Neither a position indicator** nor a rising stem .9 5
(8) Checking by reader/checker of the task performer in .5 5
a two-man team, or checking by a second checker,
routine task (no credit for more than 2 checkers)
(9) Checking the status of equipment if that status .001 5
affects one's safety when performing his tasks
(10) An operator checks change or restoration tasks Above 5
performed by a maintainer HEPs
+ 2
*
This table applies to cases during normal operating conditions in which a
person is directed to check the work performed by others either as the
work is being performed or after its completion.
**
A position indicator incorporates a scale that indicates the position of
the valve relative to a fully opened or fully closed position. A rising
stem qualifies as a position indicator if there is a scale associated
with it.
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Table 6.4 - Factors Affecting Human Error Rates
Factor Affecting Human
Reliability in Maintenance HEP 1/Modification Factor
HEP
HEP
HEP
HEP
HEP
HEP
procedure not used)
procedure quality is good)
procedure needs improvement)
multiplier (not trained on task)
multiplier second check required)
multiplier (post-maintenance testing)
'HEP = Human Error Probability
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0.10
0.002
0.02
2.0
0.10
0.01
Table 6.5 - RHR Pump Failures Involving Human Error (Page 1 of 2)
Plant/Date Failure Failures Failure Failure
Cause Events Mode Des-
cription
1) operations 1 Power lost personnel
Davis error to decay accidental
Besse 1 heat pump ly tripped
5/28/78 ps busses
2) maintenance 3 Power personnel
Davis error supply lost error
Besse 1 to pump
6/15/78
3) maintenance 1 Pump maintenanc
Davis error stopped e failed
Besse 1 when to defeat
8/13/80 suction interlock
valve was
closed
4) maintenance 1 pump incorrect
Davis error inoperable substitute
Besse 1 breaker
1/28/76 installed
5) procedure 2 pumps lost air leaked
Calvert discrepancy suction from
Cliffs 2 purificati
10/17/78 on system
to SDC
6) operations 1* no flow, no two valves
Palisades error pressure in wrong
1 position
10/9/75
7) maintenance 2 pumps faulty
Browns error tripped relays
Ferry 1 because installed
1/1/71 isolation
valves
closed
8) operations 1 pump accidental
Brunswick error tripped bumping of
1 switch
6/18/77
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Table 6.5 - RHR Pump Failures Involving Human Error_(Page 2 of 2)
Plant/Date Failure Failures Failure Failure
Cause Events Mode Des-
cription
9) operations 1 motor personnel
Brunswick error switch in left
2 off switch in
6/22/77 position off
position
10) maintenance 1 pump pump wired
Edwin error tripped incorrectl
Hatch 1 during y
4/9/76 functional
test
11) maintenance 1 pump wrong
Edwin error vibrated reference
Hatch 1 outside data used
9/6/80 ASME code
12) maintenance 1 pump control
Nine Mile error inoperable power fuse
Point 1 was bent
9/15/78
13) procedure 1 low suction
Nine Mile discrepancy
Point 1
4/4/77
14) operations 1 pump operator
Peach error blocked for removed
Bottom 2 2 hours unit 2
4/29/78 instead of
unit 3
15) procedure 3 pumps pumps not
Beaver discrepancy airbound vented
Valley 1
4/8/80
16) procedure 1 pump pumps not
Donald discrepancy unstable properly
Cook 2 vented
9/4/80
17) maintenance 1 air locked RHRSW pump
Quad error suction had air
Cities 1 header line
12/2/76 connected
to case
* recorded as only one event
mispositioned.
even though two valves are
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Table 6.6 - RHR Pump Part Clearances [46]
Running
Clearances (Dia.)
From To
Impeller (3-1)
Impeller (3-1)
Pump Shaft 4-1)
Pump Shaft 4-1)
Case Year Ring(1-2)
Hydrostatic Bearing
Cover Year Ring (2-7)
Pump Cover (2-1)
Seal Flange (5-1)
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Location
From To
.033"
.020"
.125"
.125"
.037"
.024"
.155"
.138"
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0
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- THERP
Procedure Quality of Training on QA/2nd Post-Maintenance Human
Use Procedures Task Check Testing Error
Probability
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4.OE-5
.004
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7. QUANTIFICATION OF MAINTENANCE IMPACT ON RISK
Section 5 develops a model for quantifying the impact of changes in maintenance
practices on common-cause failure rates. Section 6 performs a similar role for human error
rates (the failure to restore equipment following testing or maintenance). In this section,
the impacts of a number of maintenance program changes (relative to the current JAF
program) are quantified.
Two particular parameters are treated in this analysis. The first parameter, Q4mdp,
is the demand unavailability of the four RHR pumps due to common-cause failure. The
second is Qre, the unavailability of a single RHR pump train (one of four) due to the failure
of the operators to restore the train after maintenance. Note that, in principle, multiple
train unavailabilities due to restoration errors should be considered; however, these do not
appear in the important cutsets reported in Ref. 6 (possibly because their joint
probabilities are small), and are therefore not considered in this analysis.
The case studies discussed in this section are developed by examining the
maintenance program block diagram (Figure 2.1), identifying possible values for each
block's characteristic parameters, establishing base case parameter values to represent the
JAF maintenance program, and postulating changes in these base case values (to represent
changes in the maintenance program).
7.1 Maintenance Program Block Options
Five blocks in Figure 2.1 are considered for changes. Some of the other blocks (e.g.,
Block 10 - QA/QC) can be treated using the approach used for the selected blocks. The
treatment of still others (e.g., Block 4 - Measure of Overall Plant Effectiveness) requires a
detailed analysis of plant organization and management, and is beyond the tools and data
used in this report. The blocks considered are:
0 Block 1 - Maintenance Management
0 Block 2 - Corrective, Preventive, and Predictive Maintenance
0 Block 3 - Post-Maintenance Testing
0 Block 8 - Personnel Qualification and Training
* Block 9 - Procedures and Regulatory Constraints
The following subsections present the various changes postulated for each block.
7.1.1 Block 1 - Maintenance Management
This block includes planning, scheduling, staffing, and shift coverage. These
activities can affect the proximity (in time) of testing and maintenance activities on
identical equipment and the crew composition during these activities. These factors can
affect the likelihood of a common-cause failure affecting multiple RHR pumps. Poor
planning and scheduling activities can also place the operators under significant time
pressure, increasing their stress and the likelihood that the operators fail to restore a train
of RHR after maintenance 3 .
13Tight scheduling of maintenance activities could increase the dependency between
nominally separate actions in restoring equipment. Thus, the THERP/ASEP model should
be affected by changes in Block 1. As discussed earlier, the risk model used in this study
does not include failures to restore multiple trains of equipment. The effect of tighter or
looser scheduling on the coupling of failures is therefore not treated in this case study.
113
The options affecting Q4mdp are as follows:
A Staggered testing on two loops; use the same staff for both loops.
B Staggered testing on four trains; use the same staff for all trains.
The current practices at JAF are best represented by (A).
The options affecting Qre are as follows:
A Tight scheduling.
B Loose scheduling.
The current practices at JAF are best represented by (A).
7.1.2 Block 2 - Corrective, Preventive, and Predictive Maintenance
This block indicates the degree to which corrective, preventive, and predictive
maintenance are emphasized. Note that predictive maintenance can be viewed as a more
efficient approach for scheduling preventive maintenance. Increased preventive
maintenance can reduce the likelihood of initial faults; its effect on preventing the coupling
of faults is less clear but may still be postitive.
Regarding the effect on Qre, a stronger emphasis on preventive maintenance can
increase the frequency with which an RHR train is taken out for servicing. This increases
the rate of challenges to the operators to properly restore the train after servicing. On the
other hand, since the servicing intervals are shorter, it also reduces the time that a failure
will go undetected. Recall from Eq. (3.6) that the unavailability due to restoration errors
following maintenance is given by
Qre = fmWrerd,m (7.1)
Unless failures can be detected before the next maintenance period, the maintenance
frequency fm is likely to be inversely proportional to the detection time rd,m, and the
unavailability Qre remains constant regardless of the particular mixture of corrective,
preventive, or predictive maintenance employed. Thus, only options affecting the
common-cause failure term, Q4mdp, are treated for this block.
The options affecting Q4mdp are:
A) Emphasis on corrective maintenance. Some application of preventive and
predictive maintenance.
B) Emphasis on preventive maintenance. Some application of predictive
maintenance.
C) Emphasis on predictive maintenance.
The current practices at JAF are best represented by (A).
7.1.3 Block 3 - Post-Maintenance Testing
The performance of post-maintenance testing directly affects the likelihood of system
restoration errors after maintenance, but does not affect the likelihood of other
common-cause failures (as modeled by Q 4mdp).
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The options affecting Qre are as follows:
A Post-maintenance testing not performed.
B Post-maintenance testing performed.
The current practices at JAF vary, according to the component/system being serviced.
7.1.4 Block 8 - Personnel Qualification and Training
The qualifications and training of personnel clearly can affect the likelihood of
common-cause failures and of RHR train restoration errors.
The options affecting Q4mdp and Qre are as follows:
A) Maintenance crew is not trained in specific procedure for RHR
pumps/trains.
B) Maintenance crew is trained in specific procedure for RHR pumps/trains.
The option best representing current practices at JAF varies, according to the
component/system being serviced.
7.1.5 Block 9 - Procedures and Regulatory Constraints
The availability of procedures and the quality of these procedures can affect the
likelihood of common-cause failures and of RHR train restoration errors. Good quality
procedures are easy to understand and easy to follow. They employ short and clear
statements, and frequently employ second checks. Procedures needing improvement are
long and ambiguous, and do not employ second checks.
The options affecting Q4mdp and Qre are as follows:
A) Procedures not used.
B) Procedures used, procedure quality needs improvement.
C Procedures used, procedure quality good.
The option best representing the current practices at JAF varies, according to the
component/system being serviced.
7.2 Effects of Maintenance Program Changes on Risk Model Parameters
Using the approach developed in Section 5, the common cause unavailability of 4
RHR pumps (fail to start mode), Q4mdp, is computed for a variety of cases. The results are
shown in Table 7.1.
The first case treated in Table 7.1 is a baseline analysis, intended to represent the
current practices at JAF. The JAF program is characterized in terms of the options
described in the preceding section. Thus, for example, considering Block 1 (Maintenance
Management) the current JAF policy is to stagger the testing of RHR loops (instead of
staggering the testing of the separate trains). This is common cause failure (CCF)
Option A for that block. Table 7.1 provides both brief descriptions of the options, and a
code for these options (which represents the block number and the relevant option for that
block). Note that for Block 1, the CCF options differ from the human error/failure to
restore (RE) options. Only CCF options are available for Block 2, and only RE options are
available for Block 3.
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The next two cases represent the best and worst available combinations of CCF
options. The following intermediate cases are nearly identical to the baseline case, with the
exception that one option is allowed to vary. It can be seen that Q 4dp can be significantly
reduced by maintenance program changes; the best case leads to nearly a factor of 25
reduction. This reduction is due to the model's assessment of the effect of an increased
emphasis on predictive maintenance and improved procedures for RHR pump maintenance.
The worst case results in a small (a factor of 4) increase in Q4mdp. The difference between
this case and the baseline case involves crew training; the baseline case assumes that the
crew is trained specifically on the RHR pump maintenance procedures. The changes in
Q4mdp predicted for the intermediate cases are generally small, varying from the baseline
prediction by a factor of 3 or less.
In a similar fashion, the approach developed in Section 6, is used to compute the
unavailability associated with a failure to restore an RHR pump train after maintenance,
Qre, for a variety of cases. The results are shown in Table 7.2.
As in Table 7.1, Table 7.2 provides a short description of the maintenance program
characteristics being treated in each case. Note that since the program practices can vary
from component to component, three descriptions (and related options-based codes) are
provided. For example, in the baseline case used to represent the current JAF program, it
is assumed that the procedures for the valves are of good quality, but the procedure for the
pumps needs improvement.
The best case in Table 7.2 shows a reduction in Qre of over 2 orders of magnitude.
This is primarily due to the greater use of procedures for the pump, the inclusion of second
checks in the procedures, and specific training of the maintenance technicians on the pump
procedures. Post-maintenance testing for the manual valves also contributes significantly.
The worst case shows an increase of nearly 3 orders of magnitude. This case's lack of
procedures, training, second checks, and post-maintenance testing leads to a prediction
that one of the four components considered will probably not be properly restored.
Intermediate cases 1 RE, 3 RE, and 4 RE, which all focus on improving RHR pump
availability, lead to about the same degree of improvement (about a factor of 3); training
specific to the RHR pumps is shown to have the greatest benefit by a slight margin.
7.3 Effects of Maintenance Program Changes on Risk
Maintenance program changes have the potential to affect many PRA parameters
simultaneously. The quantification of risk requires the treatment of cases where all
affected parameters are changed, as the total change in risk may be greater than the sum of
the changes due to separate changes in the parameters.
Table 7.3 describes the cases considered; Table 7.4 presents the impact on RHR
system unavailability (CS mode) and plant risk for each case. Also presented are the
results of the preliminary JAF Individual Plant Examination [6]. These results differ
slightly from the baseline case results of this study due to this study's treatment of
JAF-specific factors that affect common cause failure and human errors, and due to
differences in the common cause failure model used (this study uses the a-factor model; the
JAF study uses the #-factor model).
Even though Q4mdp and Qre are significant contributors to risk, Table 7.4 shows that
the changes in RHR system unavailability are, for the most part, relatively small. This is
believed to be due to the fact that the risk of losing long term decay heat removal is
dominated by scenarios initiated by a loss of offsite power. The RHR system failures
having the maximum contribution in such a situation could very well be different from the
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failures that contribute the most under normal circumstances. This result illustrates a
well-known lesson from PRAs: the dominant contributors to risk can vary tremendously,
depending on the level of consequences being considered [50].
The changes in plant risk for the different cases also tend to be small. (This is not
unexpected, given the results of the scoping calculations performed in Section 4.) In
particular, the potential for risk improvement appears to be quite small. This situation
arises because of another well-known characteristic of PRAs: although Q4mdp and Qre are
significant contributors to risk, they are not the only contributors. As measures are taken
to reduce these dominant risk contributors, other (previously less important) contributors
become visible [50]. The results for the worst case indicate that, if maintenance activities
affecting the RHR pumps are significantly degraded, there can be a significant increase in
risk.
The detailed results in Table 7.4 clearly depend upon the modeling assumptions
employed in Sections 5 and 6, and upon the assumptions made in assessing the baseline
conditions at the JAF plant. It is interesting to note, however, that the results of two
independent studies: a) a study on the effect of improved maintenance on the frequency of
loss of feedwater initiating events [36], and b) a study on the impact of management factors
on core damage frequency [51] indicate risk changes that are comparable in scale to those
shown in Table 7.4. Thus, it appears that Table 7.4 provides a reasonable indication of the
potential improvements/degradations in risk given improvements/degradations in
maintenance program activities.
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Table 7.1 - Common Cause Failure Cases (Page 1 of 2)
Case Definition Q4mdp
Name
Baseline CCF Staggered testing on two loops; use the same staff for both loops. 1.6*10-4
Emphasis on corrective maintenance; some preventive and predictive maintenance.
Maintenance crews trained specifically in RHR procedures.
Procedure quality needs improvement.
Code: (1A, 2A, 8B, 9A)
Best CCF Staggered testing on four trains; use the same staff for all trains. 6.2*10-6
Emphasis on predictive maintenance.
Maintenance crews trained specifically in RHR procedures.
Good procedure quality.
Code: (1B, 2C, 8B, 9B)
Worst CCF Staggered testing on two loops; use the same staff for both loops. 6.1*10-4
Emphasis on corrective maintenance; some preventive and predictive maintenance.
Maintenance crews not trained specifically in RHR procedures.
Procedure quality needs improvement.
Code: (1A, 2A, 8A, 9A)
Case 1 CCF Staggered testing on four trains; use the same staff for all trains. 5.4*10-5
Emphasis on corrective maintenance; some preventive and predictive maintenance.
Maintenance crews trained specifically in RHR procedures.
Procedure quality needs improvement.
Code: (1B, 2A, 8B, 9A)
Case 2 CCF Staggered testing on two loops; use the same staff for both loops. 8.4*10-5
Emphasis on preventive maintenance.
Maintenance crews trained specifically in RHR procedures.
Procedure quality needs improvement.
Code: (1A, 2B, 8B, 9A)
Table 7.1 - Common Cause Failure Cases (Page 2 of 2)
Case Definition Q4mdp
Name
Case 3 CCF Staggered testing on two loops; use the same staff for both loops. 5.8*10-5
Emphasis on predictive maintenance.
Maintenance crews trained specifically in RHR procedures.
Procedure quality needs improvement.
Code: (1A, 2C, 8B, 9A)
Case 4 CCF Staggered testing on two loops; use the same staff for both loops. 4.8*10-5
Emphasis on corrective maintenance; some preventive and predictive maintenance.
Maintenance crews trained specifically in RHR procedures.
Good procedure quality.
Code: (1A, 2A, 8B, 9B)
Table 7.2 - Failure to Restore Model Cases (Page 1 of 3)
Case Definition Qre
Name
Baseline a) Valves 10RHR-250X and 10RHR-28X. 4.0*10-4
RE Good procedures used; training on specific procedures; procedure has 2nd
check; loose scheduling. Code: (1B, 3A, 8B, 9B)
b) Valve 10MOV-13X. 2.0*10-5
Same assumptions as for (a), except that there is no 2nd check, and there
is a flow test. Code: (1B, 3A, 8B, 9A)
c) Pump RHR P3-X. 9.0*10-
Procedures usage: 70%; procedures need improvement; no training on specific
procedures; post-maintenance testing. Code: (1B, 3B, 8A, 9A)
Total: 1.3*10-3
Best RE a) Valves 10RHR-250X and 10RHR-28X. 2.0*10-6
Good procedures are used; operators are trained on procedure; always a
2nd check; post-maintenance testing is performed. Code: (1B, 3B, 8B, 9B)
b) Valve 10MOV-13X. 4.0*10-6
Same as (a). Code: (1B, 3B, 8B, 9B)
c) Pump P3-X. 2.0*10-6
Same as (a). Code: (1B, 3B, 8B, 9B)
Total: 8.0*10-6
Worst RE a) Valves 10RHR-250X and 10RHR-28X. 2.0*10-1
Procedures not used; no recovery factors are applied; no training;
tight scheduling. Code: (1A, 3A, 8A, 9A)
b) Valve 10MOV-13X. 4.0*10-1
Same as (a). Code: (1A, 3A, 8A, 9A)
c) Pump P3-X. 8.0*10-1
Same as (a). Code: (1A, 3A, 8A, 9A)
Totala: 9.0*10-1
aTotal value accounts for cross-product terms.
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Table 7.2 - Failure to Restore Model Cases (Page 2 of 3)
Case Definition Qre
Name
Case 1 RE a) Valves 10RHR-250X and 10RHR-28X. 4.0*10-4
Same as baseline. Code: (1B, 3A, 8B, 9B)
b) Valve 10MOV-13X. 2.0*10-5
Same as baseline. Code: (1B, 3A, 8B, 9A)
c) Pump RHR P3-X. 4.0*10-5
Procedures are used 100% of the time; good quality procedures;
post-maintenance testing is performed. Code: (1B, 3B, 8A, 9B)
Total: 4.6*10-4
Case 2 RE a) Valves 10RHR-250X and 10RHR-28X. 4.0*10-4
Same as baseline. Code: (1B, 3A, 8B, 9B)
b) Valve 10MOV-13X. 2.0*10-5
Same as baseline. Code: (1B, 3A, 8B, 9A)
c) Pump RHR P3-X. 4.4*10-4
Procedures are used 70% of the time; procedures need improvement; maintainers
are trained on procedures; post-maintenance testing. Code: (1B, 3B, 8B, 9A)
Total: 8.6*10-4
Case 3 RE a) Valves 10RHR-250X and 10RHR-28X. 4.0*10-4
Same as baseline. Code: (1B, 3A, 8B, 9B)
b) Valve 10MOV-13X. 2.0*10-5
Same as baseline. Code: (1B, 3A, 8B, 9A)
c) Pump RHR P3-X. 2.0*10-5
Procedures are used 70% of the time; procedures need improvement; maintainers
are trained on pump; post-maintenance testing. Code: (1B, 3B, 8B, 9A)
Total: 4.4*10-4
Table 7.2 - Failure to Restore Model Cases (Page 3 of 3)
Case Definition Qre
Name
Case 4 RE a) Valves 10RHR-250X and 10RHR-28X. 4.0*10-4
Good quality procedures are used; operators are trained on procedures;
procedure has 2nd check. Code: (1B, 3A, 8B, 9B)
b) Valve 10MOV-13X. 2.0*10-6
Same assumptions as for (a); there is a 2nd check, and a flow test.
Code: (1B, 3A, 8B, 9B)
c) Pump RHR P3-X. 6.3*10-5
Procedures are used 70% of the time; procedures need improvement; 2nd check;
post-maintenance testing is performed. Code: (1B, 3B, 8A, 9A)
Total: 4.6*10-4
Case 5 RE a) Valves 10RHR-250X and 10RHR-28X. 4.0*10-6
Good quality procedures are used; operators are trained on procedures;
procedure has 2nd check; post-maintenance testing. Code: (1B, 3B, 8B, 9B)
b) Valve 10MOV-13X. 2.0*10-5
Same assumptions as for (a); no 2nd check, but there is a flow test;
post-maintenance testing is performed. Code: (1B, 3B, 8A, 9B)
c) Pump RHR P3-X. 9.0*10-4
Procedures are used 70% of the time; procedures need improvement; 2nd check;
post-maintenance testing is performed. Code: (1B, 3B, 8A, 9A)
Total: 9.2*10-4
Case 6 RE a) Valves 10RHR-250X and 10RHR-28X. 4.0*10-4
Good quality procedures are used; operators are trained on procedures;
procedure has 2nd check. Code: (1B, 3A, 8B, 9B)
b) Valve 10MOV-13X. 2.0*10-3
Same assumptions as for (a); no 2nd check, but there is a flow test.
Code: (1B, 3A, 8A, 9B)
c) Pump RHR P3-X. 8.8*10-2
Procedures are used 70% of the time; procedures need improvement; 2nd check.
Code: (1B, 3A, 8A, 9A)
Total: 9.0*10-2
Table 7.3 - Definition of Combined Cases (Page 1 of 2)
Case Definition Q4mdp Qre
Name
Baseline Procedures used most of the time; pump procedure needs 1.6*10-4 1.3*10-3
Combined improvement; maintenance crew trained on RHR procedures;
post-maintenance testing; staggered testing on two loops;
emphasis on corrective maintenance.
CCF Code: (1A, 2A, 8B, 9A
RE Code: 1B, 3B, 8B, 9A (Pump)
1B, 3A, 8B, 9B (Valves)
Best Procedures used all of the time; good quality pump 6.2*10-6 8.0*10-6
Combined procedure; maintenance crew trained on RHR procedures;
post-maintenance testing; staggered testing on trains;
emphasis on predictive maintenance.
CCF Code: (B, 2C, 8B, 9B
RE Code: (1B, 3B, 8B, 9B
Worst Tight scheduling; procedures not used; procedures need 6.1*10-4 9.0*10-1
Combined improvement; maintenance crew not trained on RHR procedures;
no post-maintenance testing; staggered testing on two loops;
emphasis on corrective maintenance.
CCF Code: (1A, 2A, 8A, 9A
RE Code: (1A, 3A, 8A, 9A
Case 1 Procedures used most of the time; good quality procedures; 1.6*10-4 4.6*10-4
Combined maintenance crew trained on RHR procedures;
post-maintenance testing; staggered testing on two loops;
emphasis on corrective maintenance.
CCF Code:(1A, 2A, 8B, 9A)
RE Code: (1B, 3A, 8B, 9B)
Table 7.3 - Definition of Combined Cases (Page 2 of 2)
Case Definition Q4mdp Qre
Name
Case 2 Procedures used most of the time; pump procedure needs 5.8*10-5 8.6*10-4
Combined improvement; maintenance crew trained on RHR procedures;
post-maintenance testing; staggered testing on two loops;
emphasis on predictive maintenance.
CCF Code:(1A, 2C, 8B, 9A
RE Code: 1B, 3B, 8B, 9A (Pump)
1B, 3A, 8B, 9B (Valves)
Case 3 Procedures used most of the time; pump procedure needs 8.4*10-5 4.4*10-4
Combined improvement; maintenance crew trained on RHR procedures;
post-maintenance testing; staggered testing on two loops;
emphasis on preventive maintenance.
CCF Code:(1A, 2B, 8B, 9A
RE Code: 1B, 3B, 8B, 9A (Pump)
1B, 3A, 8B, 9B (Valves)
Case 4 Procedures used most of the time; pump procedure needs 5.4*10-5 4.6*10-4
Combined improvement; maintenance crew trained on RHR procedures;
post-maintenance testing; staggered testing on all trains;
emphasis on corrective maintenance.
CCF Code:(1B, 2A, 8B, 9A
RE Code: 1B, 3B, 8A, 9A (Pump)
1B, 3B, 8B, 9B (Valves)
Case 5 Procedures used most of the time; pump procedure needs 1.6*10-4 9.0*10-2
Combined improvement; maintenance crew trained on RHR procedures;
no post-maintenance testing; staggered testing on two loops;
emphasis on corrective maintenance.
CCF Code: (1A, 2A, 8B, 9A
RE Code: 1B, 3A, 8B, 9A (Pump)
1B, 3A, 8B, 9B (Valves)
N.
Table 7.4 - Combined Cases Risk Results
System Ratio to Plant Ratio to
Case Unavailability Baseline Risk Baseline
Qrhr Qrhr F(TW) F(TW)
IPE Result 5.5*10-3 0.98 1.7*10-4 0.85
Baseline 5.6*10 -3 1.0 2.0*10-4 1.0
Best Case 5.4*10 -3 0.96 1*10-4 0.50
Worst Case 1 180 1.2*10-2 60
Case 1 5.6*10-3 1.0 1.9*10-4 0.95
Case 2 5.5*10-3 0.98 1.4*10-4 0.70
Case 3 5.5*10-3 0.98 1.5*10-4 0.75
Case 4 5.5*10-3 0.98 1.3*10-4 0.65
Case 5 5.7*10-3 0.98 1.0*10-3 5.0
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
8.1 Summary of Results
This study quantifies the change in one measure of plant risk, the frequency of loss of
long term decay heat removal, due to changes in maintenance at the James A. Fitzpatrick
(JAF) plant. Quantification is accomplished in two steps. First, the effects of
maintenance are quantified in terms of changes in two key parameters: the frequency of
common cause failure of residual heat removal (RHR) pumps, and the frequency with
which operators fail to correctly restore the RHR system following maintenance. These
parameters are selected as the result of an importance analysis performed using a
preliminary version of the JAF Individual Plant Examination (IPE) [6]. Second, the
changes in these two parameters are propagated through a simplified version of the plant
model to obtain the associated change in plant risk.
Based on this study's assessment of the current maintenance program at JAF, the it
appears that the potential for significant risk reduction due to improved maintenance is not
extremely large; an optimal program might lead to an 50% reduction. The optimal
program would place a stronger emphasis on predictive maintenance, and would employ
improved procedures for RHR pump maintenance. There is potential for significant risk
increase (around a factor of 60) if the maintenance program is significantly degraded (e.g.,
if post-maintenance testing is deemphasized).
This study shows how, at a simple level, maintenance program changes can be
quantified without explicit modeling of the details of a plant's management and
organizational structure (e.g., the work request process). However, such modeling may be
required: a) to more strongly justify the quantitative factors used in the analysis, and b) to
quantify the effect of other program changes not yet treated (e.g., the strengthening of
program elements ensuring feedback of information to organization).
8.2 Issues and Limitations
The analysis results clearly depend upon underlying assumptions regarding the
modeling scope and data employed. These assumptions place some limitations on the
conclusions that can be drawn regarding the risk impact of maintenance program changes.
There are two potential issues regarding modeling scope. First, this study employs
two parameters, the demand unavailability of RHR pumps due to common cause (Q4mdp)
and the unavailability of an RHR train due to restoration failures following maintenance
(Qre), to quantify the effect of maintenance program changes on plant risk. These
parameters are significant contributors to plant risk, and the maintenance program changes
considered are directed specifically at the RHR system. Nevertheless, by neglecting the
risk impacts associated with other parameters, the overall change due to certain
maintenance program changes can be underestimated.
Consider, for example, the dominant minimal cutsets shown in Table 4.3. These
generally involve single failure events for each system. Thus, Q4mdp and Qre are not
multiplied together when quantifying the sequence likelihood. In turn, this means that the
model does not address any nonlinear impacts of maintenance, reducing the importance of
a given program change. The approach used in this study clearly can be extended to treat
other systems and even some initiating events (e.g., the loss of feedwater event is treated in
Ref. 36), thereby dealing with the nonlinear impact of maintenance on plant risk.
However, such a treatment was judged to be beyond the scope of this study.
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Regarding data, Section 7.4 points out that that the quantitative results of this study
dearly depend upon the submodels for common cause failure and human error developed in
Sections 5 and 6, respectively. In particular, the common cause failure analysis relies upon
root cause and coupling mechanism modification factors obtained from Ref. 42 (see
Tables 5.9-5.12 and 5.14-5.17), and the human error analysis relies upon THERP
modification factors obtained from Ref. 10 (see Tables 6.1-6.3). The quantitative
estimates provided in these references are based upon the experience of the authors, but do
not necessarily reflect the specific conditions at JAF. Additional data gathering and
analysis are required to provide a stronger basis for these estimates. Additional
data/estimates are also needed to address root causes/maintenance defense and coupling
mechanism/maintenance defense combinations not included in this report (see Tables 5.8
and 5.13).
The analysis also employs a number of judgments (based on the results of interviews
with plant personnel) concerning the JAF maintenance program. These judgments are
used to select the appropriate failure/error rate modifiers from the above-mentioned tables.
These judgments clearly need to be reviewed before making an evaluation of the JAF
maintenance program, and of the need to change any elements in that program.
Note that Section 7.4 points out that the results of two independent studies related
to the plant service and maintenance indicate risk changes that are comparable in scale to
those shown in this study'. This provides additional confidence that, despite the modeling
and data limitations, this report provides a reasonable indication of potential
improvements/degradations in risk given improvements/degradations in maintenance
program activities.
8.3 Applications
The analytical techniques developed in this study can be applied to assess the impact
of maintenance changes on common cause failures and maintenance-related human errors.
Thus, they can be used to help design a maintenance program optimized from the
standpoint of safety and cost. For example, one of the questions asked by the model is if
the operators are trained on the maintenance procedures specific to a given system (or part
of a system). Assuming that such a level of training cannot be accomplished and
maintained for all equipment in the plant, the model provides a method to prioritize
training.
It is important to recognize that this study does attempt to quantify all possible
modifications to a maintenance program. The models provided in this study should be
used in concert with currently available models (e.g., those dealing with the actual
scheduling of maintenance activities [1,15]) when developing an optimized program. For
example, this study suggests that increased preventive maintenance should help reduce the
likelihood of failures. On the other hand, increased preventive maintenance is likely to lead
to increased component downtimes due to maintenance. Program optimization thererfore
requires a treatment of the trade-offs between these competing effects.
tThe first study uses digraph modeling techniques and failure data collected from Japanese
power plants in an analysis of the frequency of loss of main feedwater, and of the impact of
improved service and maintenance on this frequency [36]. The second study uses
plant-specific data and PRA models to scope the level of impact that management and
organizational factors can have on risk [51].
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8.4 Future Work
The models used in this study are relatively straightforward. Improved models, such
as a simulation model for maintenance crew performance [31] or a physical model for a
component [52] could improve decision making concerning program changes. However, it is
believed that there are two fundamental areas where work needs to be done to assure that
maintenance program changes can be quantified.
The first, and most obvious, area concerns data. As mentioned earlier, this study
relies upon values for sensitivity parameters obtained from other studies. The quantitative
basis for many of these parameters is not clear. Actual data concerning, for example, the
change in human error rates when operators are trained on a specific piece of equipment,
could be very useful in enhancing the credibility, as well as accuracy, of the results.
Because failure events are relatively rare, some work must also be done on modeling the
failure process. This will allow the use of partial failures /component degradations as
supplements for the data base. The work reported in Ref. 29 provides major advances in
this direction.
The second area concerns a number of maintenance program activities not treated in
this work, e.g., Block 6 in Figure 2.1 (Communication). In order to model the impact that
changes in these blocks will have on risk, the particular workings of the organization must
be analyzed (e.g., to determine the causal chain linking a change in policy with a change in
actual organizational learning and, eventually, a change in basic event failure rates). Work
has been initiated on the problem of management and organizational influences on risk
(e.g., [13,51]), but the results are not yet ready for quantitative application.
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APPENDIX A
Table A.1 - RSW System Component Ranking
COMPONENT & FAILURE MODES DATA
2 Discharge valves -4 CC
4 Pumps -+ FS
Nov 89A Control Circuit -- NO
89B Control Circuit - NO
MOV 89A -- CC
89B - CC
Switchgear 1OA-S48A - DN
1OA-S48B -> DN
Manual valve 24B - PG
valve 11B -- PG
Pump P-1A -- FR
Pump P-1C -- MA
3.8E- 5
7.6E- 6
4.4E 6
1
2
3
7.4E- 7 4
5.5E- 7
1. 6E- 7
5
6
Table A.2 - ESW System Component Ranking
COMPONENT & FAILURE MODES DATA RANKING
Loop B -- MA 2.8E-6 1
MDP 46-2A - FR
46-2B -- FR 2.2E-6 2
Loop A -- MA 1.9E-6 3
Manual valve 3A - RE
valve 3B -- RE 5.7E-7 4
RANKING
Table A.3 - AC4 System Component Ranking
COMPONENT & FAILURE MODES DATA RANKING
Circuit Breaker 10640 -- DN
10550 - DN 1.5E-6
Relay 86A-1HOEB01 path - NO
86A-1HOEB03 path - NO 8.8E-7 2
Relay Bus10600 -+ MC
Bus10500 - MC 5.7E-7 3
Relay 86A-1HOEA01 path - NO 1.9E-8 4
Table A.4 - DC1 System Component Ranking
COMPONENT & FAILURE MODES DATA RANKING
Panel 10500 - ST
10600 -- ST
71DC-A4 -- ST
BCB-2A - ST 1.3E-7 1
Panel BCB-2B -- ST 1.7E-8 2
DC fuse -- NO 9.8E-8 3
Table A.5 - HPCI System Component Ranking
COMPONENT & FAILURE MODES DATA RANKING
System - MA 2.9E-7 1
Turbine Driven Pump - FS 4.8E-8 2
Turbine Driven Pump -- FR 4.2E-8 3
Steam Supply/exhaust path - DN 1.7E-8 4
Table A.6 - TBC System Component Ranking
COMPONENT & FAILURE MODES DATA RANKING
Control Circuit for Pump 37P-2A - NO
37P-2B - NO 1.OE-9 1
Pump 37P-2B - MA 8.8E-10 2
Pump 37P-2B - RE 2.1E-10 3
For other systems, each only has one ranking inside itself.
Table A.7 - Pumps Group Component Ranking
COMPONENT & FAILURE MODES DATA RANKING
LPCI 4 Pumps - FS 2.8E-5 1
LPCI Pump 3A -- RE 2.2E-5 2
LPCI Pump 3D -- RE 2.1E-5 3
RSW 4 Pumps - FS 7.6E-6 4
ESW Pump 2A -- FR
Pump 2B -- FR 2.2E-6 5
RSW Pump 1A -- FR
Pump 1C -+ MA 1.6E- 7 6
HPCI TDP -+ FS 4.8E-8 7
HPCI TDP -- FR 4.2E-8 8
TBC Pump 37P-2B -- MA 8.8E-10 9
TBC Pump 37P-2B -+ RE 2.1E-10 10
Table A.8 - Valves Group Component Ranking
COMPONENT & FAILURE MODES DATA
RSV 2 Discharge Valves -- CC 3.8E-5
LPCI Check Valve 42B -- CO
42C - CO 2.9E-6
LPCI Check Valve 42A -- CC
42D -+ CC 1.1E-6
RSV MOV 89A -- > CC
89B - CC 7.4E- 7
ESV Manual Valve 3A -- > RE
3B - RE 5.7E-7
LPCI MOV 12B -- > PG
MOV 65B - PG
MOV 3A - PG
MOV 65A -- PG
MOV 12A - PG 2.OE-7
RSV Manual Valve 24B -- > PG
Manual Valve 11B - PG
LPCI Check Valve 45D -- PG
Manual Valve 151A -- PG 1.6E-7
LPCI MOV 16A -- CC
MOV 16B -- CC 1.3E-8
RANKING
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Table A.9 - CONTROL CIRCUITS GROUP COMPONENT RANKING
COMPONENT & FAILURE MODES DATA RANKING
RSW MOV 89A Control Circuit --+ NO
89B Control Circuit - NO 4.4E-6 1
LPCI RP-3A Control Circuit -- NO 2.3E-6 2
AC4 Circuit Breaker 10640 -- DN
10550 -- DN 1.5E-6 3
LPCI RP-3D Control Circuit -- NO 2.3E-7 4
TBC P37-2A Control Circuit -- > NO
P37-2B Control Circuit -- NO 1.0E-9 5
Table A.10 - Trains Group Component Ranking
COMPONENT & FAILURE MODES DATA RANKING
ESW Loop B -- MA 2.8E-6 1
ESW Loop B -- MA 1.9E-6 2
HPCI Whole system -- MA 2.9E-7 3
HPCI Steam Supply Path -- DN 1.7E-8 4
Table A.11 - Relay Group Component Ranking
COMPONENT & FAILURE MODES DATA RANKING
AC4 86A-1HOEB01 -- NO
86A-1HOEB03 - NO 8.8E-7 1
LPCI 10A-K19A Path -- CO 6.9E-7 2
LPCI 10A-K22B Path -- OC 5.9E-7 3
AC4 Bus 10500 -- MC
10600 - MC 5.7E-7 4
AC4 86A-1HOEA01 -- NO 1.9E-8 5
LPCI 1OA-K48A Path -- NO 4.5E-9 6
LPCI 1OA-K48B Path - NO 4.2E-9 7
Table A.12 - Switchgears Group Component Ranking
COMPONENT & FAILURE MODES DATA RANKING
RSW 1OA-S48B Path - DN
1OA-S48A Path - DN
SPC 10A-S17A Path - DN 5.5E-7 1
LPCI 10-S3D Path - DN 1.2E-10 2
Table A.13 - Buses Group Ranking
COMPONENT & FAILURE MODES DATA RANKING
DC1 BCB-2A -- ST
10500 Panel - ST
10600 Panel -- ST
71DC-A4 Divsion - ST 1.3E-7 1
DC1 BCB-3B - ST 1.7E-8 2
Remaining components each have a single ranking.
